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Abstract
Re-capturing the Self: Narratives of Self and Captivity by Women Political Prisoners in 
Germany 1915-1991
This project represents one of the few major pieces of research into women’s narratives 
of political incarceration and is an examination of first person accounts written against a 
backdrop of significant historical events in twentieth-century Germany. I explore the 
ways in which the writers use their published accounts as an attempt to come to terms 
with their incarceration (either during or after their imprisonment). Such an undertaking 
involves examining how the writer ‘performs’ femininity within the de-feminising 
context of prison, as well as how she negotiates her self-representation as a ‘good’ 
woman. The role of language as a means of empowerment within the disempowering 
environment of incarceration is central to this investigation. Rosa Luxemburg’s prison 
letters are the starting point for the project. Luxemburg was a key female political figure 
in twentieth-century Germany and her letters encapsulate prevalent notions about 
womanhood, prison, and political engagement that are perceptible in the subsequent texts 
of the thesis. Luise Rinser’s and Lore Wolf’s diaries from National Socialist prisons 
show, in their different ways, how the writer uses language to ‘survive’ prison and to 
constitute herself as a subject and woman in response to the loss of self experienced in 
incarceration. Margret Bechler’s and Elisabeth Graul’s retrospective accounts of GDR 
incarceration give insight into the elastic concept of both the political prisoner and the 
‘good’ woman. They demonstrate their authors’ endeavours to achieve a sense of 
autonomy and reclaim the experience of prison using narrative. All of the narratives are 
examples of the role of language in resisting an imposed identity as ‘prisoner’, ‘criminal’ 
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Introduction: ‘Die Absicht des schreibenden Gefangenen ist 
die Bewahrung seiner Identität.’1
The prison and twentieth-century German Studies
In the scholarly analysis of German-language narratives of incarceration during the 
twentieth century, attention is most often given to those accounts which detail the 
maltreatment and mass annihilation of individuals in concentration camps during the 
Third Reich. The vast amount of autobiographical writing in the public realm attests to a 
need by those involved in the atrocities to represent their experiences. But the 
‘traditional’ prison both during the Third Reich and in the years following its demise has 
been overlooked in scholarly research. The historian Nikolaus Wachsmann, in his 
examination of prisons in Nazi Germany, reveals that up until 1942 there were more 
inmates in prisons than there were in concentration camps,2 a statistic that is not reflected 
in the number of published accounts from Nazi prisons. The field of Third Reich 
incarceration testimony may be dominated by accounts from extermination camps –
Vernichtungslager –, such as Auschwitz, but other less extreme categories of camp 
existed too (such as the Arbeitslager, Aussenlager, Konzentrationslager, 
Durchgangslager). Ruth Klüger writes of a general reluctance to differentiate between 
the different types of internment: ‘The death camps seem easier to comprehend if we put 
them all into the basket of one vast generalization, which the term death camp implies, 
but in the process we mythologize or trivialize them’.3 Just as it is important to 
acknowledge different categories of camp, prison – as another form of internment –
                                                
1 Sigrid Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und 
Gattungsgeschichte der Gefängnisliteratur (Marburg/Lahn: Guttandin und Hoppe, 1982), p. 8.
2 Nikolaus Wachsmann, Hitler's Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi Germany (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), pp. 394-5.
3 Ruth Klüger, Landscapes of Memory: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 
p. 77.
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requires attention too. There has been a tendency to view prisons and camps as entirely 
separate institutions – according to Wachsmann, post-1945 prison officials claimed that 
prisons were entirely unconnected to concentration camps.4 But during the Third Reich, 
prisons and camps co-operated institutionally: the writer and political prisoner Luise 
Rinser, if found guilty, was to be relocated from Traunstein prison to a concentration 
camp. This is true for the early GDR too: Margret Bechler was transferred between a 
number of different camps and prisons until those camps that had been kept in operation 
after 1945 were dissolved in 1950.5
Exploring the relationship between the prison and the camp in their various 
manifestations (and prisons come in different forms too – such as the Zuchthaus or 
Untersuchungsgefängnis) is a problematic undertaking: one risks conflating planned 
annihilation with ‘normal’ incarceration. It is nonetheless important to point out the 
similarities between the two institutions, especially since both have historically been sites 
of political oppression. Both are what Erving Goffman would term ‘total institutions’, 
places in which the individual’s life is strictly regimented. Goffman writes that a total 
institution ‘may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number of 
like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, 
together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.’6 Goffman includes a 
number of other institutions such as asylums and hospitals in his study, so it is worth 
being more specific about the parallels between prisons and camps. Although Ruth 
Klüger claims that something good can come out of the prison in the shape of ‘reform’, 
                                                
4  Wachsmann, p. 6. 
5 Gerhard Finn, Die politischen Häftlinge der Sowjetzone, 1945-1958 (Berlin-Nikolassee: Verlag 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 1958), p. 32. 
6 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 11.
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this was not possible in the concentration camp because, according to her, ‘they weren’t 
good for anything’.7 But she later writes that she did ‘learn’ from her experience in 
Auschwitz and changed for the better through it, despite her tendency to represent it as 
wholly bad. She also asserts the need to compare the Holocaust with the world outside it: 
even though it has been perceived as a barbaric anomaly in the context of the post-
Enlightenment Western world, the Holocaust and concentration camps have roots and 
reflections within the ‘civilised’ world.8 In this study, the prison and Auschwitz are not 
conflated: prison writing is singled out as a separate genre in order to be able to 
distinguish it as an appreciable field of study. We must, however, be able to comprehend 
the prison within the historical context of other methods of incarceration such as the 
concentration camp.
Given the predominance of the Holocaust (often represented by ‘Auschwitz’) in 
academic discourse, there has been very little in the way of research into women’s prison 
narratives from the pre-1945 and early GDR period.9 The most notable attempts at 
constructing a framework for reading prison writing in German focus on post-1945 West 
German men’s texts, and do not take gender as a methodological starting point, as I 
intend to.10 International studies of prison writing also tend to focus on men’s literature, 
such as Ioan Davies’ Writers in Prison and H. Bruce Franklin’s Prison Literature in 
                                                
7 Klüger, p. 32. Camps, especially the KZ, tend to represent pure punishment, rather than the reform 
purported by the modern prison system, as elucidated in Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish.
8 Ibid., p. 107 and p. 261. Klüger hereby responds to post-1945 debates concerning the Holocaust, in which 
art was seen as an inappropriate mode of representation after 1945: Theodor Adorno, for example, wrote of 
the Holocaust as a cultural break in history, a return to barbarism that many had prided themselves on 
escaping through the Enlightenment. Theodor W. Adorno, "Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft," in Lyrik nach 
Auschwitz?: Adorno und die Dichter, ed. Petra Kiedaisch (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1995), pp. 27-49. 
9 Apart from a minor study by Uta Klein in 1988 involving Rosa Luxemburg and Luise Rinser: Uta Klein, 
"Texte inhaftierter Frauen," in Gefangenenliteratur: Sprechen, Schreiben, Lesen in deutschen 
Gefängnissen, ed. Uta Klein and Helmut H. Koch (Hagen: R. Padligur, 1988), pp. 124-140.
10 Nicola Keßler, Sigrid Weigel, Uta Klein and Helmut Koch have undertaken research into German prison 
writing.
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America: The Victim as Criminal and Artist. Davies’ account is particularly problematic 
when it comes to the analysis of women’s prison writing because of his declaration that 
‘prison writing is centrally about violence.’11 Such a methodological starting point does 
not, as we will see, apply to women’s texts, and it is questionable whether it is even a 
useful way to set out a study of men’s prison writing. One must look to other disciplines 
such as sociology and criminology as well as to the limited but developing international 
research into women’s prison narratives, in order to gain further knowledge. This may 
involve looking to other political and historical climates and, although I remain aware of 
different cultural and historical contexts in my use of such international research, I feel 
that such studies can still provide valuable insight into the concerns of the incarcerated 
writer in twentieth-century Germany.
Prison, self and narrative
One key theme shared by all incarceration narratives is an articulation of the prison or 
camp’s momentous effect on the prisoner’s or former prisoner’s sense of ‘self’. Goffman 
writes of total institutions as ‘the forcing houses for changing persons; each is a natural 
experiment on what can be done to the self’.12 Looking at prison specifically, its objective 
has been, depending on the penal system in place, to punish inmates and/or reform them 
into obedient citizens (as described in more detail with reference to the East German 
prison in Chapter 4). It may seem contradictory to punish inmates whilst, in some cases, 
attempting to reform them but what remains is an institutional attempt to initiate a change 
in the personality of the prisoner. Those texts which document the experience of prison 
                                                
11 Ioan Davies, Writers in Prison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 16.
12 Goffman, Asylums, p. 22.
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often reveal the ways in which the prison, as the dominant authority, attempts to impose 
this change. 
Prison acts as a seemingly unified method of imposing the moral beliefs and 
objectives of the state upon the prisoner. In prison writing, two oppositional elements 
emerge: the prison and the prisoner. Both forces are in themselves diverse: the prison 
consists of several different layers of authority – from law and policy-makers at the top to 
prison guards near the bottom – which are subject to change. This is seen in the 
possibility of bribing or subverting prison guards or in the ever-changing decrees of the 
state, which alter the criteria that determine illegality. Nor does the category ‘prison 
writer’ represent a homogenous grouping: she/he varies across time, geography, gender, 
class, sexuality and subjective experience. Despite the diversity of the prison/prisoner 
categories, there is still a clear distinction between prisoner and authority. As an 
extension of this divide, there exists a discrepancy between a government’s public 
statements about what confinement is supposed to achieve and the experience of 
incarceration described by the prisoner. Official statements, for various reasons, often do 
not fit with first person accounts of experiences of prison. There are competing 
discourses within the judicial and penal systems, each representing a different version of 
events and grappling for dominance over each other.13 The issue of competing discourses 
within the prison space is given particular attention by Paul Gready in his research into 
                                                
13 A fascinating example of competing discourses within the judicial system is to be found in: Michel 
Foucault, I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and my brother ..: a case of parricide 
in the 19th century. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), in which Foucault presents numerous differing 
and conflicting narratives concerning a young man’s parricide and emphasises the role of various types of 
discourse within the process of judgement-making. 
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prison writing in South Africa. Gready examines the ways in which the prisoner is 
‘rewritten’ by the institution of punishment.14
Prison may be represented as having an impact upon the writer’s sense of self, but 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the rather elusive signifiers ‘self’ and 
‘identity’ have generated much scrutiny across the disciplines. For my purposes, the ‘self’ 
represents an understanding of who ‘I’, or the subject, is in the world. For the purposes of 
this study I shall describe the ways in which the subject represents her ‘self’ rather than 
interrogating the concept of ‘self’ itself. Jerome Bruner refers to ‘our need to tell stories 
in order to elucidate what we mean by “self” ’.15 Bruner proposes that ‘in effect, there is 
no such thing as an intuitively obvious and essential self to know, one that just sits there 
ready to be portrayed in words’; instead, it is through language, or, more specifically, 
narrative, that ‘we constantly construct and reconstruct our selves’.16 Bruner here 
establishes a dependency on narrative for the creation of ‘self’. He has faced opposition 
within the field of philosophy: Galen Strawson argues that narrative scholars, such as 
Bruner and Oliver Sacks place too much weight upon the role of narrative in the 
formation of self.17 The degree to which narrative is responsible for ‘selfhood’ is often 
disputed; indeed it remains an ongoing philosophical debate whether events (the fabula or 
story) precede narrative (the sjuzet or representation of events) or whether it is actually 
the process of narrativisation that creates the events it describes. H. Porter Abbott refers 
to Jonathan Culler’s concept of a ‘double logic’ here that cannot be resolved ‘since at one 
                                                
14 Paul Gready, “Autobiography and the 'Power of Writing': Political Prison Writing in the Apartheid Era,” 
Journal of South African Studies 19, no. 3 (1993), pp. 489-523.
15 Jerome S. Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” in Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life
(Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 63.
16 Ibid., p. 64.
17 Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” Ratio 17, no. 4 (2004), pp. 428-452.
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and the same time story appears to both precede and to come after narrative discourse.’18
This is of particular significance to stories related in the past tense: ‘since the narration 
seems to start at a point after the completion of the story. On the other hand, before the 
narrative discourse is expressed, there is no story’.19 Whatever point of view one adopts, 
it is difficult to ignore the momentous impact that language can have on the creation of 
self, of identity – as Bruner notes with reference to Henry James: ‘adventures happen to 
people who know how to tell about them’.20
Even if it is not the only source, narrative is a vital component in the creation of self, 
particularly for the prison writer. One of the many ‘pains of imprisonment’21 involves 
what could be termed a loss or change of former self. Central to the perception of self is 
how much control the subject has in her life. Pat Carlen writes: ‘Prisons (as institutions) 
are, from the perspective of the prisoners, essentially about loss of control over personal 
space’ and ‘also about loss of control over time’.22 The prison space is a foreign 
environment, especially to those incarcerated for the first time. Regardless of his or her 
choice, the inmate is placed in cramped quarters with others or in an isolated cell with 
limited social contact. Common to many accounts of incarceration is a sense of lack of 
space – be it in a crowded cell or solitary confinement. Combined with these foreign 
living conditions is the regulation of everyday life: food, eating times, clothes and 
activities are decided by the authority rather than the prisoner herself. Forms of 
communication with the outside world too are strictly controlled by the prison, as well as 
                                                
18
H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p. 20.
19 Ibid, p. 20. His emphasis.
20 Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” p. 68.
21 Gresham M. Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1958), Sykes was the first sociologist to use the term ‘pains of imprisonment’.
22 Pat Carlen, Sledgehammer: Women's Imprisonment at the Millennium (Basingstoke: Pan Macmillan, 
1998), p. 83.
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the opportunities for and modes of self-education. In short, the prisoner’s sense of agency
– i.e. how much control or choice she has to act in the world – is greatly inhibited.23 The 
existence of a sense of agency is vital to the process of effective identity construction. 
Christine Korsgaard writes: ‘an action is a movement attributable to an agent as its 
author, and that means that whenever you choose an action – whenever you take control 
of your own movements – you are constituting yourself as the author of that action, and 
so you are deciding who to be.’24 The diminished agency involved in imprisonment has a 
severe impact on the prisoner’s self. Michel Foucault would describe such a prisoner as a 
‘docile body’, upon whom the power of the authority, in this case the prison, is enacted.25
Mary Bosworth writes that much of the criticism directed at Foucault’s seminal 
Discipline and Punish (1979) centred on the lack of agency with which Foucault imbued 
his ‘docile’ prisoners. Foucault depicts his prisoners as completely controlled by the total 
institution and unable to assert themselves.26 For Bosworth ‘[t]he capacity to define 
oneself as an agent is crucial to surviving imprisonment’.27 In the case of most prisoners, 
an assertion of agency, often through resistance to the dominant power, is an essential 
part of their survival. Bosworth and other critics of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish
have asserted that prisoners are not docile, that they can and do assert their agency 
through, in various ways, resisting authority, with differing levels of success. The 
prisoner therefore constitutes herself as a subject through the process of becoming an 
                                                
23 Mary Bosworth, Engendering Resistance: Agency and Power in Women's Prisons (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1999), p. 131. Bosworth describes the prison situation as a negation of individual agency 
because everything is controlled from above.
24 Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. xi. 
25 ‘A body is docile that may be subjected, used transformed and improved.’ Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 136.
26 Bosworth, p.17 – according to Bosworth, Foucault’s prisoners are ‘neither subjects nor agents’.
27 Ibid., p. 127.
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agent, of choosing action, rather than being an object. As we will see, narrative plays a 
pivotal role: it is a means of resistance to prison and in this it becomes a key means 
through which the prisoner creates agency and a sense of self. There are, of course, other 
non-linguistic means of obtaining agency available to the prisoner, such as physical acts 
of resistance to authority (rather than writing thereof) but the focus here is on how she 
uses language to assert who she is in response to incarceration. 
The political prisoner: context and labelling 
All of the writers in this study can be defined as political prisoners, but the term itself has 
differing interpretations. Loosely-speaking, the political prisoner is one who has been 
charged with crimes pertaining to his or her political beliefs or activities. The category 
‘political prisoner’ is most commonly associated with authoritarian governments, who 
persecute those who do not share their ideology. Most often, scholarly analysis of prison 
narratives concentrates on those accounts involving political oppression and/or 
authoritarian governments: South America and South Africa have been prolific sites of 
prison writing and subsequent academic research.28 I concentrate chiefly on accounts 
from National Socialist and East Germany, the exception to which are the prison letters 
of Rosa Luxemburg, who was imprisoned in Wilhelmine Germany, within what is now 
referred to as the Obrigkeitsstaat, a type of authoritarian state adhering to certain 
                                                
28 An international selection of women’s prison writing is given in: Judith Scheffler, ed., Wall Tappings: An 
International Anthology of Women's Prison Writings, 200 to the Present, 2nd ed. (New York: Feminist 
Press at The City University of New York, 2002), although, the anthology does not include any writing 
from East Asia.
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democratic principles.29 The term political prisoner is culturally and historically 
dependent: it is used by those who have a different ideology than the government in 
power, and often refers back to a political system that no longer exists. Latotzky writes of 
those arrested in the early years of the GDR: ‘Der Großteil wurde zu Unrecht verhaftet, 
nach der unglaubwürdigsten Denunziation und aus Gründen, die heute als politische 
Verfolgung gelten’.30 Ideas of who is a political prisoner can alter greatly over time and 
rely heavily on how we view such governments today, on how the audience partakes in 
the process of designation. For instance, one could argue that there is much wider 
knowledge about Third Reich atrocities than there is about the injustices of the GDR. It is 
more common to use the term political prisoner with reference to the Third Reich than 
East Germany, although this is changing as more attempts are made to come to terms 
with the recent past in the form of memorials and publications. 
Political crime has, depending on historical context, encompassed a broad spectrum of 
‘illegal’ activity throughout the twentieth century: in both the Third Reich and the GDR, 
even the smallest subversive activities, such as complaining about the government, were 
punishable by prison-sentencing.31 However, at the other end of the spectrum are 
activities which involve what we still see as serious crimes, such as kidnapping and 
murder for political purposes. They pose a violent threat to the established order and are 
designated ‘terrorism’ in the public discourses of democracies. 
                                                
29 Peter M. R. Stirk, Twentieth-Century German Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2006), p. 219. 
30 Alexander Latotzky, Kindheit hinter Stacheldraht: Mütter mit Kindern in sowjetischen Speziallagern und 
DDR-Haft, (Leipzig: Forum Verlag Leipzig, 2001), p. 9, my emphasis.
31 Gabriele Schnell, Das 'Lindenhotel': Berichte aus dem Potsdamer Geheimdienstgefängnis (Berlin: Links, 
2005), p. 38. Everything which the East German government did not like politically was punishable with 
prison, for example: spreading pamphlets, threatening to strike, oral/verbal criticisms. During the Third 
Reich too, those who, even casually, voiced their disregard for the regime, such as Luise Rinser, faced 
punishment.
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It seems the category political prisoner depends on the ideological and historical 
positioning of the designators. Many prisoners identify themselves as political prisoners, 
such as those in West Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF), as well as members of the 
IRA in Northern Ireland who went to extreme lengths in their attempts to be designated 
political prisoners by the British government. But often this self-designation does not 
match dominant or public discourses which name such prisoners criminals, or terrorists. 
There is a complex crossover between political and criminal identity – the prisoner may 
be described by some audiences or judges as criminal but can identify her/himself as a 
political prisoner and may be described as such by those with a similar ideology. 
Incarceration can incur shame and insecurity, given the domination of the institution 
over its inmates, as well as the stigma attached to being in prison, but political 
imprisonment can be perceived as honourable by both the prisoner and those who share 
his or her goals. In a wide range of discourses, the political prisoner has been described as 
a kind of martyr suffering for the good of humanity. The martyr model connotes agency: 
he/she has chosen to suffer.32 In addition, self-designation as political implies that the 
government is in the wrong and allows the prisoner to justify illegal, sometimes immoral 
actions. In extreme cases the ‘terrorist’ (as designated by public discourses) can identify 
as a political prisoner as justification for extremely violent activity, as the RAF did. The 
flipside to this is the labelling of Rosa Luxemburg as a ‘Terroristin’ by her opponents 
when she is now predominantly viewed as a political prisoner and martyr.33 Again 
definitions depend greatly on the context and beliefs of the designators: what emerges is 
                                                
32 Frances Heidensohn discusses political prisoners as a particularly autonomous group of prisoners in 
Great Britain. Frances Heidensohn, Women and Crime (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 23-27. Margret 
Bechler’s account, discussed in Chapter 3, gives an interesting example of this issue. 
33 Ute Speck, Ein mögliches Ich: Selbstreflexion in der Schreiberfahrung; zur Autobiographik der 
Politikerinnen Lily Braun, Hedwig Dohm und Rosa Luxemburg (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1997), p. 241.
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the idea that designation, naming, or labelling is an empowering process for the speaker, 
just as it can be disempowering for those labelled as criminal or terrorist.
Gender subversion, criminal labelling and punishment 
The main focus of the following chapters is on how the writer’s representation of herself 
as female interacts with her account of herself as prisoner. This gender-oriented analysis 
of the texts employs the post-structuralist philosophy of Judith Butler, as well as the 
earlier philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, both of whom posit gender as a cultural and 
historical construct, rather than a natural consequence of the subject’s biological sex. For 
Butler, femininity and masculinity are unconsciously learned and performed in the belief 
that such performances conform to some sort of ‘true’ biological femaleness or maleness. 
Butler claims that gender is ‘an identity tenuously constituted in time’ – it is constituted 
differently throughout history and, because it is constantly repeated, there is room for 
transgression. Butler states: 
If the ground of gender identity is the stylized repetition of acts through time, and 
not a seemingly seamless identity, then the possibilities of gender transformation 
are to be found in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a 
different sort of repeating, the breaking or subversive repetition of that style.34
Subversion of gender roles is possible, but the subject who transgresses can also face 
disapproval, even punishment from her audience. As Butler emphasises, the repetition of 
gender performances provides the possibility of change and subversion but only within 
the limits of the given society: ‘As a strategy of survival, gender is a performance with 
clearly punitive consequences […] those who fail to do their gender right are regularly 
                                                
34 Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," in Writing on the Body: Female 
Embodiment and Feminist Theory, ed. Katie Conboy et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
p. 402.
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punished.’35 If gender is ‘done’ wrong then punishment can ensue, because such 
transgression can pose a threat to the dominant heterosexual binary.
This issue of gender subversion and punishment is of particular significance to the 
imprisoned woman. Each writer in this study may identify, in one way or another, as a 
‘political prisoner’, but some face labelling as ‘criminal’ both during and after 
imprisonment. One example of the power of labelling and stigma is to be found in an 
exhibition on women’s GDR imprisonment currently taking place in the Stollberg 
Stadtbibliothek in the Erzgebirge region of Germany. A former prisoner and participant 
in the exhibition, ‘Helga R.,’ says of her time after incarceration: ‘Als wir dann in 
Westdeutschland lebten, sagte man uns: ‘Wenn Sie 25 Jahre Zuchthaus hatten, müssen 
Sie wohl etwas verbrochen haben.’ Ich habe es nicht mehr erwähnt.’36 The criminological 
concept of labelling theory (or social reaction theory), popular in the 1960s and 1970s, 
posits that labelling someone a criminal encourages them to commit deviant behaviour. It 
‘focuses on the reaction of other people and the subsequent effects of those reactions 
which create deviance.’37 Labelling theory is a useful concept because it elucidates the 
powerful role of language and of naming in the formation of identity, but it is problematic 
when applied to those who identify as political prisoners, largely because it implies that 
in being labelled as criminal, the writer is propelled towards criminal behaviour. In the 
texts I examine, they are not. My interest in labelling theory lies purely with the effect 
that criminal labelling has upon the author’s self-representation, rather than on whether or 
not they commit ‘crime’. Literary studies provide a more usable, if more nascent, way of 
                                                
35 Ibid., p. 405.
36 Stiftung Sächsischer Gedenkstätten, Politische Haft in Hoheneck (Stollberg Stadtbibliothek Erzgebirge).
37 Overview of Labelling Theories (accessed May 2007) 
http://www.hewett.norfolk.sch.uk/curric/soc/crime/labeling.htm.
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theorising the imprisoned self, distinguishable in Paul Gready’s Foucauldian concept of 
the self ‘rewritten’ as criminal through imprisonment: ‘What Foucault calls the ‘power of 
writing’ plays an essential part in the mechanisms of discipline. Individuals are situated 
in a ‘network of writing’, ‘in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them’.’ 
Gready continues: 
To varying degrees, spanning interrogation, imprisonment and even release, a 
prisoner’s sense of self and world was undermined. Through such mediums as 
statements made during interrogation, legislation, the political trial and prison 
regulations, the prisoner was rigorously and violently rewritten.38
One such method of ‘rewriting’ is labelling as criminal and as prisoner. 
Such labelling is particularly problematic for the female prisoner, given that female 
criminality has historically been theorised as a particularly ‘deviant’ behaviour and an 
unfeminine ‘act’, as Butler would term it. Criminal activity has long been associated with 
men rather than women. The violence which characterises many criminal activities is 
traditionally associated with masculinity, in the stereotypical belief that men are 
physically stronger and more ‘naturally’ aggressive than women. The role of man has 
been typecast as that of perpetrator and active participant, with woman as victim and 
passive target. In this non-aggressive role, woman is seen as less capable of criminality 
than man. The sociologist Marlis Dürkop writes that woman has been and continues to be 
widely perceived as incapable of criminality: ‘Ein Berliner forensischer Psychiater 
äußerte 1974 – auf dieses Problem angesprochen –: ‘Frauen? Die können ja nicht einmal 
kriminell sein’.’39
The framework for examining female crime has, up until the 1970s and the advent of 
feminist criminology, been dominated by the flawed positivist criminology of the 
                                                
38 Gready, p. 492.
39 Marlis Dürkop, Frauen im Gefängnis (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), p. 7.
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nineteenth century. Positivist criminological research proposed that female crime could 
be explained by the criminal’s biology; it sought to establish what it saw as the ‘natural’ 
reasons for female criminality, which were grounded in deeply embedded cultural 
perceptions of woman as mentally and physically inferior to man. The emphasis here was 
on perceiving crime to be a result of the person’s body and inborn nature, rather than 
seeing it as a consequence of social circumstances such as upbringing, background and 
education. The belief that women were mentally deficient and less intellectually, morally 
and physically developed than their male counterparts informed many criminological 
theories, especially those of Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo Ferrero.40 The female 
criminal was often treated as a child, with an inferior and weak mind, unable to take full 
responsibility for her behaviour. This typology of the female criminal corresponds to 
widespread beliefs of woman as victim, who was to be granted a more lenient 
punishment from a chivalric judicial system.41
Frances Heidensohn mentions criminal law’s ‘dual assumptions about women, some 
of which are sometimes lamentably confused: virgin and whore, witch and wife’.42 In line 
with the patriarchal construction of an angel/whore dichotomy, and in order to protect the 
feminine ideal of childish passivity and innocence, the criminal woman was often 
pathologised and represented as more deviant, indeed more dangerous than her male 
counterpart. Research into criminal behaviour in women was preoccupied with the body 
of the female criminal. The woman who fell into the deviant category ‘criminal’ was 
                                                
40 Their most well-known work on the subject was: Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo Ferrero, The Female 
Offender (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895), translated from the original: Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo 
Ferrero, La donna delinquente, la prostituta e la donna normale (Rome: Torino, 1893).
41 Mechthild Rotter, "Die Frau in der Kriminologie," Kriminalsoziologische Bibliografie 6, no. 23/24
(1979), p. 92.
42 Heidensohn, p. 39.
22
represented as sexually abnormal in positivist discourse. It was thought that women 
committed crime as a consequence of their biology as female; that, for example, 
menstruation could, in ‘abnormal’ cases, cause a potentially deadly and murderous 
imbalance in the woman’s mood.43 The cause of hysteria, often given as an explanation 
for female criminality in nineteenth century discourse, was traced back to the woman’s 
supposedly abnormal womb.44 Lombroso and Ferrero claimed that the prostitute, whom 
they saw as the ‘classic’ female criminal, was sexually abnormal as well as being the 
female equivalent of the male offender: ‘Die Prostitution ist nur die weibliche 
Erscheinungsform der Kriminalität.’45 Thus the female criminal was theorised as an 
example of the female body – and by extension the woman’s status as female and 
feminine – gone wrong. To the nineteenth-century criminologist, the female criminal 
showed non-feminine, indeed masculine characteristics. 
Feminist theory has provided insight into positivist explanations of women and crime. 
Many feminists theorise a patriarchal norm of woman as always already deviant, Other, 
purely on the basis of being female, as opposed to man’s norm.46 If crime is a masculine 
domain, then the female criminal not only performs an illegal act, she also subverts a 
gender role, transgressing her gender boundary and becoming ‘doubly deviant.’47 In 
mainstream culture there is a strong sense that female criminality is much worse than that 
                                                
43 Alfred Springer, "Kriminalanthropologie und Kriminalitätspsychopathologie des weiblichen 
Geschlechts," Kriminalsoziologische Bibliographie 6, no. 23/24 (1979), p. 71. 
44 Springer, p. 74.
45 Ibid., p. 69. Sander Gilman also writes of scientific observations made by Lombroso’s former student 
Pauline Tarnowsky in her nineteenth-century study into prostitutes which claimed that: ‘as the prostitute
ages, she begins to appear more and more mannish.’ Sander Gilman, "Black Bodies, White Bodies: Toward 
an Iconography of Female Sexuality in Late Nineteenth-Century Art, Medicine and Literature," in 'Race', 
Culture and Difference, ed. James Donald and Ali Rattansi (London: Sage Publications in association with 
Open University, 1992), pp. 186-7.
46 As declared by Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (London: Cape, 1953), p. 53. 
Translated from the original French: Simone de Beauvoir, Le Deuxieme Sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949).
47 Carlen, p. 88.
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of men. Whereas male criminality ties in with acceptable stereotypes of men as masculine 
and violent, the female criminal (if not treated as childlike and non-culpable) becomes 
‘male’ and, in losing her femininity, even inhuman. Judith Butler has written that gender 
identity is needed in order to ‘be’ in the world; she discusses the widespread belief that 
when there is a loss of femininity there is the possibility of a much more extensive loss of 
who the woman is as a person. These ‘defeminising’ (as I term it) positivist 
criminological theses were highly influential and fed into more widespread cultural 
discourse; they re-appear, for example, in Frank Wedekind’s Lulu plays, in which the 
protagonist, Lulu, is represented as a dehumanised and psychologically damaged monster 
in her sexually dominant actions.
As Butler has stated, the transgressing of gender roles can entail punishment within 
society. But the women in this study have already been punished by imprisonment 
(although their punishment is not ostensibly based on their gender subversion). Differing 
types of ‘punishment’ emerge here: there is the judicial, which depends largely on the 
type of government in place and the historical period. Then there is the more abstract type 
of societal punishment, exemplified most clearly by the ways in which ‘transgression’ is 
dealt with in the public discourses of the media. This depends once again on era, but also 
on who is doing the judging. The concept of audience is important here: within the 
societal response to female crime there is more stigma attached to the ‘double deviance’ 
of female criminality than to male criminal activity: the stigmatised individual ‘is 
disqualified from full social acceptance’ in having broken a gender and judicial law.48
                                                
48 Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1990), p. 9.
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But the woman who identifies as a political prisoner faces less stigmatisation than the 
‘criminal’ prisoner. The political woman can appear transgressive given the connotations 
of power associated with the term ‘political’. However, the term is open to varying 
interpretations, which locate it within a less stigmatising context: there can be honour and 
self-sacrifice associated with political imprisonment. 
One particularly significant implication that accompanies the term ‘political prisoner’ 
is associated with class. Contemporary criminology theorises crime as a working-class 
phenomenon but the political prisoner is more often associated with those from a well-
educated, middle-class background. In the prison space, she is often a separate type of 
prisoner from many of those around her. In the public sphere in which her text appears, 
however, middle-class values have been taken as the norm:49 she who shows that she 
conforms to middle-class conventions faces less stigma than her ‘criminal’ counterpart. 
Audience, performance and agency in the text
The creation of narrative and the performance of gender identity are heavily affected by 
the writer’s awareness of her real or imagined audience. Bruner writes that although 
much of the self may be constituted from ‘inside’ – by one’s memory, feeling and 
subjectivity, ‘much of self-making is from outside in – based on the apparent esteem of 
others and on the myriad expectations that we pick up from the culture in which we are 
immersed’.50 The writer (un)consciously writes with an awareness of what those who 
                                                
49 Eileen Yeo writes of Jürgen Habermas’ theories about the “the emergence of a middle-class public 
sphere of literary culture and political association, first in eighteenth-century Britain and later elsewhere in 
Europe.” Eileen Yeo, Radical Femininity: Women's Self-representation in the Public Sphere (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 3.
50 Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” p. 65.
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read and judge her actions may expect. This includes writing a suitable gender identity in 
order to avoid punishment or rejection by the audience. The writer has a certain view of 
herself that she wishes to convey to her audience, but this must merge with what she 
thinks others want to read. There is a negotiation between how the writer sees herself and 
how others should see her. There is an effort on the part of the writer to negotiate as 
‘ideal’ an identity as possible. This involves, consciously or not, using rhetorical tools in 
order to meet the expectations of the readership. In the field of life-writing one of the 
most important factors in being accepted lies in self-representation as an ‘honest’ subject 
who shows the reader her true self through her autobiographical writing.51 This issue of 
identifying who the ‘real’ writer is raises questions of truth within the sphere of women’s 
prison writing. First person accounts from or about prison function as a type of evidence 
– the writer’s truth – presented to the reader in order to explain the writer’s incarceration. 
Gready has pointed out that ‘little attempt has been made to unravel the ‘truth’ equation 
and identify ways in which prison writing should be read.’52 Throughout this thesis I 
investigate the fraught concept of ‘truth’ and ‘integrity’ in women’s prison writing in an 
attempt to suggest the ways in which such writing could, in the context of twentieth-
century Germany, be read.
In focussing on self-representations I am aware that the writer is constructing an 
identity for a particular audience but am less concerned about how their texts were 
actually received. Rosa Luxemburg, given her status as a much discussed political icon, is 
an exception to this, indeed her letters seem to encapsulate prevalent notions about the 
ideal female political prisoner which are also visible in the texts discussed in subsequent 
                                                
51 Martina Wagner-Egelhaaf, Autobiographie (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000), pp. 3-4.
52 Gready, p. 491.
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chapters. There is little critical material available on the other texts in this study, 
including reviews at the time of publication. I concentrate on the writer’s voice rather 
than anyone else’s: on how she represents herself in relation to the world around her. This 
involves being aware of how the writer imagines her audience, rather than the audience 
response itself. Interestingly, with the exception of Luxemburg, all the writers in this 
study create a kind of dialogue with themselves in the subsequent editions of their 
accounts.
If the writer negotiates with her audience then this has an impact on her level of 
agency. Bruner writes of the ‘self-making narrative’ as a balancing act which
must, on the one hand, create a conviction of autonomy, that one has a will of one’s 
own, a certain freedom of choice, a degree of possibility. But it must also relate the 
self to a world of others – to friends and family, to institutions, to the past, to 
reference groups.53
There exists a negotiation in all narratives between autonomy and commitment to others, 
indeed the two are interdependent (one needs others to constitute the self and vice versa). 
Bruner sees commitment to others as agency-robbing, but I perceive it as part of a whole 
process of agency-creation: all that is written is there to serve the approval of an audience 
and in this way to constitute, or repair, the self. Through the rhetorical function of 
language, the writer has power over her audience as well as being judged or partly 
constituted by them. 
Language is a powerful force in the creation of self as well as in the creation of 
agency. As the ‘political prisoner’ category indicates, designation can be empowering: 
the rhetorical nature of language gives the writer power over her audience. But criminal 
labelling (combined with imprisonment) proves destabilising: the writer/subject is partly 
                                                
53 Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” p. 78.
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constituted by her audience or labellers. It is through writing that the author has a way of 
becoming an agent. In her examination of prison writing, Sigrid Weigel writes: 
‘Gefängnisliteratur konstituiert sich durch die Doppelrolle des Autors als Schreibsubjekt 
und als Objekt der Bestrafungsinstanz und –methoden’.54 Leigh Gilmore takes this one 
step further, although not in specific relation to prison writing. Her research analyses 
‘how women use self-representation and its constitutive possibilities for agency and 
subjectivity to become no longer primarily subject to exchange but subjects who 
exchange the position of object for the subjectivity of self-representational agency.’55 For 
Gilmore, writing allows the woman to reposition herself as a subject rather than an 
object, where Weigel sees a crossover in the two positions within prison writing. Perhaps 
the situation of imprisonment means that the subject has no other option but to partly 
submit and adapt to the total (objectivising) institution in order to survive. Peter Paul 
Zahl’s concept of ‘Unterleben’ is a useful way of visualising both the objectification of 
the prisoner as well as the methods by which they retrieve autonomy. Zahl’s term 
‘Unterleben’56 is partly a submission to prison and partly ‘eine tätige Auseinandersetzung 
mit der Haft, eine Überlebensstrategie im Gefängnis’.57 Through interchanging 
adaptation and resistance, the prisoner is able to survive the experience without losing too 
much of her former ‘self’. In many ways, this correlates with the function of prison 
writing: adaptation to the situation of incarceration and to the readership, but empowering 
the self through writing.  
                                                
54 Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und Gattungsgeschichte 
der Gefängnisliteratur, p. 18.
55 Leigh Gilmore, "Autobiographics," in Women, Autobiography, Theory: a Reader, ed. Sidonie Smith and 
Julia Watson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), p. 183.
56 Ralf Schnell, "Schreiben ist ein monologisches Medium": Dialoge mit und über Peter Paul Zahl (Berlin: 
Ästhetik und Kommunikation, 1979), p. 35.
57 Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und Gattungsgeschichte 
der Gefängnisliteratur, p. 18.
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A main theme running through this thesis is that of the writing process as a healing, 
therapeutic act that in some (inestimable) way assists the subject in coming to terms with 
her incarceration.58 Narrative ‘repair work’, as it is termed in sociological studies is, of 
course, not limited to dealing with the experience of prison.59 With reference to prison 
writing itself, Nicola Keßler’s research concentrates on the ways in which subjectivity is 
articulated during and after imprisonment in order to help the prisoner cope during the 
‘crisis point’ of prison and thereafter. Keßler’s research is extensive and, at times, works 
with ideas of identity performance through the illocutionary act of writing.60 She touches 
on J.L. Austin’s theory of the illocutionary act or speech act in which: ‘the issuing of the 
utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying 
something.61 Language does not just state, it actually performs a function in the world. 
Although Keßler does discuss this branch of study, there is much scope for taking the 
concept of the speech act further and using it as a methodology for the analysis of the 
primary texts in the following chapters of this thesis. It is through language and, in this 
case, writing, that the prison writer can ‘perform’ and create an identity which suits her 
desired self-image. As Paul Gready puts it, she can ‘rewrite’ and thus recreate her 
identity.62 The illocutionary nature of life-writing serves an important purpose in the 
following chapters, there to right the wrongs done by incarceration. Writing becomes a 
                                                
58 Two primary texts of relevance here are: Sibylle Plogstedt, Im Netz der Gedichte: Gefangen in Prag nach 
1968 (Berlin: Links, 2001), and Birgit Schlicke, Knast-Tagebuch: Erinnerungen einer politischen 
Gefangenen an Stasi-Haft und das Frauenzuchthaus Hoheneck (Wiesbaden: Books on Demand GmbH, 
2001), in which the authors claim to write their accounts as a form of therapy. 
59 Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (Ithaca; London: Cornell University 
Press, 2001).
60 Nicola Keßler, Schreiben, um zu überleben: Studien zur Gefangenenliteratur (Godesberg: Forum Verlag, 
2001), p. 172.
61 John Langshaw Austin, J. O. Urmson, and Marina Sbisà, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 6. 
62 Gready, p. 492. 
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means of ‘survival’ (as Keßler identifies in the title of her book: Schreiben, um zu 
überleben63), a step towards attempting to gain public acceptance in order to combat the 
stigma of imprisonment and, perhaps more significantly, a way of gaining control over a 
situation in which much autonomy over one’s identity has been stripped away.
Self-representation is dependent not only on audience but also on the context in which 
the text is written, and published, as well as the genre in which it appears: all of the texts 
in this thesis may be autobiographical but each chapter deals with a different 
autobiographical sub-genre. Rosa Luxemburg’s letters from prison, written between 1914 
and 1918, provide the basis for a discussion of women’s writing of political 
imprisonment. In Luxemburg’s self-representation she creates differing ‘types’ of 
femininity in her various incarnations of herself and gives insight into the concerns of the 
political writer and woman during the crisis of incarceration. As one of the most 
renowned female political prisoners of the twentieth century, Luxemburg provides an 
interesting starting point for the texts that follow her, contributing to a collective 
‘masterplot’ of the female political prisoner. 64
The prison diary, too, acts as a means of coping during an unsettling experience, 
steadying the writer through allowing her to articulate and therefore confirm her identity 
to herself as an addressee. Luise Rinser’s diary of her incarceration in National Socialist 
Germany points towards key issues in the field of women’s prison writing, largely 
because of Rinser’s construction of a self-representation that relies heavily on the 
‘inferior’ position of the female ‘criminals’ around her. Lore Wolf, too, was imprisoned 
                                                
63 And as Gready points out in his study of the writing of the South African prison writer Breyten 
Breytenbach – the act of writing allows the author to come to terms with his incarceration, Ibid., p. 510. 
64 In his exploration of narrative, H. Porter Abbott refers to ‘masterplots’ as ‘stories that we tell over and 
over in myriad forms and that connect with our deepest values, wishes, and fears.’ Abbott, p. 46 and p. 157.
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by the Gestapo and, although her diary seems to serve the similar purpose of self-
preservation, her construction of her self is quite different from Rinser’s, and 
concentrates instead on using models more commonly associated with politically 
powerful women such as Luxemburg. 
Autobiographies of East German incarceration are the subject of the second half of the 
study: I ask how the writer retrospectively constructs an identity in response to the 
aftermath of the prison experience and to appease her audience. Such an examination 
involves questions of agency, authenticity and constructions of ideal ‘femininity’. 
Chapter Three examines Margret Bechler’s narrative of her eleven years in East German 
confinement, focussing on how she constructs herself as the ‘right’ kind of prisoner and 
woman in the context of her potentially controversial ‘crime.’ In many ways Elisabeth 
Graul’s Die Farce expands the issues raised in Bechler’s narrative; it is a text which 
represents a negotiation between the world of the prison and the world of the imagined 
audience, especially in regard to questions of lost femininity. Central to Graul’s account 
is the representation of her self as an agent and even authority, who through narrative 
tries to take control of her experience.
As discussed above, political crime is historically and politically contingent. 
Furthermore, Judith Butler examines gender as a historically variable identity, subject to 
transgression and change over time.65 It is with this idea of ever-changing perspectives 
about the nature of acceptable identity that the framework for an ‘ideal’ female political 
prisoner is created by the prison writers. Although prison is often described as an 
institution that robs its inmates of identity, it is useful to regard autobiographical 
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narratives of imprisonment as a method of creating identity, or more specifically, prison 
writing as simultaneously identity-giving.
32
Chapter One: ‘Ich bin hier ach! so schwach’: Rosa 
Luxemburg’s prison letters
Introduction
Rosa Luxemburg spent three short terms in prison between 1904 and 1907 and served 
two longer sentences between 1915 and 1918 for her anti-war activities. During this time 
Luxemburg wrote numerous political articles as well as hundreds of letters. Of particular 
interest are her prison letters written during the First World War, from prison in Berlin 
Barnimstrasse in 1915, and from the Festung Wronke in 1917, where she was interned 
under Schutzhaft – a form of administrative custody often used in cases of political 
imprisonment, in which no trial was required.1 Many of these letters were published in 
various smaller publications made available after Luxemburg’s death in 1919 by those 
who were eager publicly to defend her memory after her violent murder.2 Most of the 
correspondence was collated and published in 1982 as her Gesammelte Briefe, the most 
extensive collection of her correspondence available, by the East German publishing 
house Dietz, in what could be read as an attempt on behalf of the East German 
government to market and promote Communism’s most famous female political figure.3
                                                
1 J. P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, Abridged ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 399.
2 Such as: Rosa Luxemburg, Das Menschliche entscheidet: Briefe an Freunde (Munich: List, 1951), Rosa 
Luxemburg and Charlotte Beradt, Rosa Luxemburg im Gefängnis: Briefe und Dokumente aus den Jahren 
1915-1918 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1973), Rosa Luxemburg and Luise Kautsky, Briefe an Karl und 
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Briefe, Annelies Laschitza and Günther Radczun maintain that their edition holds the most ‘original’ of 
Luxemburg’s correspondence. Annelies Laschitza and Günther Radczun, "Einleitung," in Gesammelte 
Briefe, ed. Georg Adler et al. (Berlin: Dietz, 1982), p. 45.
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Of those different sets of letters contained in the Gesammelte Briefe, it was the 
publication of Luxemburg’s prison letters to Sophie Liebknecht (the wife of Karl 
Liebknecht) shortly after Luxemburg’s death in 1919 that attracted particular public 
attention. The letters prompted a wave of sympathy for the woman previously dubbed 
‘blutige Rosa’4 and seen by some bourgeois opponents as an ‘unweibliche Terroristin’.5
It seems the focus of much of the criticism directed at Luxemburg was a result of her 
subversive gender performance – she was vilified because she was a woman operating in 
the male-dominated sphere of politics. But Luxemburg also had a radical political 
vision, one that attracted much criticism from political opponents. Bronner remarks on 
the widespread image of ‘the revolutionary as a dour, sneering, paranoid automaton.’ 6
As a left-wing revolutionary, Luxemburg was exposed to the criticism that she lacked 
warmth and humanity. If the political revolutionary was already seen as transgressive 
and cold, then the female revolutionary, in her doubly transgressive role, was even more 
demonised – for many she was a monstrous anomaly, a ‘Schreckgespenst’.7
But the Luxemburg portrayed in the prison letters to Liebknecht (published by the 
Communist organisation ‘Die Jugendinternationale’) has been described as a kind-
hearted, compassionate woman who loved nature and art.8 The letter that has generated 
the most discussion, written on 24 December 1917, includes Luxemburg’s description of 
her heart-felt sympathy towards a herd of oxen that she saw being maltreated in the 
                                                
4 Charlotte Beradt, "Einleitung," in Rosa Luxemburg im Gefängnis; Briefe und Dokumente aus den Jahren 
1915-1918, ed. Charlotte Beradt (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1973), p. 7. 
5 Ute Speck, Ein mögliches Ich: Selbstreflexion in der Schreiberfahrung; zur Autobiographik der 
Politikerinnen Lily Braun, Hedwig Dohm und Rosa Luxemburg (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 240-1.
6 Stephen Eric Bronner, A Revolutionary For Our Times: Rosa Luxemburg (London: Pluto, 1981), p. 73. 
7 Beradt, p. 7.
8 See for example, Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und 
Gattungsgeschichte der Gefängnisliteratur, pp. 86-7 and Nettl, p. 412.
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courtyard of her prison in Breslau. According to Bronner, this letter ‘caused a scandal 
for her opponents and stimulated a new popular evaluation which exposed Luxemburg’s 
kindness, sensitivity, and humanity.’9 In the various responses to Luxemburg’s prison 
letters, her ‘humane’ character is linked to her interest in the natural world and her 
literary ability.10 In 1920, Karl Kraus gave a public reading of the same letter and 
reproduced it in his Austrian newspaper Die Fackel, describing it as ‘dieses […] 
einzigartige Dokument von Menschlichkeit und Dichtung.’11 Stephen Bronner further 
connects Luxemburg’s concern with the natural world to her poetic writing in prison: 
‘Particularly in prison, her letters assume a lyrical power of poetic proportions as her 
gaze shifts from the infighting with the International [an international socialist 
organisation – KR] to the little world of her confinement: a world of insects, plants, and 
birds.’12 In various responses to Luxemburg’s prison letters lies the implication that her 
poetic side highlights her humane character. One of Luxemburg’s most sycophantic 
biographers, Paul Frölich, emphasises the poetic element in her prison letters: ‘the 
lyrical chords within her were quite powerful. Her letters prove it; many of them are 
pure poetry, particularly those written in prison, when, hungry for the pleasures of life, 
she sought and found them in her memories’.13 It seems Frölich and others who read and 
responded to Luxemburg’s letters interpret the lyrical quality in the writing as a sign of 
                                                
9 Bronner, p. 74. 
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her human qualities, reflecting a wider belief that those lacking in humanity cannot be 
cultured or literary, and vice versa.
The Luxemburg presented to the world after her death was viewed as a better woman 
than the seemingly cold, stern revolutionary figure evoked by her ‘transgressive’ 
political activities. She was represented as compassionate and caring – characteristics 
which are not only humane, but also conventionally feminine, even maternal. Indeed, at 
the same time as Luxemburg’s newfound humanity and poetic ability was under 
discussion, there came an overt campaign to re-feminise her public image through Luise 
Kautsky’s publication of Luxemburg’s letters to her and Karl Kautsky in 1923. Kautsky
claimed of her friend: ‘Wer sich unter Rosa […] ein Mannweib vorstellt, geht 
vollständig fehl, sie war eine echte Frau’14. In the cultural discourse surrounding 
Luxemburg in the years after her death there is an implicit connection between what has 
been described as her love of the natural world, her humanity, her aesthetic character 
and her status as an acceptable woman. This does not necessarily imply that humanity or 
literariness are ‘feminine’, rather it reflects a wide belief that the unfeminine woman, as 
monstrous and inhuman, cannot be compassionate, poetic, or nature-loving. 
Luxemburg’s identity as a woman has been under public scrutiny and subject to 
conflicting discourses – that of the bloodthirsty female radical versus that of the 
sensitive, caring woman. Discourses that defend Luxemburg against those who saw her 
as deviant, and even inhuman, often try to pinpoint who the ‘real’ Luxemburg was in 
their attempts to discuss her as an ideal woman. In the critical reception of Luxemburg’s 
autobiographical writing, there is an assumption that this ‘real’ Luxemburg is feminine 
                                                
14 Speck, p. 241. 
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(with its connotations of humanity, poetry and affinity with the natural world) rather 
than political. Bronner writes: ‘after her death, friends like Henriette Roland-Holst and 
Luise Kautsky sought to show that Rosa Luxemburg was fundamentally an apolitical 
person’.15 For Bronner, Roland-Holst and Kautsky, that Luxemburg was apolitical 
provided more room for her to be perceived as feminine. The representation as aesthete, 
nature-lover and good woman has thus been set in opposition to Luxemburg’s status as a 
political revolutionary.16
Scholars and critics have often described Luxemburg’s letters either to Mathilde 
Jacob, Hans Diefenbach or Sophie Liebknecht as authentic confirmation of her ‘real’ 
self, for various reasons. The letters to Jacob are described as more spontaneous and less 
literary, whereas the Diefenbach letters seemingly expose hidden weaknesses, and the 
Liebknecht ones show her humanity and poetic ability.17 In this claim to have found the 
‘real’ Luxemburg, there lies an assumption that a woman is actually always traditionally 
feminine, even if she masks it with that transgressive public performance as masculine. 
There is a desire not only on the part of her friends but also on the part of her critics to 
believe that Luxemburg is ‘really’ feminine.18
During incarceration, Luxemburg’s communication with the outside world was 
greatly restricted. The prison censors prohibited any writing on political matters, but she 
                                                
15 Bronner, p. 69, my emphasis.
16 See: Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und 
Gattungsgeschichte der Gefängnisliteratur, pp. 86-7 and Klein, p. 131 for discussion of this division 
between the two spheres. 
17 According to: Laschitza and Radczun, p. 4 and p. 42. Günther Radczun, in an earlier publication with 
Evelyn Radczun, indicates that it is those letters to Diefenbach and Liebknecht that reveal her ‘true’ self. 
Radczun and Radczun, p.108. According to Beradt, p. 9, the letters to Jacob are more spontaneous and less 
literary than those to her other addressees. 
18 This is most often exemplified in the ‘body politic’/’body natural’ division created for powerful women 
in order to preserve the ideal of the ‘real’, natural woman as conventionally feminine.
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was able to smuggle out a significant portion of her writing, including her political 
writing for the Spartakusbund, the revolutionary left-wing movement and precursor to 
the German Communist Party (KPD), of which she was a co-founder. Although it is 
known for certain that her political writings were smuggled out and therefore 
uncensored, very little information is available concerning whether or not those personal 
prison letters discussed in this analysis were censored.19 Luxemburg’s political writings 
and her prison letters were her main mode of participation in the intensifying political 
climate. Annelies Laschitza and Günther Radczun give their interpretation of her 
isolated situation: ‘Diese zwangsweise Abgeschiedenheit wurde ihr um so 
unerträglicher, je mehr die Revolution in Europa heranreifte. Der Brief wurde für sie zu 
einem wichtigen Kommunikationsmittel.’20 Writing, even that which was subject to 
censorship, was a vital means of communication for Luxemburg, especially since she 
spent the majority of her custody in solitary confinement. Such confinement entails little 
or no social interaction for extended periods of time, although there are various degrees 
of isolation and Luxemburg, especially when incarcerated in Wronke, had fairly regular 
social contact.21 Nonetheless, she was isolated for most of the time, and writing and 
reading provided a substitute for those more substantial communicative modes found in 
the outside world. It allowed her to sustain relationships that she had established outside, 
to which prison posed a constant disruption. As we will see, maintaining friendships 
                                                
19 According to Annelies Laschitza, who has worked extensively with Luxemburg’s prison documents, it 
is not possible to ascertain which of the letters in this analysis were censored and which were smuggled 
out. This highlights a significant, if challenging area of research still to be carried out on Luxemburg’s 
letters. 
20 Laschitza and Radczun, p. 39. 
21 Frölich, p. 227 and ‘Gespräch mit Mathilde Jacob’ in Rosa Luxemburg, Ich umarme Sie in grosser 
Sehnsucht: Briefe aus dem Gefängnis 1915-1918 (Berlin and Bonn: Dietz, 1980), p. 23 and p. 39. 
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through letter-writing allows Luxemburg the opportunity to preserve a sense of who she 
was before imprisonment. In creating a dialogue she attempts to break through the 
isolation of solitary confinement.
Luxemburg was skilled when it came to both written and spoken composition and it 
is often said that she adapted according to whomever she was addressing. According to 
Charlotte Beradt: ‘Rosa Luxemburg schrieb an jeden Empfänger in einem anderen, ihren 
Beziehungen zu ihm angepaßten Ton.’22 Ute Speck explains of Luxemburg’s letters: 
‘[das Ich] muss sich immer wieder und für jeden und jede, an die es schreibt, neu 
erfinden; es ist für die Ansprüche seiner Adressaten offen’.23 The author made it a 
priority to change her self-representation in order to interact fully with her addressee, 
something that is reflected not just in her prison letters but in most of her personal 
correspondence. Although for reasons of space I do not intend to make a comparison 
between the prison and non-prison letters, it does seem that letter-writing in prison 
requires a particularly intense cooperation and negotiation with the reader, given 
Luxemburg’s disconnection from the outside world.24 In the quest for the ‘real’ 
Luxemburg by those who wrote about her subsequently, we are presented with a 
problem, as we will see in an analysis of her letters: Luxemburg presents a number of 
sometimes conflicting selves, and not all of these can be described as fundamentally 
feminine or apolitical.
                                                
22 Beradt, p. 8. 
23 Speck, p. 211. 
24 Such a comparison of prison and non-prison letters to establish the impact of prison upon Luxemburg’s 
self-representations would be a fascinating area of future research, but would require a full research 
project rather than that to which I am confined in this chapter.
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I propose to focus primarily on Luxemburg’s performance of her gender as a 
response to the isolation and change of identity imposed by incarceration: to examine 
how Luxemburg, unconsciously or otherwise, ‘performs’ femininity (and masculinity) in 
Judith Butler’s sense of the word. For Butler, gender performance enables a certain level 
of flexibility in self-representation as ‘feminine’, but there are restrictions on this, and, if 
it is ‘done’ wrong then it can provoke punishment.25 I shall examine Luxemburg’s 
various constructions of ‘appropriate’ gender roles in a selection of her prison letters, 
paying particular attention to her different uses of the word schwach. Her self-
representation varies according to each correspondent and produces different creations 
of Luxemburg the political prisoner: from the weak, feminine self to the maternal and 
dominant woman to the strong patriarchal leader. It seems her differing self-
representations pertain to the power relations between her and her addressee. I shall 
consider the conflict between Luxemburg’s self-representation as a political and public 
figure, speaking to a wide audience, and her more private self-representation as 
feminine. Of particular import throughout Luxemburg’s letters is the function of self-
expression within the prison context of isolation and self-doubt. I investigate how 
Luxemburg, unconsciously or not, performs gender roles in order to ‘survive’ and 
understand her imprisonment. 
‘Shameful’ weakness and femininity
The belief that weakness is a desirable feminine characteristic has long permeated 
Western culture. The writer and linguist, Joachim Heinrich Campe (1746-1818) 
                                                
25 Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," p. 405. 
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reminded young women that they were created as both physically and emotionally 
weaker than men. According to Campe, woman is supposed to be: ‘schwach, klein, zart, 
empfindlich, furchtsam, kleingeistig,’ unlike the man who is ‘stark, fest, kuhn, 
ausdauernd, groß, hehr und kraftvoll an Leib und Seele.’26 Luxemburg’s correspondence 
with her close friend Hans Diefenbach (1884-1917) provides a particularly interesting 
example of her use of what were clearly still relevant cultural ideas of femininity and 
weakness, through her use of the word ‘schwach’ in relation to herself. Diefenbach was 
a doctor who was also friends with Luxemburg’s colleague Karl Kautsky and his wife 
Luise. He was younger than Luxemburg, an acquaintance of her former lover Kostja 
Zetkin, and it has been alleged that he and Luxemburg were involved in a romantic 
relationship – a claim that is supported by the flirtatious tone of their correspondence.27
Luxemburg sent Diefenbach long, cheerful letters from prison to comfort him during his 
time as a military doctor on the Western Front, where he was later killed in October 
1917.28 In her position as a political leader, Luxemburg seems to occupy an 
intellectually superior role with Diefenbach, as was the case with many of Luxemburg’s 
close friends in Germany. According to Bronner: ‘in the intellectual realm, she was fully 
aware of her superiority. In fact, what was probably most important to Luxemburg in the 
friends that she chose was a lack of pretentiousness, a warmth, and even a certain 
naivety.’29 As is the tendency with many Luxemburg biographers, Bronner assumes 
knowledge of Luxemburg’s feelings, but in this case he does support part of this claim 
                                                
26 Joachim Heinrich Campe, "Väterlicher Rat für meine Tochter," in Ob die Weiber Menschen sind: 
Geschlechterdebatten um 1800, ed. Sigrid Lange (Leipzig: Reclam, 1992), pp. 26-7.
27 Ettinger, p. 211. 
28  Laschitza and Radczun, p. 42. 
29 Bronner, p. 69.
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with evidence from the letters themselves. He informs us that, in her relationship with 
Diefenbach, Luxemburg ‘quite consciously sought to take [him] in hand’, and her letters 
to him demonstrate her wish that he become more intellectually ambitious.30
Luxemburg’s authoritative stance vis-à-vis Diefenbach has a maternal tone, visible in 
her use of pet names such as ‘Hänschen’ and ‘Kindermund’, as well as in her warning to 
him about the heat in a letter from 20 June 1917: ‘Ich bin in großer Sorge, wie Sie diese 
kannibalische Hitze ertragen’.31 Luxemburg's maternal performance situates her within 
what could be termed an 'ideal' feminine role as selfless carer, reinforcing the claim that 
Luxemburg’s real self was feminine. But performance as ‘mother’ is not without 
transgressive undertones. Just as there exist opposing cultural constructions of 
femininity, exemplified in the angel/whore dichotomy, the mother too has been, albeit 
less obviously, constructed in binary terms. In psychoanalysis, the good mother’s evil 
counterpart is the ‘phallic mother’ who, in her supposed state of penis-envy, exerts a 
domineering, masculine presence over the lives of those around her.32 In self-
representation as a mother, there is a fine line between being caring and exerting 
dominance through being overbearing. In her role as mother and intellectual superior, 
Luxemburg may take on a potentially dominant role, but it is one in which, as we will 
see, she attempts to play down any authority by employing acceptable stereotypes of 
femininity, such as weakness. 
                                                
30 Ibid., p. 72.
31 Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Adler, and Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Institut für Marxismus-
Leninismus, Gesammelte Briefe (Berlin: Dietz, 1982), Volume 5, p. 261. Subsequent references to 
Luxemburg’s letters all come from this volume and will be given in the main text.
32 As discussed in E. Ann Kaplan, Motherhood and Representation: The Mother in Popular Culture and 
Melodrama (London: Routledge, 1992), especially chapter 6. 
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In a particularly interesting letter written on 23 June 1917, Luxemburg writes that she 
is weak (‘so schwach bin ich!’ (263)) because she has broken a self-enforced rule which 
prohibits her to write letters. Presumably she has implemented such a rule in order to 
optimise her output of political writing. In this context, the word ‘weak’ invokes 
characteristics such as a lack of self-control and frivolity because she is writing personal 
letters rather than working. Luxemburg shows that she fully understands the gendered 
nature of the word ‘schwach’ and even explains that it is expected of women and can be 
used to please men:
Wenn, wie Sie in Ihrem letzten Brief schrieben, dem starken Geschlecht die 
Frauen am meisten gefallen, wenn sie sich schwach zeigen, dann müßten Sie 
jetzt von mir entzückt sein: Ich bin hier ach! so schwach, mehr, als mir lieb ist 
(263). 
Luxemburg gives an example of her ironic wit in the feigned ‘Ich bin hier ach! so 
schwach’, as if she is consciously performing the role of weak woman. Luxemburg 
parodies a stereotype and seems very aware of the roles that women perform; 
indeed there is a distinct separation of herself from other women and even a disdain 
for weakness and its connotations of femininity. 
An awareness of the behaviour expected of women extends to how Luxemburg 
represents her conduct in the political world. She talks of a mutual hatred between 
herself and the prominent Belgian socialist politician Camille Huysmans (1871-
1968). Luxemburg believes he does not like politically active women (presumably 
because of the threat they seemed to pose in a male-dominated arena). However, 
Huysman’s disdain for Luxemburg disappeared when he was told of what 
Luxemburg describes as her ‘Hilflosigkeit in “irdischen Dingen” ’ (264) such as 
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travelling by train. Luxemburg describes his transformation from unfriendly 
colleague to warm and accommodating gentleman who accompanied her to the train 
station at the end of the day. Luxemburg says: ‘Er hatte mich endlich schwach 
gesehen und war in seinem Element’ (264). In this context, weakness is used to 
convey women’s unpractical and dependent nature.
Luxemburg’s melodramatic exclamation: ‘Ich bin hier ach! so schwach’ is, as 
Elzbieta Ettinger has said, only ‘half in jest’33 and the more serious element 
emerges in her admission: ‘mehr, als mir lieb ist’. There is a distinctly confessional 
tone to this clause, as if Diefenbach is being exposed to Luxemburg’s inner 
feelings, her ‘real’ self. She admits weakness and, despite the overtones of irony 
and parody, Diefenbach is given a brief glimpse of what can be read as her hidden 
weakness, in other words her ‘inner femininity’. At the same time as admitting what 
the reader is to believe is her inner self, Luxemburg shows how such weakness is 
unbecoming to her, implying that she should be strong rather than weak. Indeed, 
she seems to disdain her own weakness and, by extension, a part of her own 
femininity.
Such an apparent admission of weakness is not uncommon in Luxemburg’s 
letters to her close friends, as demonstrated in the correspondence to her secretary 
and most frequent addressee Mathilde Jacob (1873-1942), to whom she writes 
concerning practical matters such as food, visits, and her administrative affairs in 
the outside world. As with Luxemburg’s friends such as Diefenbach and Sophie 
Liebknecht, Jacob was not as intellectually or politically active as Luxemburg and 
                                                
33 Ettinger, p. 212.
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these letters to her, although pleasant and friendly, reflect once again Luxemburg’s 
intellectually dominant position. However, it is important to note that Jacob was 
Luxemburg’s main link to the outside world and Luxemburg depended on her 
greatly.34 Jacob not only ensured that Luxemburg received the right food and 
medication (her health was poor in prison), but played a key role in the smuggling 
of articles for the Spartakusbund. Without her, Luxemburg’s political activity and 
general health would have suffered greatly, which meant that Luxemburg was keen 
to please her. Luxemburg’s letters to Jacob are comprised of instructions; 
Luxemburg is telling Jacob what to do. The way that Luxemburg uses the language 
of weakness is perhaps a means of redressing her letters’ instructive, sometimes 
demanding content. It has also been suggested that Luxemburg’s party colleague 
and former lover, Leo Jogiches, read the Jacob letters and that Luxemburg was 
aware of this third addressee.35 This gives added complexity to Luxemburg’s 
correspondence: she may have felt intellectually superior to Jacob, but this was not 
the case with Jogiches. At the time of a letter to Jacob, dated 23 February 1915, 
Luxemburg had just been arrested and taken to prison in Berlin. There are 
potentially three audience members here: the censors (the letter in question was 
almost certainly official given that Luxemburg had only just been placed in custody 
and would have not yet had any smuggling opportunities), Jacob and Jogiches. 
In this letter, Luxemburg takes a reassuring tone, writing that she is cheerful and 
somewhat amused by her predicament. This stance conveys strength: her ability to 
                                                
34 Beradt states that: ‘Mathilde […] ermöglichte ihr das Dasein im Gefängnis.’ Beradt, p. 9.
35 Ibid, p. 201. Luxemburg refers to Jogiches as ‘Mimis Vormund’ in one letter: Luxemburg, Adler, and 
Marxismus-Leninismus, Gesammelte Briefe, vol. 5, p. 65. 
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cope with a new and isolated environment. Still, she allows herself no heroics and 
seems reluctant to expose any fragility to her reader: 
Damit Sie übrigens keine übertriebene Vorstellung von meinem Heldentum 
bekommen, will ich reumütig erkennen, daß ich in dem Augenblick, wo ich 
zum zweiten Mal an jenem Tag mich aufs Hemd ausziehen und betasten lassen 
mußte, mit knapper Not die Tränen zurückhalten konnte. Natürlich war ich 
innerlich wütend über mich ob solcher Schwachheit und bin es jetzt noch (47).
Luxemburg both reveals her hidden weakness (brought about by the degradation of 
prison) and chastises herself for it. Weakness is represented as shameful, especially 
public displays thereof, such as tears in front of prison officers. Once again, 
Luxemburg shows or performs contempt for a stereotypically feminine 
characteristic. Nonetheless, she continues to highlight her ‘feminine’ concerns when 
describing her surprise at the overwhelming concern she felt for her appearance on 
entering prison: ‘Auch entsetzte mich am ersten Abend nicht etwa die 
Gefängniszelle und mein so plötzliches Ausscheiden aus den Lebenden, sondern –
raten Sie! – die Tatsache, daß ich ohne mein Nachthemd, ohne mir das Haar 
gekämmt zu haben aufs Lager mußte’ (47). Luxemburg writes that this worry takes 
priority over the greater issue of being incarcerated. She emphasises a 
preoccupation with what is widely held as a female concern, demonstrating to Jacob 
and Jogiches that prison has brought out her ‘feminine’ side. She makes it clear 
throughout, however, that this is an unusual experience for her. It is a side of her 
that requires protection, which appeals to the gender roles of both addressees: Jacob 
becomes the maternal protector and Jogiches is the chivalric shielding figure to 
Luxemburg’s childlike feminine vulnerability. 
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Luxemburg’s letters to Jacob also highlight a maternal and caring side to her 
own character, especially in her consistent references to her beloved cat, Mimi. 
Every letter to Jacob ends with wishes sent to both her and Mimi. She writes on 30 
March 1915: ‘Küssen Sie von mir die Mimi auf beide Äuglein, was sie von mir 
gern litt’ (50). Although Luxemburg shows disdain for weak femininity, she seems 
happy to show herself as maternally feminine, with its connotations of strength and 
protectiveness, rather than of weakness or passivity.
Luxemburg’s letters to her colleague Franz Mehring (1846-1919) provide another 
dimension to her performance of weakness. Mehring was a co-founder of the 
Spartakusbund as well as a Marxist theoretician and influential writer. He was older than 
Luxemburg and her way of addressing him reflects that she looks up to him, seeing him 
as a figure of authority. In a letter written 31 August 1915, she mentions the difficulties 
she has concentrating on her work while in prison. Luxemburg positions herself as 
Mehring’s student here, giving reasons for her low output, and expressing a wish to 
explain herself in case, as she puts it, she disappoints his expectations regarding her 
work (72). The power relations between Luxemburg and Mehring may have been 
different from those between her and Diefenbach, but Luxemburg still makes Mehring 
aware of her weaknesses in order, perhaps (as with Diefenbach) to minimise any threat 
she may pose to his sense of masculinity. She writes that he encourages and shames her 
into work when she is on the brink of daydreaming or becoming impatient: ‘Sie kennen 
nur zuwenig meine schändlichen Schwächen’ (70). But in her correspondence with 
Mehring, she does not seem to ‘expose’ hidden weakness, rather she portrays her 
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weakness as a constant element in her character. There is much less of a sense of a 
strong, tough façade disguising her feminine frailty; she is always weak with Mehring.
Despite the differences in the ways that Luxemburg portrays her weakness and 
femininity, she seems to be drawing on it as a way to please her reader: to 
Diefenbach she writes light-heartedly of her: ‘ganz blamable Schwäche, die Ihnen 
schon so viel frohe Augenblicke bereitet hat’ (264). It is this positioning as a weak 
woman that allows Luxemburg to occupy a ‘safe’, inferior status next to her 
addressees, countering any potentially authoritative or transgressive role that she 
may have. It allows Diefenbach, Mehring and Jogiches to inhabit various socially 
comfortable roles as masculine and strong. Luxemburg portrays her weakness in 
various ways according to her addressee, and this reflects the type of relationship 
she has with him/her. It flatters her male addressee’s sense of his own masculinity 
and provides the opportunity for Jacob to occupy the comfortable female role of 
mother, caring and providing for Luxemburg during her incarceration. These letters 
– containing Luxemburg’s performance as weak and feminine – are an important 
means of communication because they allow Luxemburg’s relationships with her 
friends and acquaintances to continue, despite the restrictions placed upon them by 
her imprisonment. The letters thus operate as crucial substitutes for the interaction 
that would normally take place face to face: a context in which voice, tone, body 
language and gesture function as further modes of communication. In the letter, 
however, all communication has to be performed through using words on a page.
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Public strength and masculinity
Luxemburg’s more political and public letters contrast starkly with her private 
correspondence. A ‘political’, ‘strong’ Luxemburg is seen in a letter dated 16 
February 1917 to Mathilde Wurm (1874-1934), wife of Emanuel Wurm (1857-
1920). Mathilde Wurm was a Social Democratic parliamentary representative who 
often wrote on socialism and feminism and had a turbulent political relationship 
with Luxemburg.36 Speck tells us that, due to the political tone of the letter, 
Luxemburg wrote to Wurm ‘mit zumindest einem Blick auf die Aufmerksamkeit 
der betrachtenden Nachwelt.’37 Indeed, as a famous and powerful figure, it is quite 
credible that she would write certain letters in the knowledge that they would later 
be widely read, especially if they involved political dispute. 
Luxemburg had viciously attacked Wurm in a letter dated 28 December 1916 about 
her lack of action to prevent the war: ‘ >Ihr< seid überhaupt eine andere zoologische 
Gattung als ich, und nie war mir Euer griesgrämiges, sauertöpfisches, feiges und halbes 
Wesen so fremd, so verhaßt wie jetzt’ (150). The response from Wurm cannot be found, 
but according to J.P. Nettl, Wurm ‘must have defended herself as stoutly as she knew 
how’ provoking the more diplomatic letter of truce from Luxemburg (16 February 
1917).38 This letter may be less fierce but Luxemburg still maintains her role as a strong 
and authoritative comrade, positioning herself as Wurm’s teacher: ‘Freundin bleibe ich 
Dir gern. Ob ich Dir auch […] Lehrerin bleibe, hängt von Dir ab’ (176). She also uses 
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37 Speck, p. 313. 
38 Nettl, p. 409.
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diminutive names such as ‘Lämmchen ‘ and ‘Mädchen’ (176). In her letters to 
Diefenbach, such monikers are terms of endearment, there to reflect Luxemburg's role as 
a caring woman, as good mother rather than a domineering authority. However, they 
come across as patronising when used in the Wurm letter, connoting dominance over her 
correspondent. 
Luxemburg takes this dominant performance further by describing the masses as ‘feig 
und schwach’, thereby distancing herself from weakness and emphasising her own 
strength (176). This stands in direct contrast to her letter to Diefenbach in which she 
tempered any (maternal) dominance by admitting weakness. As she used femininity to 
connote weakness, so strength becomes a masculine characteristic, demonstrated in her 
comparison of herself to a chivalric figure: ‘Mädchen, ich sitze fest im Sattel, mich hat 
noch keiner in den Sand gestreckt’ (175). This self-representation may conflict with the 
Luxemburg seen in her letters to Diefenbach, Jacob and Mehring, but the two versions 
of Luxemburg do converge in places. Both privilege the masculine/strong over the 
feminine/weak: Luxemburg derides weakness in her letter to Wurm and emphasises her 
own strength – an implicitly masculine characteristic. This echoes her disdain for a 
certain type of weak femininity in her letters to Diefenbach, Mehring and Jacob. In 
showing awareness of the shamefulness of weakness, she implies even in her private 
correspondence that such behaviour is a deviation from her habitual ‘public’ self – that 
self that she presents to Wurm. 
To Luxemburg, as a politician, it was important that she come across as strong, 
dominant and ‘masculine’. When she writes: ‘ich sitze fest im Sattel, mich hat noch 
keiner in den Sand gestreckt’ she follows it by a self-assured remark: ‘auf den, der’s 
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kann, bin ich neugierig’ (175). The reader is to believe that anyone who can destabilise 
her will be met with curiosity rather than fear. Luxemburg’s assertion of her strength is 
particularly persuasive here: language serves to cement Luxemburg’s sense of herself as 
an authoritative figure during a time when her leadership skills have been challenged by 
Wurm. Although it is important to her to perform as weak and feminised with 
Diefenbach, Mehring and Jacob, it is equally vital that she take on this authoritative role 
with Wurm (and whoever else may read this letter) in order to stabilise her public status 
as a political figure.
Negotiating female authority
The letters to Sophie Liebknecht, wife of her colleague Karl, again provide a conflicting 
view of femininity. The letters also give further insight into how Luxemburg constructs 
her identity for a private, female audience, in contrast to the public one seen in the 
Wurm letter. They too deal with the concept of weakness in conjunction with femininity 
and, despite being the letters that initiated her public ‘re-feminisation’, they problematise 
her identity as an ideal woman. Two days after her stern letter to Mathilde Wurm, 
Luxemburg writes to Liebknecht, to whom she regularly composed lengthy letters of 
encouragement and comfort during Karl Liebknecht’s imprisonment. Bronner tells us 
that Sophie Liebknecht was prone to bouts of depression and, as with many of her close 
friends, Luxemburg wrote cheerful letters to her with very little information about any of 
her own worries.39 Liebknecht had studied art history and was therefore in some ways 
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intellectually equal to Luxemburg, but generally she took on a domestic and non-
political role as the young wife of Luxemburg’s colleague.40 In their relationship, 
Luxemburg’s intellectually superior position is reflected in her sometimes 
condescending tone. 
In a letter dated 18 February 1917, Luxemburg writes an in-depth and complimentary 
review of Irene, a female character in John Galsworthy’s The Man of Property – a novel 
that she and Liebknecht had both recently read. Luxemburg places herself and Sophie in 
united opposition to Luxemburg’s socialist colleague Clara Zetkin, an activist for 
women’s emancipation. Zetkin and Luxemburg did not share the same views on the 
women’s movement, indeed Luxemburg distanced herself from it.41 Ettinger tells us that 
Luxemburg was interested in it only in terms of socialism: 
[T]he belief that people should not be divided by sex but united against the 
exploiters shaped her views on women’s emancipation. It was, from her 
point of view, yet another harmful division, comparable to the division by 
class, race, or nationality that split the international proletariat.42
Luxemburg highlights her differing viewpoint from Zetkin in her musings about the 
book to Liebknecht, declaring: ‘Klara schrieb mir begeistert über den >Reichen 
Mann<. Aber wie puritanisch-herb ist ihr Urteil über unsere – Ihre und meine –
Irene’ (180). Here, Luxemburg puts her own and Liebknecht’s views of the 
character Irene on the same level and therefore in the ensuing assessment of Irene, 
Luxemburg represents Liebknecht’s opinion too. In Luxemburg’s review, Irene is 
described as ‘dieses entzückende Geschöpf, das zu schwach ist, um sich mit den 
                                                
40 Radczun and Radczun, p. 110.
41 Speck, p. 291.
42 Ettinger. Introduction. Comrade and Lover, p. xxvii.
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Ellbogen den Weg durch die Welt zu bahnen, und wie eine zertretene Blume am 
Wege liegenbleibt’ (180). Luxemburg seems to enjoy Irene’s weakness 
aesthetically, comparing the character to a flower. Here weakness is attractive, 
delicate and there to be protected. Luxemburg links the concept of aesthetic 
pleasure with ‘feminine’ traits further in her descriptions of the role of beautiful 
women in the world: 
als ob schöne Frauen nicht schon deshalb ein Geschenk des Himmels wären, 
weil sie unsere Augen erfreuen […] Laß uns die zarten Irenen, wenn sie 
auch zu nichts gut sind, als die Erde zu schmücken, wie die Kolibri und die 
Orchideen. Ich bin für Luxus in jeder Gestalt (180).
In writing ‘unsere […] Irene’ (180, cited above), Luxemburg shows that she and 
Liebknecht are both in favour of weak and beautiful women, but she also makes it clear 
that she herself is not such a woman. But for Luxemburg, Liebknecht is – she writes: 
‘Und Sie, Sonitschka, werden sicher diese meine Fürsprache für holde Frauen, deren 
Liebenswürdigkeit ihr ausreichendes Daseinsrecht ist, unterstützen, denn bei Ihnen wird 
es ein Plädoyer pro domo sua sein.’43 When Luxemburg describes an ideal woman, or, 
more specifically, a weak woman as a positive model, she is referring to Liebknecht and 
showing support for her identity as such. It seems she is actually allowing or creating an 
identity for Liebknecht; this functions as a means of encouraging and supporting 
Liebknecht during a distressing time, helping to steady her identity and assure her that it 
is acceptable and attractive to be a ‘weak’ woman. 
Interestingly, the above quotation, in describing Liebknecht as weak, employs the 
attributes of beauty (‘holde’) and kindness (‘Liebenswürdigkeit’) as further 
                                                
43 p. 180: ‘in eigener Sache’ – Liebknecht would be pleading on behalf of herself.
53
characteristics of the beautiful, delicate, weak woman. These descriptions perhaps soften 
Luxemburg’s rather harsh assumption that weak women (such as Liebknecht) are ‘zu 
nichts gut […], als die Erde zu schmücken’ (180). Such a statement may seem offensive 
to the twenty-first century reader, but in the context in which Luxemburg was writing, 
beauty was seen as an important characteristic of good womanhood.44
Luxemburg is not offending Liebknecht here, rather she is demonstrating the 
influence that she exerts over the definition of ‘weakness’ – here it is a positive attribute. 
In all the letters discussed above, she writes of the concept as feminine and infuses it 
with various meanings according to how she wishes to appear to her addressee. For her 
male addressees and Jacob it invokes frivolity, lack of self control, a dependent nature 
and a preoccupation with domestic rather than political matters. For Wurm, it is the 
opposite of Luxemburg herself, given the distance she creates between herself and the 
term.
Meaning is changed according to addressee, context, and to the other words that are 
used in the letter. In his pathbreaking ‘Course in General Linguistics’, Ferdinand de 
Saussure theorised the word, or the ‘sign’, as a combination of a concept (the signified), 
and the ‘sound-image’ (the signifier) that represents that concept. Saussure writes of the 
arbitrary relationship between the signified and signifier – concepts and the sound –
images, or words, that are used to represent them are not naturally related. 45 According 
to Saussure, meaning is created through difference: the meaning of a word is established 
                                                
44 Campe’s succinct interpretation of the ‘proper’ role of men and women is as follows: ‘Er die Eiche, sie 
der Efeu.’ Campe, p. 27. 
45 Ferdinand de Saussure, "Course in General Linguistics," in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. Julie 
Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 79. 
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through its opposition to other words.46 Since meaning is ‘differential’, the meaning of a 
word, such as ‘weak’, or ‘feminine’, can be established by its relation to the words 
around it.47 For post-structuralist Jacques Derrida, meaning is endlessly deferred; it is 
never fixed and prone to change depending on the other signs in the narrative: ‘the 
movement of signs defers the moment of encountering the thing itself’.48 So we might 
see the meaning of schwach (and, indeed, of feminine) as unfixed and dependent upon a 
number of other factors in the narrative. All meaning is created through context and 
difference and this is by no means unique to Luxemburg’s construction of the meaning 
of schwach. Although there are restrictions, the meanings of words such as ‘good’, 
‘bad’, ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ can be altered according to the context in which they 
appear. But what is striking in Luxemburg’s letters is the control she exerts through her 
redefinitions of weakness. In being able to define her friend in such a way, Luxemburg 
exercises a distinct control over her identity, telling her who she is and what her role in 
the world is. A function of the first person account is not only to define the self, then, but 
to classify others too.
Luxemburg’s strong influence and dominance is also seen in her maternal 
performance with Liebknecht. She is determined to care for her and scolds her for not 
writing to her about her distress at visiting her husband in prison: ‘Ich habe ein Anrecht, 
an allem, was Ihnen wehtut, teilzunehmen, und lasse meine Besitzrechte nicht kürzen!’ 
(179). Although her tone is jokingly affectionate, there is something forceful about her 
desire to maintain a nurturing role with Liebknecht while in prison. Again, the letter 
                                                
46 Ibid., p. 82. 
47 Ibid., p. 87.
48 Jacques Derrida, "Différance," in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. Rivkin and Ryan, p. 391. 
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emerges as a distilled, concentrated form of maintaining relationships during absence, 
substituting for other forms of physical communication. Luxemburg cannot be there in 
person to comfort Liebknecht and cannot write as often as she would like to, so her 
sentiments must be condensed within the letter. 
This sense of forcefulness does conjure up the concept of the domineering, ‘phallic’ 
mother too – as discussed in relation to Luxemburg’s letters to Diefenbach. At the same 
time, Luxemburg’s expressions of ardent empathy with Liebknecht’s position evoke a 
more caring maternal performance. She assures Liebknecht that she shares her pain, 
even wishing that she could help by taking on her husband, Karl’s, prison sentence: 
‘Wie gern und freudig würde ich jetzt dort im Luckauer Käfig sitzen, um es Karl 
abzunehmen!’ (179). This seems not only to demonstrate how much Luxemburg cares 
but, more significantly, it conveys her will to make a martyr of herself in order to ease 
Sophie’s (and Karl’s) suffering. That situates her on the ideal side of maternal 
performance. But there is a fine line between ideal and transgressive maternal self-
representation. Speck notes that in comforting Liebknecht by aligning herself with Karl, 
Luxemburg becomes Karl, she becomes male. Of Liebknecht’s response, Speck writes: 
‘Wie sie ihren Mann sah, sieht sie jetzt, beim Lesen, auch ihre Freundin.’49 Luxemburg 
also constructs herself as an almost superhuman protector, prepared to take on terrible 
punishment. In her willingness to sacrifice herself lies an implication that she has 
enough strength to withstand harsh prison conditions. Furthermore, Luxemburg may 
condone weakness in women, but she does not refer to herself as weak (unlike in her 
correspondence with Diefenbach et al). Her self-separation from weak women and 
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Liebknecht is apparent when she states: ‘als ob schöne Frauen nicht schon deshalb ein 
Geschenk des Himmels wären, weil sie unsere Augen erfreuen’ (180). When Luxemburg 
says unsere this time, she does not seem to be referring to herself and Liebknecht, 
because Liebknecht is the object rather than the subject of the gaze. Luxemburg takes on 
the ‘masculine’ role of the observer. She thereby risks defeminising herself. However, 
the archetype of the protective and strong mother serves her well. She has positioned 
herself as a feminised protector-figure: physically and emotionally strong yet nurturing 
and self-sacrificing. Although Luxemburg transgresses gender boundaries, her self-
characterisation as lioness or martyr (probably unconsciously) utilises potent cultural 
myths and seems to be there to shield her from any accusations of gender transgression. 
Prison as a ‘feminising’ space?
In comparing Luxemburg’s letters to Sophie Liebknecht, which are particularly poetic 
and descriptive, with those written to her acquaintances in the worker’s movement, it 
could be argued that there exist ‘two Luxemburgs’: the compassionate, aesthetic nature-
lover and the stern politician. Luxemburg seems to favour one self over the other 
depending on whom she is writing to. For instance, her declared approval for luxury in 
her letter to Liebknecht (‘Ich bin für Luxus in jeder Gestalt’) stands in direct contrast to 
a letter written to Marta Rosenbaum on 6 April 1915. Rosenbaum was a wealthy 
socialist who supported the Spartakusbund financially.50 Given Rosenbaum’s role as 
benefactor, she was clearly someone whom Luxemburg wished to impress. In her letter 
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to Rosenbaum, Luxemburg implies that luxury is only an occasional extravagance for 
her. 
Rosenbaum’s intellectual and political status was closer to Luxemburg’s than that of 
close friends such as Sophie Liebknecht and Hans Diefenbach. In the same letter, 
Luxemburg highlights her own courage, confidence and efficiency whilst in prison, as 
well as expressing a friendly desire to see Rosenbaum again and fondly remembering a 
time when they went walking together. She then goes on to describe a Turner picture 
that touches her deeply. Although she mentions art in this letter, as she does in much of 
her correspondence, Luxemburg is restrained in her enthusiasm for the painting, quickly 
adding: ‘Aber denken Sie ja nicht, daß ich hier bloß ästhetisiere! Das sind nur manches 
Mal so Luxusgaben, die ich mir spende. In der Hauptsache sitze ich beim trockensten 
Zeug und suche >nützlich< zu sein’ (52). In her correspondence with Rosenbaum, 
(which is tinged with irony!) Luxemburg constructs an identity that prioritises political 
work far above the world of art. Here, she counters the aesthetic, luxurious world with 
the rational political world and chooses the latter, sustaining the image of a work-
oriented politician. 
In her correspondence with Liebknecht, not only does Luxemburg demonstrate a 
more enthusiastic approach to aesthetics, but her representation of her commitment 
to political work is much less keen than in her correspondence with her political 
friends, especially when we remember her declaration to Mathilde Wurm: 
‘Mädchen, ich sitze fest im Sattel’ (176, my emphasis). In a letter sent to Sophie 
Liebknecht on 2 May 1917, Luxemburg writes extensively about the birds and 
insects she sees in her garden, as well as of the pleasure that she takes in the 
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sunshine. She even puts her love of nature above her commitment to the party when 
she describes the potential extinction of birds in Germany and berates herself for 
being so affected:  
Aber ich bin ja natürlich krank, daß mich jetzt alles so tief erschüttert. Oder 
wissen Sie? Ich habe manchmal das Gefühl, ich bin gar kein richtiger 
Mensch, sondern auch irgendein Vogel oder ein anderes Tier in mißlungener 
Menschengestalt; innerlich fühle ich mich in so einem Stückchen Garten wie 
hier oder im Feld unter Hummeln und Gras viel mehr in meiner Heimat als 
auf einem Parteitag. Ihnen kann ich ja wohl das alles ruhig sagen: Sie 
werden nicht gleich Verrat am Sozialismus wittern (229, my emphasis).
Even though Luxemburg is happy to die at her post she says: ‘Aber mein innerstes Ich 
gehört mehr meinen Kohlmeisen als den “Genossen” ’ (229). Here Luxemburg reveals 
another ‘hidden’ side to her character in prioritising nature over her allegiance to the 
party.51 This does not fit with how she creates herself for Mathilde Wurm and Marta 
Rosenbaum. But it does correspond to the self-representation she gives Liebknecht, one 
in which the importance of politics pales in comparison with the natural and the 
aesthetic world, just as it seems to for Liebknecht. 
It seems that, for Luxemburg, commitment to art and nature implies a narrowing of 
her political commitment;52 yet a self-representation as nature-loving, artistic and poetic 
dominates her letters. Even in her letters to Wurm and Rosenbaum she takes a 
significant interest in her natural surroundings and recalls music or art, writing 
descriptively, nostalgically and, it could be said, poetically. In a letter to Mathilde Wurm 
                                                
51 She made similar assertions in her letters to Luise and Karl Kautsky too according to Frölich, p. 187 and 
Bronner, p. 69: ‘Again and again, she maintained that she was happier sitting in a garden than at a party 
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52 Such a belief is not unique to an analysis of Rosa Luxemburg’s letters – the lyric subject of Bertolt 
Brecht’s 1939 poem ‘Schlechte Zeit für Lyrik’ speaks of the seemingly inimical relationship between 
aesthetics and politics. ‘In meinem Lied ein Reim/Käme mir fast vor wie Übermut/ In mir streiten sich/Die 
Begeisterung über den blühenden Apfelbaum/Und das Ensetzen über die Reden des Anstreichers [i.e. 
Hitler].’ Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Gedichte, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 744-5.
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from 16 February 1917, she writes: ‘Ich fühle mich in der ganzen Welt zu Hause, wo es 
Wolken und Vögel und Menschentränen gibt’ (177), and discusses a Mörike poem at 
length. So the ‘feminine’, less political Luxemburg is visible in her ‘male’, political 
letters too. Luxemburg’s apparent commitment to these seemingly non-political areas 
situates her within a more conventionally feminine sphere. Statistically speaking, it is 
those ‘feminine’ letters to Diefenbach, Jacob and Liebknecht (as well as those to 
Jogiches and Kostja Zetkin) that dominate the prison sections of her Gesammelte Briefe.
In her prison letters to Diefenbach, Mehring, Jacob and Liebknecht, Luxemburg, 
while she is critical of feminine frailty, in various ways constructs a persona as feminine. 
This is done either through highlighting her weaknesses in order to flatter Mehring’s and 
Diefenbach’s masculinity, or through approving of weakness in her letters to 
Liebknecht, and creating an authoritative identity that allows Liebknecht to be weak in a 
time of crisis. As she flatters the men’s masculinity, so she flatters Liebknecht’s 
femininity. In her maternal performance with Liebknecht, she creates a potentially 
transgressive identity as dominant ‘phallic mother’, and as an onlooker with a‘male’ 
gaze. This transgression may well be counteracted by Luxemburg’s exposure of a hidden 
identity as aesthete and nature-lover rather than politician, which is perhaps why her 
letters to Liebknecht were so immediately popular: they showed the public that she was 
not really a politician ‘inside’, that she was feminine and caring. The letters to 
Diefenbach and Mehring, in which she admits an ‘inner’ femininity and weakness, serve 
to reinforce such an assessment. 
This ‘feminine’ Luxemburg (according to those who wrote in praise of her 
posthumously) may dominate her Gesammelte Briefe as a whole, but it is her prison 
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letters that show her to be particularly ‘feminine’ and non-political. Within the prison 
space, Luxemburg was not allowed to write letters with political content, although she 
did write political pamphlets which she smuggled out. This, combined with the isolation 
and monotony of prison life, meant that she concentrated far more on those natural 
aspects around her: plants, animals, and the surrounding environment (as Lore Wolf 
does in my analysis in Chapter Two). As with many prison writers, Luxemburg relied 
too on memory in her writing, spending large portions of letters writing fondly of and 
recreating past events. Her reading of political texts too would have been restricted, and 
she read (and wrote about) many novels while in prison. According to Nettl, whereas 
Luxemburg’s political writing became repetitive, and her political ideas stale, it was in 
her letters to friends in her two years at Wronke that her literary, non-political talent was 
at its greatest:
Prison life, instead of stifling her, in fact enabled her to reach a spiritual and 
emotional maturity which is remarkable – as are the means which she developed to 
convey the flow of feelings and ideas. For the next two years the political aspect of 
her life was bound to cede primacy to the demands of a bursting personality 
confined in a relatively small space.53
This may be a rather speculative claim to make about Luxemburg’s character but it does 
emphasise something which is indicated by Luxemburg’s letters and the responses to 
them by Luxemburg scholars: that through prison, she is ‘brought back’ to the domestic, 
female space. In her letters to Jacob and Diefenbach, she gives the reader insight into 
prison’s weakening influence upon her: the body searches that make her cry, her concern 
for her appearance, her isolation and loneliness. 
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Conclusion: the public Luxemburg versus the personal function of her 
prison letters
In her letter to Mathilde Wurm however, Luxemburg explained that prison actually 
makes her harder: ‘ich [bin] in der letzten Zeit, wenn ich schon nie weich war, hart 
geworden wie geschliffener Stahl’ (151). This public self-representation conflicts with 
the suggestion that prison brings her back to femininity. The party-focused, rational
politician is at odds with the private, aesthetic, feminised one. But when biographical 
and scholarly discourses claim that the ‘real’ Luxemburg was feminine, there lies therein 
the implicit assumption that the public, political Luxemburg is fake, a deceptive identity, 
a lie. 
There is a scholarly and cultural split in the Rosa Luxemburg myth: the sensitive, 
humane female poet versus the masculinised ruthless politician. What is most interesting 
about some of the academic and biographical responses to Luxemburg is the suggestion 
that she combines these supposed polarities in her legendary and influential status. 
Frölich writes of her as a combination of the positive attributes of each sex: “The great 
talents of her heart and intellect and a flaming will to action united in her to a full-toned 
harmony. Our century will never see her like again.”54 This is reflected in how her 
political theses have been received. According to Georg Lukács ‘she did not divide 
reality into two halves […] Rosa Luxemburg analysed the imperial phase of capitalism 
as a whole, not – as in vulgar Marxism – in its individual aspects, but as a total 
process.’55 Radczun and Radczun apply this ‘whole’ identity to Luxemburg’s time in 
prison. For them, it seems as if: ‘die große Politikerin und Agitatorin begleitet wurde 
                                                
54 Frölich, p. 193.
55 Ibid., p. 307.
62
von einer ‘anderen’, sensiblen Frau’ in Luxemburg’s prison letters.56 But they insist that 
there is no split in Luxemburg’s personality, that both sides are intrinsic parts of her 
character. Indeed, they attempt to piece these ‘polar’ characteristics together under 
Luxemburg’s overarching political (and humane) identity by insisting that her poetic 
nature writing is ultimately political in its symbolism.57 Luise Kautsky does this too in 
writing of Luxemburg’s political but artistic essence: ‘diese Künstlerseele war durch und 
durch politisch. Politisch zu denken, politisch zu handeln war ihr Lebensbedürfnis’.58
For Kautsky and Radczun, Luxemburg is both political and artistic at heart, but if we 
look at Luxemburg’s self-representation in her prison letters, there is the sense that it is 
prison that has created this ‘whole’ Luxemburg by exposing her hidden side. Nettl 
declares that despite Luxemburg’s limited contact with the outside world during 
incarceration: ‘she was determined to live – perhaps more fully than she had ever lived 
before; and her friends were turned into delegates, pressed and moulded to live her life 
for her.’59 Her identity as a legend and martyr is supplemented not just by her violent 
death, but also by these public responses to her prison letters. Cultural discourse has 
created a double-sided identity for Luxemburg, one which requires both masculine and 
feminine attributes in order for her to be accepted as a politically active woman and 
legend  by her audience. The editors of her Gesammelte Briefe claim that it contains 
letters that Luxemburg wrote to those in or connected to the German worker’s 
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movement.60 In publishing only those letters written in correlation with Luxemburg’s 
political career, it seems Laschitza and Radczun do not provide a fully comprehensive 
survey of the letters that Luxemburg wrote during her life. There are no letters to her 
family or those friends not connected to her work, although such documents do exist.61
The Gesammelte Briefe is thus a selection of Luxemburg’s correspondence and one 
which focuses on those relationships connected to her political work and career. 
Although the emphasis has been on Luxemburg as non-political, her legendary status is 
fully reliant on her political relationships and political identity. 
Luxemburg’s prison letters give insight into how she writes of herself as a woman 
amidst these ongoing public discourses. An analysis of her self-representation 
problematises the ‘political’/‘feminine’ binary proposed by some of those who opposed 
or supported her. It is a self-representation that negotiates between those transgressive 
and ideal femininities and one that blurs the boundaries between the cultural 
constructions of femininity and masculinity. 
As with the majority of first person accounts, even when the writer is a talented 
rhetorician, it is important to acknowledge Luxemburg’s self-representation or self-
scripting as weak, strong, feminine or masculine as a valid and valuable expression of 
how she feels about herself when in communication with a particular audience.62 In 
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emphasising her weakness, Luxemburg expresses her emotions and her cultural context, 
actively participating in that culture and highlighting a societal demand that women 
perform a particular type of femininity. Writing is vital for the subject to gain or re-
establish a sense of control over her own life, especially since prison is a situation which 
strips the subject of autonomy and thus alters her sense of self. Luxemburg’s mastery of 
language is an important means of obtaining a sense of agency and control within her 
restricted world. Luxemburg’s words perform what J.L. Austin would describe as an 
‘illocutionary’ function:63 through language, she seeks to create or preserve who she 
wants to be – be it a powerful politician, supportive friend, or weak woman – during this 
time. As Luxemburg writes to Diefenbach, writing refreshes her: ‘Ich fühle mich heute 
so einsam und muß durch Plaudern mit Ihnen ein wenig erfrischen’ (263). Luxemburg’s 
emphasis on her feminine and masculine identity, then, should not be viewed as merely 
a strategy for negotiating with her audience – creating a self to please her reader – but as 
a way of staving off both the de-feminisation and feminisation of prison, preserving that 
sense of self which prison has stripped her of.
A paradigm for the ideal female political prisoner of the twentieth century has been 
inadvertently created: one who negotiates typically masculine traits with feminine ones 
in order to please her audience, and to survive the damaging effects of imprisonment. In 
her recognition of issues related to gender, and her use of language to maintain a sense 
of self and a sense of agency, Luxemburg’s prison letters touch on a number of key 
issues that we will see in the ensuing chapters. Her various self-representations as 
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63 Discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
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woman and politician provide a model for other female prison writers throughout the 
twentieth century. It is, however, important to remember that the narratives of 
Luxemburg biographers and scholars contribute to this model too. Femininity is seen as 
the basis but it is possible for ‘transgressive’ identities to become – in Luxemburg’s case 
an integral – part of the self-representation. 
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Chapter Two: ‘Das Wort schiebt sich gnädig isolierend 
zwischen mich und das nackte Erlebnis der Haft’: narratives of 
survival in two prison diaries 
Introduction: published letters and diaries
Much literary criticism of autobiography calls attention to the difficulty of assigning 
firm definitions and characteristics to the genre and its assorted sub-genres.1 After all, 
the various types of diary and letter serve diverse purposes: from the community journal 
to the private diary, from the letter to the editor to the love letter.2 The private letter or 
diary showcases an apparent spontaneity that has, time and again, been proved dubious. 
Robert Fothergill explains that Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) claimed to write his diary 
every day, but his writings are not ‘the freehand improvisations they were imagined to 
be. Rather they are composed from notes and rough drafts.’3 Pepys, who is often 
discussed by critics as the original European diarist, reporting on significant historical 
events, emerges as a conscious diarist. He may have claimed to write spontaneously, but 
did not write events and thoughts down on the day that they happened; instead he 
retrospectively constructed his text. Something similar can be said for the letter: for 
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Cheryl Cline, both diary writing and letter writing are to be considered as constructions; 
both may seem to have ‘the same qualities of spontaneity, effortlessness and 
‘artlessness’’ but ‘these effects are learned, practised and perfected.’4
Although Cline regards diaries and letters as ‘art’, and Fothergill highlights the 
conscious and constructed nature of some, Rosa Luxemburg, Luise Rinser (1911-2002) 
and Lore Wolf (1900-1996) participate in a tradition of writing which has not enjoyed 
the esteem associated with genres such as drama, prose and poetry. Those letters and 
diaries which are published are in most cases written by venerated writers who have 
already proved their worth in the ‘higher’ literary forms. There is, it is assumed, no 
particular talent or ability associated with the writing (or reading) of a diary or a letter: 
they are everyday activities that many people undertake. Susanne Kord identifies a ‘Das 
kann ja jede’5 element in the perception of the letter, one which pertains to the diary too. 
The issue of audience in the diary and letter expands the issue of the text as a 
construction. Margo Culley explains of the diary, that:
The presence of a sense of audience, in this form of writing as in all others, has a 
crucial influence over what is said and how it is said […] it shapes the selection and 
arrangement of detail within the journal and determines more than anything else the 
kind of self-construction the diarist presents.6
In the prison letters of Rosa Luxemburg, an awareness of her audience shaped the self-
representation of the letter writer; we shall see something similar in the diaries of Rinser 
and Wolf. According to convention the letter is written from one party to another and the 
                                                
4 Both quotations, Cline, p. xxiii.
5 Susanne T. Kord, Sich einen Namen machen: Anonymität und weibliche Autorschaft 1700-1900
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1996), p. 64
6 Margo Culley, "Introduction to A Day at A Time," in Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader, ed. 
Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), p. 218.
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diary is written to the self. But these basic characteristics are contestable, especially in 
prison writing: in a prison situation in which letters are not allowed, the diary can be 
partly used as a letter substitute (as we will see in Lore Wolf’s diary), and the letter is 
open to the extra audience of the censor, as seen in Luxemburg’s correspondence. 
From the nineteenth century onwards, the personal, non-fictional diary became a 
more public document.7 Indeed for the twentieth-century author, diary-writing and 
publication often went hand-in-hand: ‘Gerade zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts 
verstanden mehr und mehr Schriftsteller ihr privates Empfinden als einen Appell an die 
Öffentlichkeit.’8 Luxemburg was aware of an audience beyond her addressee in certain 
letters; for diarists such as Rinser and Wolf, who edited and published their writings 
themselves (unlike Luxemburg whose letters were published posthumously), the sense 
of a wider audience plays an even greater role in the representation of self. Rinser 
compiled her diary from scraps of paper written in shorthand and even added in 
material: into the entry from 6 November 1944 she inserts the account of her arrest and 
entry into prison, as well as two letters at the end. As a published document subject to 
retrospective editing, Wolf’s diary also has a public element to it, despite her lack of 
experience as a writer: it is not unlikely that she inserted or omitted elements in the 
editing stage. The original notes or diaries cannot be seen and so what the authors 
                                                
7 Felicity Nussbaum, "Toward Conceptualizing Diary," in Studies in Autobiography, ed. James Olney 
(New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 131. This is applied specifically to Germany: 
according to Elke Frederiksen, diary-writing was ‘one of the primary forms of expression’ for writers in 
nineteenth-century Germany. It became an increasingly popular form of writing so that by the late 1960s 
and early 1970s: ‘the diary developed into one of the most popular German literary genres for both female 
and male writers.’ Elke Frederiksen, "Luise Rinser's Autobiographical Prose: Political Engagement and 
Feminist Awareness," in Faith of a (Woman) Writer, ed. Alice Kessler-Harris; William McBrien 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1988), p. 168, note 4.
8 Rüdiger Görner, Das Tagebuch: Eine Einführung. (Munich: Artemis, 1986), p. 29.
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‘really’ wrote in prison remains a mystery.9 In this chapter, I shall consider the final 
published accounts as the representations of themselves in the prison context that Rinser 
and Wolf wished to make public. 
Female political prisoners in the Third Reich and the ‘rewriting’ of the self
Political prisoners made up a considerable percentage of those held in National Socialist 
prisons and concentration camps, especially in the pre-war years.10 The ‘political’ was a 
type of prisoner who was set apart from the ‘normal’ prisoner in the Third Reich. The 
relationship between the two was complex and variable, as an analysis of Rinser’s and 
Wolf’s diaries will show. Wachsmann points out that sometimes political prisoners were 
given privileges, but sometimes it was the regular criminals who received better 
treatment.11 He mentions the often tense relationship between prisoners: ‘Political 
prisoners often referred to regular criminal inmates with open hatred, both in 
contemporary and in post-war accounts.’12 What is clear is that political prisoners often 
saw themselves in a superior territory to the normal prisoner. Class and education play a 
key role in the relationship between the political prisoner and her non-political 
counterpart. Judith Scheffler says of the writer Agnes Smedley (1892-1950), who was 
imprisoned for espionage in the U.S.A in 1918: ‘observing the women prisoners, she 
                                                
9 According to Luise Rinser’s son, Christoph Rinser, the original diary has been destroyed as he detailed 
in an email from 2 July 2007: Christoph Rinser, "Re: Rinser Nachlass," ed. Kim Richmond (2007). Lore 
Wolf’s diary remains untraceable due to the demise of the diary’s publishing house. 
10 Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (London: Hill and Wang, 2001), p. 198.
11 Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, p. 125.
12 Ibid, p. 124
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notes that she was separated from them by her more highly developed ability to 
reason.’13
Rinser and Wolf were punished because their so-called political activity went against 
the dictates of National Socialism but the term ‘political prisoner’ itself can have various 
interpretations. The meaning of the term can change over time and according to the 
designator. In the National Socialist regime, for example, the reasons for ‘political’ 
imprisonment could be fairly trivial, such as listening to foreign radio stations or 
expressing anti-Nazi opinions in casual conversation. The punishment for such 
behaviour was particularly harsh because of the threat that activism posed to the volatile 
National Socialist dictatorship. Rinser and Wolf were luckier than many political 
prisoners in that they escaped with their lives. Wolf was particularly fortunate to escape 
a death sentence for her anti-fascist campaigning, since most of her comrades who were 
caught by the Gestapo were executed. Although the term ‘political prisoner’ is open to 
different interpretations, it can carry with it connotations of involvement in the 
traditionally male sphere of politics, indicating that any woman labelled as such has 
engaged in behaviour outwith her assigned gender role. But, especially during the Third 
Reich, little ‘political’ activity was required to earn the label political prisoner. In other 
words, there was less gender transgression connoted by the political prisoner label 
during the Third Reich than we might be tempted to assume. Furthermore, both female 
‘criminal’ and political prisoners were not at all uncommon in Third Reich Germany, 
given the dramatic increase in the rate of imprisonment of women during World War 
                                                
13 Judith Scheffler, "Agnes Smedley's 'Cell-Mates'," in Faith of a (Woman) Writer, ed. Alice Kessler-
Harris and William McBrien (New York; London: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 201.
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Two. Wachsmann explains that during the first half of 1943 ‘some 40% of convicted 
Germans were female.’14 Wolf and Rinser are two amongst thousands of women 
convicted of either ‘crimes’ or political crimes. 
The criminal label, when associated with women, has historically carried with it 
connotations of a specifically sexual deviance: something that is not implied by the 
political label. However, being imprisoned carries with it implications of criminality, 
despite the seeming superiority of being a political prisoner, and can force a stigmatised 
criminal identity on the prisoner. Rinser and Wolf were writing at a time when 
essentialist ideas about female criminality were culturally embedded and had not yet 
been disputed from a feminist viewpoint. Indeed, unlike the progressive and liberal 
Weimar Republic of the 1920s, National Socialism retreated into essentialist gender 
values of the nineteenth century, which said women’s ‘natural’ place was in the home 
and producing children. Emphasis was on the value of the female body in reproduction 
while Goebbels declared the running of National Socialism itself to be an entirely 
masculine affair.15
Within the still-influential sphere of nineteenth-century positivist criminology it was 
claimed that women were mentally deficient and less developed than their male 
counterparts. It was thought that women committed crime as a consequence of their 
biology, for example that menstruation supposedly caused a potentially deadly and 
murderous imbalance in the woman’s mood.16 Female criminality was explained in 
                                                
14 Wachsmann, p. 221.
15 Erin Krumel, Into Silence: Feminism Under the Third Reich (2001, accessed June 2007) 
http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/Kruml.html
16 Springer, p. 71.
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terms of sex and also madness, which, it was claimed, was linked back to the sexually 
deviant female body.17 The female criminal was often seen as either psychologically 
damaged or as a dehumanised monster, (such as the heroine in Frank Wedekind’s Lulu
plays which appeared in Germany at the start of the twentieth century). Imprisonment, 
with its connotations of criminality, invokes stereotypes of the deviant woman and 
imposes a stigmatised identity upon the female prisoner. 
But it is not only through language that an identity as criminal or prisoner is imposed 
upon the subject, it is through her physical positioning within the total institution. That 
she is in prison in the first place imposes a criminal or carceral identity upon her. She is 
not only rewritten, she is also re-located. It is only through examining her use of 
language rather than her physical location that the literature scholar is able to evaluate 
how she deals with imprisonment. Despite this restriction, it is important to remember 
the significant weight that her geographical location in prison will have on her sense of 
self. If the prisoner is ‘rewritten’ by imprisonment and the stigma associated with it, as 
Paul Gready puts it,18 then there is the possibility of resistance in her own rewriting of 
herself. Gready does not refer to the effect that the physical relocation of the prisoner 
into the carceral space can have on his or her sense of self, but it seems that writing can 
contribute to resisting this too. Cline suggests of the female diarist: ‘She is the central 
figure and everyone else – mothers, husbands, children – are secondary characters, 
perceived through her eyes, interpreted through the pages of her book.’19 Although the 
diary may be seen as a non-public, modest, less valuable form of literature, Cline makes 
                                                
17 Ibid, p. 74.
18 Gready, p. 492. As discussed in more detail in the Introduction. 
19 Cline, p. xiii. 
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us aware of the agency that the subject acquires in writing it. The diary writer is 
monologic and at the centre of their text: this can make the diary a particularly 
empowering form of writing. Language becomes a crucial tool for the female prisoner to 
create her life and to resist the effects that incarceration has on her identity. Language, 
however, is not the only tool of representing resistance; it can be enacted through art, 
music, sound and physical movement. The language of the published text serves an 
important function for the text’s author and, more importantly, it is accessible to the 
researcher in the form of written material. I compare the different ways in which Rinser 
and Wolf use language to create versions of their identities, but remain aware that there 
are other non-textual means of self-representation possible to them. 
Although the debates surrounding the definition of autobiography continue to have 
relevance, it seems more pertinent to ask not so much what autobiography is but what it 
‘does’, or more specifically, what the writer is doing (unconsciously or otherwise) when 
she writes of her life experience. In Autobiographical Acts, Elizabeth Bruss posed this 
question in her analysis of four autobiographical texts, using J.L. Austin’s theory of the 
illocutionary act or speech act. In focussing on the illocutionary, it is possible to see 
speech, and by extension autobiography, not just as a statement but as an action.20 Bruss 
questions what kind of action an autobiographical text performs, what the intentions 
behind it were, as well as the different ways in which those intentions are enacted, 
showing the various ways in which: ‘the communicative unit not only states but 
                                                
20 See: Austin, Urmson, and Sbisà, in which Austin explains: ‘the issuing of the utterance is the 
performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something,’ p. 6.
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performs’.21 I shall now examine the autobiographical acts of two female political 
prisoners in their construction of diaries as a response to incarceration. 
Luise Rinser’s Gefängnistagebuch
Soon after publishing her first novel in 1941, Luise Rinser was prohibited by the Nazis 
from writing. In October 1944 she was arrested by the Gestapo for expressing anti-Nazi 
views and taken to Traunstein women’s prison in Bavaria. There she awaited sentencing 
for high treason. Shortly after arriving in prison, Rinser found a pencil and paper hidden 
under a floorboard in her prison cell and soon started writing her diary secretly in 
abbreviated form on whatever scraps of paper she could find. In writing clandestinely, 
Rinser risked punishment, even death, if discovered, but also avoided any official 
censorship, unlike Luxemburg. The end of the war brought her freedom from prison and 
possibly saved her from a death sentence.
Rinser’s diary was among the first post-1945 publications in West Germany to 
document experiences during the Third Reich, and has met with continuing popular 
acclaim.22 It has also been taught in schools across Germany and is currently in its 
twenty-third printing. The prison diary has a significant place within Rinser’s life’s 
work. She had published her first book, a well-received novel called Die gläsernen 
                                                
21 Abbott, "Autobiography, Autography, Fiction: Groundwork for a Taxonomy of Textual Categories," 
p.600 and Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts: The Changing Situation of a Literary Genre
(Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), especially the introduction. 
22 Sigrid Weigel, "Luise Rinser," in Luise Rinser, Materialien zu Leben und Werk, ed. Hans-Rüdiger 
Schwab (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 1986), p. 142. The diary was also published in the 
GDR in 1967.
75
Ringe, in 1941.23 The Gefängnistagebuch was her second major publication. In the 
decades thereafter she published more than thirty major texts and was awarded 
numerous literature prizes.24 Much of Rinser’s fiction contains autobiographical 
elements and she published a number of diaries and autobiographies throughout her life. 
The experience of writing and releasing the prison diary seems to have had a significant 
influence on her subsequent life: Rinser writes in the foreword to the first edition of her 
prison diary: ‘Für mich wurde der Aufenthalt im Gefängnis zur Wende meines Lebens’ 
(14). 
Rinser constructs her diary as the point from which much of her subsequent work and 
life was shaped. Despite this, as well as its continuing popularity, surprisingly little in-
depth scholarly engagement with the diary has been undertaken, perhaps because of an 
academic focus on accounts of Third Reich concentration camps rather than prisons. 
Analysis focuses instead on Rinser’s other work, especially novels such as Mitte des 
Lebens (1950) and Mirjam (1983) and any criticism of her autobiographical work is 
confined to that written in the decades after her release from prison, most notably her 
later diary Baustelle (1970).25 The few critical responses to Rinser’s prison diary tend 
towards the descriptive and concentrate on the text’s supposedly factual, realistic 
depictions of prison life in 1940s Germany – a common tendency in the criticism of 
                                                
23 Stephanie Grollman, Das Bild des "Anderen" in den Tagebüchern und Reiseberichten Luise Rinsers
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000), p. 10.
24 Ibid., p. 13.
25 See Hans-Rüdiger Schwab, Luise Rinser, Materialien zu Leben und Werk (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Taschenbuch, 1986), and Albert August Scholz, Luise Rinsers Leben und Werk: Eine Einführung
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Peerless Press, 1968), for an indication of which Rinser texts are the focus of academic 
attention.
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much non-literary autobiographical writing.26 Rinser herself testifies to the diary’s 
authenticity in her foreword to the first edition: ‘Was hier berichtet wird, ist Tatsache, 
nicht Literatur’ (13).27 Such a concern with the factual correlates with the 
Dokumentarliteratur or dokumentarische Literatur movement, already popular in the 
Weimar Republic of the 1920s, but reaching its peak in West Germany during the 1960s. 
Its literature was created for political purposes and made from ‘real-life’ documents; it 
was most commonly seen in works of drama (Peter Weiss’ Die Ermittlung (1964) being 
one of the better known works) and claimed to be closer to the ‘truth’ than fictional 
literature.28 The trend for Dokumentarliteratur reflects widespread beliefs in a distinct 
split between the factual and the aesthetic. Rinser makes it clear that she is on the side of 
the objective and factual in her diary: the majority of the text is taken up with describing 
the people (mostly women, including the guards) and the grim conditions of the prison. 
Rinser writes that she is obsessed with others’ stories and makes repeated reference to 
her thirst for knowledge of other people: ‘Da meine Neugierde, Menschen und 
Schicksale kennenzulernen, unüberwindlich ist, gelang es mir, in aller Kürze aus 
heimlich geflüsterten Sätzen eine Menge zu erfahren’ (30). Instead of being a creative 
writer, Rinser represents herself as a reporter, who will risk anything in order to 
document real prison conditions.
                                                
26 Elke Frederiksen, "Luise Rinser," in Neue Literatur der Frauen: Deutschsprachige Autorinnen der 
Gegenwart, ed. Heinz Puknus (Munich: Beck, 1980), and Albert Scholz’s work and are two prime 
examples. 
27 This emphasis on the factual is not unusual in the field of prison writing, as Nicola Keßler explores in 
relation to the prison narratives of post-1945 West German prison writers Ernst S. Steffen and Günter 
Wallraff: Keßler, p. 474. 
28 Heinz Ludwig Arnold and Stephan Reinhardt, Dokumentarliteratur (Munich: Edition Text und Kritik, 
1973), p. 8. 
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It is problematic to view first-person accounts as ‘factual’ or objective, and an 
exploration of the text’s subjectivity prevents the assumption that they are the one ‘real’ 
account of the events they describe. Sidonie Smith states that autobiographical telling is 
not ‘a ‘self-expressive’ act’ because there is not one essential inner self being expressed, 
as some autobiographical theory assumes.29 This is in-keeping with what Smith 
describes as the third generation of autobiographical criticism, which incorporates 
structuralist and postructuralist theory. The second generation of criticism assumed a 
belief in ‘the referentiality of language and […] in the authenticity of the self.’30 But the 
third challenges these assumptions: identity does not exist outside language, multiple 
identities are possible and one single truth is not: ‘The autobiographical text becomes a 
narrative artifice, privileging a presence, or identity, that does not exist outside 
language.’31 In this theoretical field, no one narrative represents the ultimate truth, just 
as no one self-representation can be said to ultimately represent the self, since the self is, 
in its very nature, unfixed and subject to change. Instead of one truth, one identity, there 
are different truths representing differing subjectivities. 
Rather than being ‘factual’ (as she claims), Rinser’s diary is a particularly subjective 
account, as the few more careful scholarly references to the issues it presents show. For 
example, Sigrid Weigel makes brief reference to the superior attitude that Rinser takes 
towards others in some of her autobiographical literature, including the 
                                                
29 Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader (Madison, Wisconsin: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), p. 108.
30 Sidonie Smith, A Poetics of Women's Autobiography: Marginality and the Fictions of Self-
Representation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 5.
31 Ibid., p. 5.
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Gefängnistagebuch.32 This, although a valid point (as will be shown later), by no means 
represents an extensive engagement with Rinser’s diary. However, it does suggest that, 
far from reporting ‘factually’, Rinser injects a distinct level of subjectivity into her text. I 
aim to explore the subjectivity inherent in Rinser’s reportage of events, others’ stories 
and her own place within the prison, looking at the ways in which she selects what she 
wishes to say about others and herself. Rinser may not be at the centre of her diary in 
terms of the descriptions she provides of prison life, but whatever is written, even if 
Rinser does not mention herself, helps create the self that she presents to the reader. 
It is important to consider the self-referential function of Rinser’s text, in other 
words, to examine her autobiographical act. Rinser herself points out that diary-writing 
protects her from the starkness of the prison experience: ‘Das Wort schiebt sich gnädig 
isolierend zwischen mich und das nackte Erlebnis der Haft.’33 The diary serves a 
cathartic, comforting purpose, as does documenting (and hearing) other prisoners’ 
stories. Further comfort and strength comes from being a writer: the thought of writing 
her experiences down in a fictional form is a survival technique that puts her outwith and 
above the situation that she describes: 
Manchmal tröstet mich nichts als der Gedanke, daß ich all diese Erlebnisse eines 
Tages, falls ich diesem Verfahren entrinnen sollte, als Roman oder Erzählung 
gestalten werde […] aber das Geheimnis dieses Trostes liegt darin, daß es nicht nur 
mein dahinschwindendes Selbstbewußtsein stärkt, sondern auch mich schon jetzt, 
während des Erlebens stellt, so daß ich nicht mehr nur leide, sondern bereits, 
halbwegs über dem Leiden stehend, es gestalte (63, my italics).
                                                
32 Weigel, "Luise Rinser," p. 148. Also see Manfred Jurgensen, Das fiktionale Ich: Untersuchungen zum 
Tagebuch (Bern: Francke, 1979), pp. 266-268.
33 Luise Rinser, Gefängnistagebuch, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 2002), p. 17. 
Subsequent references will be given in the main text.
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The diary allows her to bring her observations and judgements of others into existence. 
At one point, Rinser questions whether three and a half years in prison will do anything 
to help a cell-mate who has been convicted of infanticide, then she adds: ‘Ich möchte 
kein Richter sein’ (39). Despite what Rinser would have the reader believe, she does 
judge: her diary allows her to be the superior watcher. For example, her fellow prisoner, 
Lotte, starts criticising National Socialism and Rinser decides whether Lotte’s line of 
reasoning is valid: ‘Ihre Argumente waren nicht immer stichhaltig.’ (68) Rinser’s diary 
is rife with authorial and didactic statements about the world and human nature. When 
she hears the story about her cell-mate’s imprisonment for infanticide she declares: ‘Der 
Mensch ist zu wilden, dunklen Handlungen fähig’ (39) – this refers not only to some of 
her fellow prisoners but to the guards of the National Socialist regime. Rinser creates 
herself as an authority through the act of diary-writing and, later, in her location as a 
political prisoner; I shall argue that she gains a level of control over her situation in 
being able to create a satisfactory version of herself within the diary. 
The dehumanisation and defeminisation of imprisonment
Wachsmann writes of the changes implemented in the penal system during the National 
Socialist era: ‘the instruction to prison officials in the 1923 guidelines to treat inmates in 
a ‘humane’ manner was replaced in the 1934 regulations with the demand that 
imprisonment had to be a ‘painful evil’.’34 Rinser’s diary demonstrates the 
dehumanisation and degradation imposed on the prisoner. One of many examples 
                                                
34 Wachsmann, p. 81.
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documents how they are left in extremely cold conditions after a communal shower: 
‘Offenbar hält man es für unmöglich, daß Gefangene ebenso unter der Kälte leiden 
können wie Freie. Wir scheinen eine niedriger entwickelte Art von Menschen zu sein’ 
(100). In Rinser’s depictions, the prisoner is not worthy of the respect shown to ‘real’ 
people, exemplified further in the humiliation she describes on arrival when she is 
forced to strip and deprived of most of her possessions (61). Alongside the 
dehumanisation of imprisonment, Rinser mentions the effect that it has on her perception 
of herself as a woman. When her husband ‘K’ (the writer Klaus Hermann) comes to 
visit, Rinser writes: ‘K war entsetzt über mein Aussehen, vor allem über die vielen 
grauen Haare, die ich bekommen habe […] an seinen kummervollen Blicken merkte ich, 
daß er mich häßlich fand’ (130). Particularly because she is a woman (and in line with 
expected notions of how women should look), Rinser feels shame at her deteriorating 
appearance: for her, an aspect of her femininity is lost because of her incarceration.35
Rinser mentions that she is referred to as a criminal on numerous occasions during 
her incarceration. She describes an incident in which she and her fellow prisoners are led 
through a busy street on their way to work – a woman on the street declares: ‘Ach was. 
Zuchthäusler sind’s, Diebinnen halt oder so was.’ (147) Name-calling from members of 
the public has a great effect on Rinser: an old man wearing a National Socialist badge 
sees her and some other prisoners when they are on their way to work and hurls abuse at 
them. Rinser reports shouting out defensively: ‘Es laufen eine Menge Leute in Freiheit 
                                                
35 Rinser’s marriage to K was a fake one in order to prevent him from being arrested for being a 
homosexual, so this point is rather problematic, although I believe it still stands as a valid remark about 
her femininity.
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herum, die mit mehr Grund im Gefängnis sitzen müßten als wir’ (85). Rinser’s account 
of her angry, defensive reaction shows that her experience in prison threatens her sense 
of self, especially when people call her a criminal in a public setting. Within the prison 
itself, prisoners are insulted by the guards using sexual terms of abuse: one calls them 
‘schlampige Weibsbilder.’(100) As mentioned above, early criminologists proposed a 
link between female criminality and active female sexuality, with prostitution discussed 
as the female manifestation of criminality.36 Given this influential cultural discourse, 
imprisonment carries with it labelling as criminal and deviantly sexual. It is the task of 
Rinser’s diary to counteract such accusations to herself and a wide audience and to 
represent herself as a non-criminal, ‘good’ woman. Although I focus on issues of 
gender, Rinser’s diary also functions as a means of proving to herself and to her 
readership that she is a human being worthy of respect. Rinser shouts back at the old 
man who shouts abuse at her: ‘Wir sind Menschen wie andere. Sie wissen nicht, weshalb 
wir im Gefängnis sitzen’ (85).
Non-ideal prisoners
Rinser’s extensive descriptions of her fellow prisoners often invoke negative stereotypes 
of femininity, including that of the prattling, gossipy woman: ‘Die anderen schwatzen’ 
(44). Rinser’s fellow prisoners (and guards) are also described as stupid – in her 
description of Resi’s involvement with a young man and her subsequent arrest, Rinser 
writes: ‘der junge Mann war Deserteur und hatte obendrein sich und Resi von 
                                                
36 Springer, p. 71.
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Lebensmitteldiebstählen ernährt. Resi behauptet, sie habe nichts gewußt von allem. Es 
ist ihrer Dummheit zuzutrauen’ (45). Rinser’s Gefängnistagebuch presents numerous 
references to her fellow prisoners’ sex lives. Resi’s ‘Dummheit’ (45) is presented 
alongside details of her two illegitimate children and the possibility that she may be 
pregnant again. Rinser clearly disapproves of their sexual conduct. Of Mariechen, she 
says ‘aber sie ist, was ihr erotisches Leben betrifft, ein leichtes Tuch’ (55). In fact, 
Rinser aligns criminal behaviour with deviant sexuality, drawing striking parallels with 
the ‘findings’ of much early criminology. She accusingly and judgementally describes 
Susi as ‘schlicht und einfach eine Diebin. Außerdem ist sie mannstoll’ (77). Susi’s desire 
for men is, for Rinser, yet another deviance on a par with stealing. 
Not only does Rinser represent her fellow prisoners as highly sexualised, she claims 
that they are in need of psychiatric treatment instead of penal sentencing: ‘Viele Delikte 
sind in einem Zustand begangen worden, der den Psychiater mehr angeht als den 
Richter.’ (53) Rinser’s view here correlates, to some extent, with later theories of the 
modern judicial system (of the 1960s and 70s) in which, according to Gelfland, there 
was a ‘change in emphasis from the physiological to the psychological’ (61). Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish details how punishment changed from the physical 
torture of the pre-industrial era into modernity’s notions of psychological rehabilitation 
in the punishment of both men and women. Rinser’s descriptions draw more parallels 
with the theories of early criminologists, who claimed that women’s crime and hysteria 
were closely connected, because female criminality was so often linked to a woman’s 
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body and to her apparently inferior, weak mind.37 Rinser invokes gender stereotypes in 
her descriptions of her fellow prisoners: ‘Lotte tut mir unendlich leid. Sie ist hysterisch, 
unberechenbar, streitsüchtig…’ (49). Lotte was arrested for fraudulent activities and 
Rinser implies that a secret but significant mental trauma led her to such criminal 
behaviour. Rinser’s description of Mariechen – arrested for having an affair with a 
French man (whilst married to a violent, unfaithful SS officer) and having a subsequent 
abortion – blends a description as hysterical with a high sexual drive, as the positivist 
criminologists Lombroso and Ferrero did: ‘Sie weinte und lachte abwechselnd, scheint 
ein wenig hysterisch und ist offenbar mannstoll’ (55).
The ideal female political prisoner 
In resisting the criminal label imposed upon her by imprisonment, Rinser uses several 
devices to separate herself from her criminal cell-mates. She writes of herself as non-
criminal, for example when a priest comes to hear confessions: ‘Mag sein, daß 
Gefangene mit wirklichen Vergehen großen Trost dabei finden, zu beichten’ (117). 
Unlike the ‘real’ criminals, Rinser has nothing to confess. The first diary entry confirms 
her identity as a specific and detached type of prisoner through her observation that a 
guard labels her ‘eine Politische’ (17). Rinser asserts her status and her ‘real’ label right 
from the start of the text, giving the reader and herself no doubt as to her status in their 
interpretation of the ensuing account. The political prisoner has a superior status both for 
Rinser and, according to her, for her fellow prisoners. Rinser does not use the term 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 74.
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‘class’ as a determiner, but, in her comments on intellectual ability, she does imply that 
she occupies a middle-class position with most of her fellow prisoners in a lower class. 
This is demonstrated in Rinser’s power struggle with the prison cook, a woman interned 
for stealing children’s provisions, and described with contempt. On one occasion, Rinser 
asks her mockingly if she is a political prisoner in order to humiliate her (101). This 
episode illustrates the power to be gained by the author in highlighting her political 
status, not just in her isolated dealings with the cook but in a more widespread sense: 
such statements contribute to her general performance as a political prisoner. Rinser’s 
diary represents the political prisoner as more intelligent than her criminal counterparts. 
In one entry a guard mocks Rinser and the one other ‘genuine’ political prisoner’s 
intellectual discussion: ‘Politisieren, nichts wie politisieren’ (106). Rinser responds 
patronisingly and, indeed, provocatively: ‘Ja Fräulein H, wir sind auch gern bereit, Sie 
ein wenig aufzuklären’ (106). For Rinser, political discussion, and its connection to her 
status as a political prisoner, is related to intellect and education, something that the 
guard, and many of Rinser’s fellow prisoners, lack. Indeed, Rinser fears she will lose her 
intellect, she does not want to end up like the other prisoners: at one point she discovers 
that she has forgotten how to read since being in prison. She warns herself against 
becoming more like the others: ‘Ich muß sehr achtgeben, daß ich nicht so stumpf werde 
wie sie’ (103). 
The repressive nature of the dictatorial National Socialist regime meant that one was 
likely to be severely punished and labelled a political prisoner for even the most minor 
of subversive behaviours. Rinser writes that a wide range of prohibited acts – including 
trading on the black market, listening to illegal radio stations, relationships with 
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foreigners and speaking out against the regime or the war – led to labelling as a political 
prisoner or a war criminal, and claims that three quarters of those in Traunstein prison 
are there for ‘political’ reasons (126). For Rinser, and implicitly for the rest of the 
prisoners, being political is fashionable in prison: ‘politisch zu sitzen gilt nämlich als 
vornehm.’ (81). The use of ‘vornehm’ highlights the political prisoner’s association with 
a higher social class than that of the other prisoners. Rinser, however, does not locate all 
political prisoners on the same high level as herself: ‘Frau H ist eine >Politische<. 
Allerdings scheint ihr Verbrechen recht lächerlich und ihre politische Einstellung 
äußerst fragwürdig.’ (46) Frau H may have been a pioneering National Socialist but she 
was imprisoned as a political (i.e. anti-Nazi) prisoner because she listened to prohibited 
radio stations. Rinser is suspicious of the other ‘Politischen’ because of their minor 
political ‘crimes’ and because they lie about their political prisoner status. One such 
example is Susi, who told Rinser she deserted her post as a Red Cross worker but, as 
Rinser discovers, was actually a thief (77). ‘Wirtin B’ is another dubious political: ‘sie 
sagt >politisch< […] Mag sein.’ (90). Rinser’s designation of her cellmate as ‘Wirtin’ 
implies that, because of her ‘uneducated’ profession, ‘Wirtin B’ does not belong to the 
higher class of ‘real’ political prisoners such as herself. 
In the diary, Rinser writes of herself and ‘Frau R’ as the real political prisoners. Frau 
R is the only other inmate whom Rinser shows respect towards in her account. Frau R, 
in contrast to the other prisoners, ‘spricht mit niemand, sieht hochmütig und kühl über 
alle hinweg, scheint fortwährend inständig und ingrimmig mit irgendeinem Gedanken 
beschäftigt zu sein […] Ich müßte mich sehr täuschen, wenn sie nicht eine Politische ist’ 
(82). Frau R matches Rinser’s criteria for how an ideal political prisoner should behave. 
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Interestingly, the criteria for such an identity involve a level of arrogance and separation 
of the self from other prisoners – which Rinser has already displayed in her interactions 
with the cook. Whereas other prisoners are often characterised as gossipy, Rinser never 
describes herself, or Frau R, in such a way. Furthermore, Rinser’s ‘intellectual’ 
profession as an author not only separates her from the situation and puts her above the 
suffering but it also allows her to place herself on a level above her fellow prisoners.
The madness of other prisoners stands in direct contrast to Rinser herself. Whereas 
many of her fellow prisoners and their stories are confused, Rinser remarks on her own 
calmness during her cross-examination and subsequent arrest. Of the interrogation she 
states: ‘Ich ließ mich nicht verwirren.’ (57) Rinser records that she was strong enough to 
pull herself together at her arrest: ‘In diesem Augenblick war ich einer Ohnmacht nahe, 
aber ich faßte mich sofort und bat ihn, noch einmal nach Hause zu dürfen.’ (58). She 
represents herself as the strong, reliable, rational one in prison. Near the end of the diary 
she writes of her depression and her cell-mates’ surprise at this: ‘Zum erstenmal war ich 
trostbedürftig, aber niemand wollte daran glauben’ (154). 
In Rinser’s first cell she describes the drawings that previous inmates made on the 
walls. There are ‘obszöne Bilder von verschiedener Hand’ (19), detailing the sexual 
fantasies of other women. Rinser writes: ‘Ich wundere mich darüber, daß man hier noch 
eine andere Begierde empfinden kann als die nach der Freiheit.’ Rinser is concerned 
with freedom rather than sex: she represents herself as rather prudish, as well as 
judgemental about the pictures which she says are ‘naiv und überdeutlich.’ Rinser later 
makes direct reference to her own ‘Prüderie’ (66) showing that she is aware that her 
sexual morals differ from those of her fellow prisoners. Rinser constructs herself as 
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more intellectual and rational than her fellow prisoners, but she emphasises her stupidity 
when it comes to sexual matters. At one point the cook implies that she is sexually 
attracted to their priest, a suggestion that Rinser does not understand: ‘Ich bin viel 
dümmer als die meisten hier.’ (118) Despite having two children, Rinser is adamant 
about her sexual inexperience. The culmination of this comes in her rendering of an 
incident in which ‘die Schmiede’ (a group of women who indulge in sexual activity with 
each other in their cell) give a present to Rinser’s table at lunch. Rinser has no idea what 
it is when it is unwrapped: 
Nachdem die äußere Hülle gefallen war, kam ein längliches Ding zum Vorschein, 
das mit Kreuzbändern gebunden war. Es sah aus wie ein Wickelkind. Ich staunte. 
Wozu das? Plötzlich ein wildes Gelächter der anderen rings um mich. Ich begriff 
nichts. Man belehrte mich sanft über den Zweck dieses Dings. Es war ein 
künstlicher Phallus (141). 
Rinser comes across as a naïve, almost childlike character who has to be gently educated 
by her less intellectual, more sexually experienced, more criminal fellow prisoners about 
sex toys. Elissa Gelfland, one of the few academics writing about women’s prison 
narratives, uses the example of Madame Roland (1754-1793), a political prisoner 
involved in the French Revolution, who, in her memoirs:
uses co-prisoners as a contrasting means to support her claim to womanhood, a 
strategy that is common to the solipsistic focus of many female prison texts […] 
Roland portrays the other women as archetypal female deviants, that is, debauched, 
vulgar and insensitive […] These women are also portrayed as stupid, possessing to 
an extreme degree the criminal woman’s supposed mental inactivity. In this way, 
Roland, by her superior sensitivity and intelligence, can stand in marked contrast to 
her criminal sisters.38
                                                
38 Elissa Deborah Gelfand, "Imprisoned Women: Toward a Socio-Literary Feminist Analysis," Yale 
French Studies 62 (1981), p. 196. 
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Rinser differs from Roland in that many of her co-prisoners are in prison for war crimes 
because of the National Socialist regime, yet Rinser treats them as if they are ‘real’ 
female criminals. Both Rinser and Roland use the criminalised representations of their 
fellow prisoners to construct themselves in a more ideal light.
National Socialist criminals 
Mary Bosworth writes that female political and non-political prisoners: ‘rely on notions 
of an idealised femininity to survive imprisonment which are often similar to those used 
to punish them.’39 Criticism of others through the use of prescribed gender roles can be a 
key tool in gaining agency while in prison. Judith Butler’s theory of gender performance 
posits that those who do not perform their prescribed gender role correctly can be 
exposed to societal punishment.40 Representation of gender conformity or transgression 
thus acts as a means through which power can be obtained or lost. This is at its most 
perceptible in the Gefängnistagebuch in Rinser’s derogatory representations of the 
women who oversee her at work in the bakery or at the female guards in prison. She 
represents National Socialism and its followers as criminal, as her angry reaction to the 
old man’s abuse demonstrates (85). Furthermore, Rinser’s descriptions of women using 
stereotypes of criminality and femininity are not just confined to other prisoners. She 
describes the guards and those who support National Socialism as stupid – one female 
guard is described as ‘mehr dumm als bösartig’ (130). Although some non-political 
prisoners are referred to as stupid, the word ‘dumm’ is used predominantly in relation to 
                                                
39 Bosworth, p. 4. 
40 Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," p. 405.
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situations caused by the severity and senselessness of the regime: Rinser mentions Frau 
H’s ‘Dummheit’ in still supporting Hitler (121). In addition to this, Rinser criticises one 
of the female guards using stereotypes of the gossipy woman: ‘Sie plaudert mit uns auf 
ihre unangenehme Art, die sich aus plumper, schwatzhafter Anbiederung und 
künstlichem Autoritätsanspruch mischt. Sie ist unbeschreiblich dumm’ (30). Rinser 
dehumanises the female guards: she says of the guard’s face: ‘Es ist nicht häßlich, es ist 
nicht einmal böse, es ist nur trocken, ausdruckslos, tot.’ She also describes her as an 
‘Aufsichtsmaschine’ (31), saying that it is a sense of duty (‘Pflichtbewußtsein’) not evil 
that causes her to act in such a cruel way. Rinser even expresses sympathy with the 
guard because, as Rinser puts it, she is unable to experience emotions (31). But the 
description of the female guard as non-human and lacking empathy with others makes 
her seem more criminal. The guard is criminalised and dehumanised by Rinser, which 
serves to counter that dehumanisation and criminalisation imposed on Rinser by the 
prison authority.
The woman who runs the bakery where Rinser and her fellow prisoners are forced to 
work is described as ‘eine Art Dragoner, die einst Dienstmädel bei dem Besitzer war, ein 
Kind von ihm bekam und zum Lohn dafür nun die schöne Stelle innehat’ (94). Here 
Rinser demonstrates that the ‘Dragoner’ sold herself sexually to the factory owner, 
produced a child for him and thereby took charge of the factory – so she is a type of 
prostitute, which, in early criminology, represents the archetypal female criminal.41 Nazi 
women and deviant sexuality are further amalgamated in the entry about Frau L, the 
youngest auxiliary supervisor (‘Hilfsaufseherin’) who is ‘ohne Zweifel mannstoll’ (132). 
                                                
41 Springer, p. 68. 
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Frau L flirts with a man and he mocks her. Rinser is a witness to this incident and is 
disgusted by Frau L’s flirtatious behaviour and ignorance that she is being made a fool 
of: ‘Ich habe noch nie einen so stupiden Menschen gesehen. Und so jemand setzt man 
als Aufseherin über uns.’ (133) 
Rinser highlights Frau L’s masculine characteristics and the fact that Frau L has great 
power over her: ‘Wir sind ihrer Willkür, ihrer rohen, gedankenlosen Macht ausgeliefert. 
Sie hat Schuhe Nummer 43, eine Stimme wie ein Mann und dumme, vorstehende 
Glotzaugen.’ Frau L is clearly masculinised by Rinser in her descriptions of her blatant 
sexuality and in her manly appearance. Rinser’s disgust reflects how ‘deviant’ gender 
performances are punished in the outer world and her employment of such imagery 
allows her to use Frau L’s traditionally unfeminine characteristics as a weapon against 
her. After all, Rinser is a desperate prisoner struggling for some sort of authority in a 
situation of incarceration, which robs her of autonomy. Rinser is the one in prison, being 
punished. By writing disparagingly about Frau L’s masculinity, Rinser turns the tables: 
her diary allows her to castigate the figure of authority who is part of the regime that 
punishes her. Throughout the diary as a whole, Rinser increases her own status by 
devaluing others in terms of gender – this happens not just with the rather extreme case 
of Frau L, but with most other women who she describes. Rinser’s resistance strategy is 
to dehumanise and defeminise those who oppress her or threaten her sense of self, as 
seen in her dehumanisation and defeminisation of the guards. Rinser uses the same 
method in her descriptions of the male figures of authority: In one entry, the prison 
supervisor – a man – is kind to Rinser, but changes radically when a female guard 
appears, and seems afraid of her (95). Rinser is not as hateful of the men as she is of the 
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women, but she still describes their fear of the female guards, which not only makes the 
female guards seem more terrifying, but also acts as a method for punishing the male 
authorities by emasculating them. 
The Nazi women are representatives of a system that Rinser and her (eventual) 
readers deplore; they are worse than the prisoners they oversee. In Rinser’s diary, 
National Socialism is represented as the greatest, most inhumane crime; its 
representatives are the worst criminals. Such a representation highlights the historically 
variant nature of both crime and stigma: during the Third Reich, Rinser and those who 
shared her political convictions were seen as criminals and stigmatised by the 
government and much of the German population, but in the decades afterwards they 
were lauded as politically persecuted and righteous individuals. Rinser may not have 
seen herself as a criminal at the time, but writing her diary allowed her to preserve this 
innocent identity during a time in which she was not certain that National Socialism 
would be defeated and in which she was labelled deviant.  
Conflict and self-awareness
Although Rinser is particularly damning in her descriptions of those who support 
National Socialism, she does show sympathy with many of those prisoners whom she 
observes and judges. Rinser notes that it is because of prison that she has come to 
develop a more sympathetic attitude: she has come to see many as victims who have 
been caught in a trap: ‘Wie leicht habe ich früher die Menschen abgeurteilt. Nun sehe 
ich jeden Menschen wie in einem Netz gefangen.’ (53) Within the microcosm of 
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imprisonment, Rinser attempts to realign how she sees her fellow prisoners: here she 
sees them as victims, albeit criminalised ones. There is a sense that she makes a 
conscious attempt to become part of that world that she derides and to discard some 
beliefs she held in the outer world. For instance, she is aware of her disapproving 
attitude towards sex and relates it to her bourgeois prejudices, in her reaction to 
Mariechen’s and her friend’s conversation about sex and abortion: ‘Ich muß hier immer 
wieder einmal die Reste meiner bürgerlichen Vorurteile überwinden. Ich sah das Leben 
nie so, wie ich es hier zu sehen bekomme: nackt, häßlich, hart, aber unverfälscht und 
wirklich’ (66). She shows awareness that prison brings out her own instincts of self-
preservation, when she admits that she secretly swaps her mattress for her cellmate’s 
more comfortable one: ‘Man verliert allmählich das Bewußtsein der Menschenwürde 
[…] Es bedarf großer geistiger Reserven, um hier Mensch zu bleiben. Erst im Gefängnis 
lernt man seine bösen Instinkte kennen. Ich beobachte das an mir selbst.’ (54) Despite 
her persistently condescending attitude towards those around her, she admits that she 
cannot be superior to those who supervise and incarcerate her because she fantasises 
about putting Nazis in prison: ‘Es besteht für mich nicht der leiseste Anlaß zur 
Überheblichkeit’ (118). Peter Paul Zahl’s concept of Unterleben is useful within this 
context. Unterleben describes the process by which the author adapts or submits herself 
to the forces of imprisonment, whilst simultaneously resisting it. In Rinser’s prison 
diary, there is a conflict between this assimilated, integrated self and her ‘outside’ or 
previous self. Her diary shows how she uses narrative as a means of Unterleben: of 
joining in prison life whilst simultaneously attempting to resist it through narrative.
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Rinser attempts to be part of the prisoner group, despite simultaneously separating 
herself from and deriding her fellow prisoners. She includes herself in the prison group 
when ruminating about what the rich factory owners must think about the prisoners: 
‘Wahrscheinlich halten sie uns Gefangene obendrein für dumm und ungefährlich.’ (152, 
my italics). Rinser belongs to the prisoner collective and there is solidarity involved in 
this. In highlighting her socialist beliefs, she narrows the ideological distance between 
herself and her fellow prisoners: ‘Wäre ich nicht längst Sozialistin, ich wäre es heute 
geworden’ (95). She is accused by some prisoners of being a ‘feine Dame’ and reacts 
angrily ‘Ich war ärgerlich, denn ich hatte mich nie als >feine Dame< gegeben’ (93). 
Rinser’s anger reveals her desire to belong, but in mentioning this incident she 
simultaneously emphasises her difference from those around her. The diary therefore 
performs a double function: it allows her to represent herself as both part of a group but 
also superior to that group.
This conflict between Rinser’s assimilated self and her non-prison or resistant self is 
in evidence throughout the diary: her disapproval and derision of her fellow prisoners 
exists alongside her solidarity with them and her desire to be part of their group. Rinser 
shows the reader the conflict that she faces when she and a few other prisoners visit the 
dentist. Rinser acknowledges that she is ashamed of her dirty appearance next to the 
civilians: ‘Ich kam mir recht sonderbar vor, als ich in meiner schmutzigen, vielfach 
zerissenen Gefängniskleidung plötzlich neben zivilisierten Menschen saß, die 
mißtrauisch von uns abrückten […] Außerdem stinken wir alle nach Staub, Schweiß und 
schmutziger Wäsche.’ (127) Rinser tries to redeem herself by using formal German and 
talking loudly about her work, demonstrating that sense of superiority and separateness, 
94
which is linked to her profession and educated background. But she is immediately 
aware of her vain desire to keep up appearances: ‘Ich konnte doch nicht einfach so eine 
Gefangene sein wie die anderen. Wie dumm der Mensch ist, wie dumm und eitel. Ich 
schwieg also gleich wieder beschämt’ (128). Rinser’s shame at her appearance and being 
a prisoner is replaced by her shame at her vain behaviour. She seems to swing back and 
forth between the two poles. She makes the reader fully aware of her conceited desire to 
be better than the others: ‘Ja, aber – da steht schon wieder das Aber: bin ich doch nicht 
besser als die anderen? […] Aber bin ich doch nicht klüger als die anderen? […] Ach, 
ich weiß nicht’ (128). This excerpt serves to present Rinser’s dialogue with herself, in 
which she articulates her own conflict between her prison and non-prison identity.
However, it also serves a more didactic function in presenting a moral problem to the 
reader. The posing of questions represents an active interaction with the reader and 
encourages them to take part in the discussion. Rinser demonstrates that she may judge 
her cellmates, but she also learns from them, as the reader of her prison diary should too. 
In a similar way, Rinser’s apparent naïveté could therefore be a way of educating the 
reader about criminal women: how they get involved in crime and how they are treated 
by the judicial system. As a writer, she shows that she is better able to communicate 
their muddled stories than they are. Scheffler makes reference to this in her examination 
of the American political prisoner, Agnes Smedley: ‘Smedley, as naïve observer, is most 
often present in the scene, learning from her cell mate so that she is later prepared to 
describe the encounter from a more sophisticated perspective, with editorial comment.’42
Rinser’s portrayal of her self as simultaneously separate from those around her as well 
                                                
42 Ibid, p. 202, my italics. 
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as being understanding of them, even part of their group, thus functions as a means of 
communicating this ‘other’ world of imprisonment to the reader. There is the sense that 
this, in turn, is supposed to educate the reader and make them more understanding of the 
issues involved in female crime and imprisonment: ‘Man bessert Menschen niemals 
durch Demütigung sondern nur durch Erziehung, durch Hebung des Selbstbewußtseins 
und richtige Lenkung der Kräfte. Wenn man das einmal begreifen wollte’ (54). Rinser 
campaigned throughout her life for prison reform and even edited a collection of 
women’s prison writings.43 For Rinser, prison writing functions both as a means of self-
help, resistance, and preservation of identity, but she also interacts with her public reader 
in self-consciously exposing her weakness and posing moral questions concerning her 
reaction to her time in prison. 
Conflicting narratives
Rinser’s Gefängnistagebuch, its two forewords (one written in 1946 and one in 1973), 
and her 1981 autobiography Den Wolf umarmen, present different versions of Rinser and 
provide an interesting and contradictory set of personas. Her forewords colour the tone 
of the rest of the diary. The forewords also highlight the multiple identities that different 
texts within the same publication can present. Margo Culley mentions ‘the charged 
experience of encountering past selves’44 when the diarist reads over an old diary. The 
present self is confronted by an altered self, belonging to a previous time and place. 
Rinser too is shocked at the representation of herself in her prison diary – she is 
                                                
43 Luise  Rinser, ed., Lasst mich Leben: Frauen im Knast (Dortmund: R. Padligur Verlag, 1987). 
44 Culley, p. 219.
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estranged from herself, writing of the diary: ‘Es schien mir hart und kalt, und es 
verfälschte dadurch meine Erfahrung der Gefangenschaft’ (6). The forewords allow her 
to minimise any unpleasant elements of her diary, for example in admitting that she 
came across as cold and ‘schonungslos’ (8) in the diary. She is at risk of seeming 
unfeminine or inhumane in her judgemental descriptions of her fellow prisoners and 
surroundings – something the public may disapprove of. In what seems to be a response 
to such accusations, Rinser adds that, rather than being unfeeling in prison: ‘Ich hatte 
Tieferes erlebt, und ich hatte es mit größerer Leidenschaft erlebt’ (6). In the foreword, 
Rinser explains that her diary misrepresents the ‘actual’ experience of prison because 
when she was there she had more profound emotions. 
The forewords are also there to maximise certain elements of the text. In the foreword 
to the first edition, she expressly mentions that her diary is a factual, historical 
document: ‘Tatsache, nicht Literatur’ – meaning it is to be read as the objective report, 
despite her claim in her later foreword that the diary falsified the real experience of 
prison. In this foreword to the first edition, the purpose of her diary is to educate others, 
especially future generations and to make people start talking about the atrocities of the 
National Socialist regime:
Es ist begreiflich, daß viele nichts mehr hören wollen von dem, was sie selbst erlebt 
haben. Für sie ist dieses Buch auch nicht geschrieben. Es ist für jene, die nichts 
dergleichen sahen und erlebten, die kaum oder gar nicht gelitten haben unter den 
teuflischen Methoden, die Freiheit des Menschen auszurotten (13).
The diary differs from her autobiography Den Wolf umarmen in the information it 
provides about her prison conditions. For example the autobiography is elliptical about 
the work that Rinser had to do whilst in prison: it describes nothing of her experience of 
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working in the prison’s sewing room and she claims that she was in solitary confinement 
even though this is not mentioned in the diary. Although her diary is generally 
unemotional, she does once make reference to a yearning for her husband Klaus: ‘K war 
hier, hier in diesem Haus, und ich habe es nicht gewußt’ (25). However, in her 
autobiography she describes her friendship with him as a reluctant one and writes that 
she was forced into marriage in order to protect him from the Gestapo.45 Rinser is 
preoccupied with representing herself as asexual in her diary, but makes no reference to 
this in her autobiography, in fact she does the opposite in it – in writing of her solitary 
confinement Rinser says: ‘Man befriedigt sich selbst, lustlos und gequält, um sich 
einzuschläfern, und dann schämt man sich und fühlt sich elend.’46 Rinser may mention 
her shame at her sexual activities but the fact that she mentions it at all shows a 
significant contrast to her self-representation in the diary. 
At the time of writing the autobiography she is obviously less concerned with 
seeming criminal and more willing to expose a more sexual and therefore ‘deviant’ side 
of her character. Rinser has thus created a number of differing, sometimes conflicting 
versions of herself within her autobiographical texts, showing that the version that this 
prison writer presents of herself changes according to the time in which she is writing, 
and continues to change throughout her life. 
                                                
45 Luise Rinser, Den Wolf umarmen (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1981), p. 367.
46 Ibid, p. 381.
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Writing as survival in Lore Wolf’s Ich habe das Leben lieb
Lore Wolf’s diary Ich habe das Leben lieb: Tagebuchblätter aus dem Zuchthaus 
Ziegenhain provides a fascinating contrast to Rinser’s account. The diary was published 
in West Germany in 1983, but Wolf’s autobiography, Ein Leben ist viel zuwenig, which 
documented her experiences during the Third Reich, had been published ten years earlier 
in 1973 and in the GDR. The autobiography proved more popular than the diary, 
running into several editions and was even translated into English in 1982, although both 
the diary and the autobiography are now out of print. Wolf was a former secretary and 
member of the German Communist Party (KPD). The KPD was banned when Hitler was 
appointed chancellor in 1933 and run as an underground organisation until the end of 
World War Two. Wolf worked in the KPD’s Rote Hilfe resistance movement which 
gave aid to political prisoners and their families. She was forced to flee Germany for 
Switzerland then France in order to escape arrest and continue her work in the 
resistance. Eventually she was arrested by the Gestapo in Paris in August 1940 then later 
sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment for treason and incarcerated in Ziegenhain 
prison in Rhineland-Palatinate until the end of the war. 
Whereas Rinser was in prison for a matter of months, Lore Wolf spent a total of five 
years in incarceration. Her relationship with the outside world and the people she knew 
there would have been much more estranged than Rinser’s. Long-term imprisonment 
and separation from previous life has a momentous effect on the prisoner’s sense of who 
she was before prison and who she is during imprisonment. Wolf’s punishment also 
involved being kept in solitary confinement for most of the five years she spent in prison 
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(apart from a few isolated periods): it is a form of punishment that has well-documented 
effects on the health of the prisoner: ‘Prisoners subjected to prolonged isolation may 
experience depression, despair, anxiety, rage, claustrophobia, hallucinations, problems 
with impulse control, and/or an impaired ability to think, concentrate, or remember.’47
During the widespread controversy surrounding the imprisonment of members of the 
Red Army Faction in the 1970s, solitary confinement was depicted as a means of torture, 
of ‘Zersetzung’, in which the prisoner’s former identity was slowly broken down by 
restricting their senses.48 For both men and women, solitary confinement has a huge 
effect on their emotional well-being as well as on their perception of themselves as a 
subject, especially since their world consists of a restricted and monotonous space, 
rather than a communal, more varied prison environment. Reto Volkart mentions that it 
is an inability to maintain conversation as a result of isolation that can make prisoners 
lose their sense of self, and can lead to suicide attempts.49 In other words long-term 
isolation can entail a loss of narrative, which is a crucial element of identity formation 
and survival. 
Wolf was permitted to write a diary after three years of confinement, an extremely 
unusual allowance, given National Socialism’s stringent prison regulations.50 Her diary 
                                                
47 Human Rights Watch (Organization). Out of Sight: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in the United 
States (New York; London: Human Rights Watch, 2000), p. 2
48 For a full discussion of the RAF debate see: Martin Jander, "Isolation," in Die RAF und der linke 
Terrorismus, ed. Wolfgang Kraushaar (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006), p. 974 and 980. The 
isolation most often mentioned in relation to the RAF prisoners involved not only social isolation but 
acoustic and visual isolation too, which Wolf did not experience.
49 Vera Bueller, Einzelhaft ist Folter: Interview mit Reto Volkart (2006, accessed July 2009); 
http://www.beobachter.ch/wohnen/artikel/isolationshaft_einzelhaft-ist-folter/. 
50 Martin Habicht, Zuchthaus Waldheim, 1933-1945: Haftbedingungen und antifaschistischer Kampf
(Berlin: Dietz, 1988), p. 28. See also: Wachsmann, Hitler’s Prisons, p. 91. Stefan Lorant writes that he too 
was given paper and pen to write a diary during his imprisonment in Munich for 6 months in 1933, so it 
was not unheard of: Stefan Lorant, I Was Hitler's Prisoner (London: Victor Gollancz, 1935), p. 9.  
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was more ‘public’ because the prison authorities knew she was writing it, and perhaps 
even had access to it.51 It was likely that censors oversaw Wolf’s diary and prohibited 
her from writing on political matters – a concern that Rinser did not have to contend 
with.52 But Wolf does not strictly adhere to personal, rather than political, subject matter 
in her diary. She may claim to avoid any political topics, but sometimes her allusions to 
politics are not even thinly disguised. She mentions the ‘Taten der Menschen dieser 
Epoche und [der] grausige Abgrund, in den die Menschheit zu versinken droht.’53 In 
recalling her trial and subsequent sentencing she declares: ‘Das Unrecht des Stärkeren 
hat gesiegt!’ (86) in frank reference to National Socialist injustice. A direct reference to 
Hitler comes in talking about the bloody war: ‘Der Führer watet im Blut’ (87). Wolf 
makes known her political beliefs and possibly incriminates herself in recalling the 
sentencing of her comrade Sepp Wagner: ‘In der Wachstube stehe ich plötzlich einem 
Menschen gegenüber, mit dem ich viele Jahre gegen das Hitler-Regime gekämpft und 
illegal gearbeitet habe’ (129). Here she admits working illegally against National 
Socialism and even claims that she knows more about illegal activities than the judges 
inside the courtroom do: ‘dann sehe ich ihn in der Illegalität. Aber davon wissen die da 
drin sehr viel weniger als ich’ (130). It is puzzling that Wolf incriminates herself in her 
diary – if her supervisors had read it they would have had reason to sentence her more 
                                                
51 In summer 2007 I undertook an extensive search for documents pertaining to Wolf’s imprisonment in an 
effort to find out whether and how Ziegenhain prison censored her diary. The Bundesarchiv in Berlin 
holds numerous documents on Wolf, but none on her diary, and a search in the more localised area of 
Ziegenhain where she was imprisoned uncovered suspiciously little. Wolf’s prison documents apparently 
went missing during the reunification process in 1990 and have not been found since.
52 Wolfgang Abendroth and Lore Wolf, "Widerstand 'von unten'," in Ich habe das Leben lieb (Dortmund: 
Weltkreis, 1983), p. 12.
53 Lore Wolf, Ich habe das Leben lieb (Dortmund: Weltkreis, 1983), p. 47. Subsequent references will be 
given in the main text.
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harshly. It seems that Wolf’s diary was either not censored, or perhaps – and more likely 
in my opinion – the incriminating entries were added after she was released from prison. 
It is, however, probable that in most sections of her diary she writes as if she is aware of 
the presence of the prison authorities. 
Lore Wolf was not a professional writer as Rinser was, and the format of her diary 
reflects this. The published text contains two forewords: Wolf’s foreword comes second 
and provides biographical information about her life and details surrounding her 
imprisonment, providing little to conflict with her self-representation in the diary itself. 
The first foreword comes from Wolfgang Abendroth (1906-1985), a prominent left-wing 
political scientist. His introduction serves to give an increased level of importance to 
Wolf’s diary: he presents her diary to the public and acts as her patron. This is partly 
because Wolf is not an established author and so is not qualified to introduce her own 
text as Rinser does. It also recalls the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century tradition in 
which men wrote forewords to women’s texts in order to validate the work of the 
woman writer.54 Furthermore, Abendroth’s involvement prevents Wolf’s diary from 
being assigned the dubious label of ‘Frauenliteratur’: which is commonly (and 
contentiously) thought to be writing by women that is for women.55 That a man writes 
the foreword is supposed to make the text both ‘worthy’ and accessible to men and 
women.
Wolf’s diary provides a very different response to incarceration than Rinser’s, both in 
its style and content. The sporadically written entries and poems are introspective and 
                                                
54 Kord, pp. 104-05.
55 Inge Stephan, "Frauenliteratur," in Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft, ed. Klaus Weimar 
et al (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1997), p. 626.
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repetitive, unlike the descriptive reports found in Rinser’s diary. She does not seek to 
report on prisoners and their conditions, partly because she was alone most of the time, 
in the monotony of solitary confinement. Wolf either writes to herself, or participates in 
a fantasy dialogue in which she communicates with members of her family, particularly 
on special occasions such as birthdays and sometimes in the form of a letter. The 
irregular way in which Wolf writes implies that she has limited paper (although she does 
not mention this) and that she only writes when she feels it is wholly necessary to her 
state of mind. Wolf claims of her diary in her first entry: ‘Ein Kräftereservoir soll es mir 
werden für trübe Stunden’ (37) later remarking that her diary documents her ‘bitterste[n] 
Zeit’ (94). Wolf’s diary acts as an emotional support, a confidante in times of need, to 
whom she can express her inner turmoil. It seems that it is the process of writing in the 
diary that is of import to Wolf’s sense of self as well as the content itself.56 Once again, 
language performs a particular act and function. I shall explore the ways in which 
language is used to help Wolf cope with and resist her incarceration and to help her 
perceive herself as both a good woman and political prisoner. 
A representation of the misery and lack of autonomy within prison is one of the 
distinguishing features of Wolf’s diary. Prison constricts her both physically and 
verbally: ‘So entsetzliches Leid herrscht ringsum, und man ist gefesselt an Händen und 
Füßen, und der Mund trägt ein Siegel’ (76). She often feels helpless, especially 
regarding the war in Germany in which she can neither support her family nor her 
comrades (52, 152). She repeatedly expresses grief at her continuing isolation, 
separation from the outside world, concern for her family, the war and her great desire to 
                                                
56 See Keßler, p. 465 for further discussion of the importance of the process of writing.
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be free. Wolf’s control over time has been removed by imprisonment. Not only is her 
daily routine dictated by the prison, but she also has no control over how long the war 
will last and therefore how long her incarceration will go on: ‘Wie lange noch?’ is an 
oft-repeated question. Furthermore, she feels frustration at the fact that prison has 
already robbed her of a significant portion of her own life: 
Jahr um Jahr hetzt dahin. Ein jedes nimmt ein Stück Jugend mit. Jedes 
angefangene Jahr lastet schwer auf den Schultern, weil das ungelebte Leben in 
diesem Hause, in dieser Zelle mein Lebenskonto belastet und das Defizit von Jahr 
zu Jahr steigt (121). 
This element in Wolf’s diary reveals both its function as a vent for her frustration and 
unhappiness and a depiction of the amount of agency that she has lost through 
imprisonment. Although the diary serves a cathartic purpose, I explore its function as an 
escape from incarceration in which Wolf constructs a self-strengthening, autonomous 
life narrative in contrast to the more descriptive prison reportage found in Rinser’s text. 
The maternal, strong political prisoner 
Wolf uses her diary as a substitute for real interaction with her daughter, Hannelore; this 
reminds her of her pre-prison identity as a mother. Most entries are addressed to 
Hannelore: ‘Mein Mädel, nun will ich noch ein wenig mit dir plaudern.’ (63) Even the 
entries written to her husband Hannes are written with her daughter in mind: she refers 
to her husband as ‘Däti’ (for example 125), presumably the American pronunciation of 
Daddy (the Wolf family lived in the United States for several years before returning to 
Germany in 1934). In these entries Wolf gives her daughter advice and comforts her, 
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enacting her maternal role and emphasising an identity as a mother rather than as an 
isolated prisoner. Addressing these entries to Hannelore in this way implies that Wolf 
writes purely in order to record her experiences for her daughter’s sake. An examination 
of the diary reveals, however, that Wolf not only addresses her daughter but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, herself: she seems to be writing primarily to restore her own 
perception of who she was before prison, repairing her sense of self during a time of 
self-doubt. 
It is Wolf’s self-narration as a strong, politically active and gifted woman that is the 
most striking part of her diary. The painful, frustrating aspects of being in prison are 
described at length, possibly as a means of freeing herself from negative emotions. This 
outpouring of misery stands in stark contrast to Wolf’s simultaneous emphasis on her 
inner strength and ability to overcome isolation and worry for her family. In a poem 
entitled ‘Ich bin und liebe’, Wolf represents herself as a strong woman, with a lust for 
life: ‘Nie ward ich am Lebenstisch satt,/ Immer mußt ich mein Sehnen zügeln’ (39). She 
describes herself as an active person who does not belong in prison and declares that she 
will fight to get her life back: ‘Über alle Gefängnisse hinweg will ich mir den Weg zur 
Höhe, den Weg zurück ins Leben ertrotzen’ (146). Wolf’s ability to overcome her own 
isolation and fear for her family’s safety during air-raids is represented as a sort of 
supernatural power – she describes the ‘ungeheure Seelenkräfte zur Überwindung der 
Schwierigkeiten, die sich innerhalb und außerhalb des eignen Ichs auftürmen’ (52). 
Wolf’s autobiography, Ein Leben ist viel zuwenig, reinforces such self-representation as 
supernaturally gifted; in it she recounts that she awoke one night in great fear. It 
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transpires that her friend Juliane Salzmann had died on that very night.57 This story is 
written differently in another account of Wolf’s – here she suddenly starts crying in the 
prison’s work-room during the day and realises later that it is because of her friend’s 
death.58 These accounts may conflict in terms of information but the representation of 
Wolf’s mystical powers remains. 
In the diary itself, the contradictory stance of the self as miserable and self as strong, 
functions both as a means of catharsis, and as an enactment of her strong character in 
order to strengthen her sense of self within the period of crisis and isolation. Wolf takes 
this self-strengthening persona further in her construction of herself as a political 
prisoner. Wolf’s focus is not only on her inner strength but also on her political identity, 
on combating the effects of incarceration, as she writes in her first entry: ‘nur das 
Bewußtsein des inneren Wertes und das Vertrauen in einen erfolgreichen Kampf um 
eine bessere Zukunft stärkt den Willen zur Überwindung der Schwierigkeiten, die die 
Zeit der Unfreiheit mit sich bringt’ (42). Wolf identifies strongly as a Communist and 
subsequently as a political prisoner. According to what she writes in the diary, it is 
through the process and act of writing down her strong political ideology and belief in 
the future that she is able to get through the ordeal. Her political beliefs also prevent her 
from seeing herself as criminal. Wolf sees herself as one amongst many who faced 
punishment for their activities – she mentions a number of other comrades during her 
incarceration who fought for the same cause. In mentioning them she reminds herself 
that she is one of a large group fighting for their own beliefs. She is a member of the 
                                                
57 Lore Wolf, Ein Leben ist viel zuwenig (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1973), p. 135.
58 Lore Wolf, ‘Erinnerungen an Juliane Salzmann’ Bundesarchiv SgY30/1031.
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KPD, which, were it not for the National Socialist dictatorship, would still have been a 
legitimate political force. Her statements of political commitment allow her to see her 
imprisonment as a product of the political despotism that has culminated in international 
war. 
Like Rinser, Wolf sees the political prisoner as a superior type of prisoner. She recalls 
an experience with a guard called Beermann that demonstrates the moral uprightness of 
herself and other Communist prisoners. Wolf had the opportunity to escape when being 
supervised by Beermann but says she did not do this in order to protect him from 
punishment. He returns her goodwill and decency by being kind to her. Here Wolf 
demonstrates how considerate and accommodating both she and Beermann are. Wolf 
reports that Beermann emphasises the courtesy of previous Communist prisoners: 
‘Bevor sie abtransportiert wurden, haben sie sich mit einem festen Händedruck von ihm 
verabschiedet, und ihm für die anständige Behandlung gedankt’ (90). As a Communist, 
Wolf belongs within this group. In describing this incident Wolf shows her desire to 
show her own and other Communists prisoners’ inherent goodness. She shows the 
humanity of the political prisoner, the type of prisoner who deserves kind treatment 
because of their courteous attitude. This incident demonstrates the non-criminality of the 
Communist prisoner and of Wolf herself: she belongs to a group of people who have 
done nothing ‘wrong’ and who do not belong in prison. For her, Communists are good 
people and far from being a threat to society, they actually improve it. 
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Cultural narratives and writing for survival 
Wolf takes her political self-representation further in writing that her imprisonment is 
worth it for the greater good of a Communist or peaceful future: ‘es lohnt sich, um der 
Zukunft willen alles zu ertragen’ (38). She invokes religious metaphors in her self-
portrayal as a martyr, gladly suffering for the good of mankind. In an entry addressed to 
her husband (who was also active in the resistance) she uses more religious imagery to 
describe their Christ-like sacrifices: ‘Weil wir uns selbst treugeblieben sind, mußten wir 
den Golgotha-Weg gehen, den so gar viele schon vor uns gegangen sind und viele noch 
gehen müssen’ (126). For Wolf, she and her husband, Hannes, are two amongst many 
political martyrs of the past and the future. Her use of religious imagery allows her to 
locate her suffering and isolation within a larger historical context of self-sacrifice and 
through this to account for her time in prison as worthwhile.
As a woman, Wolf presents herself as a special kind of martyr. She has sacrificed her 
role as a mother to her loved ones for her political beliefs: ‘In meinem Kampf um ein 
lebenswertes Leben für alle Menschen mußte ich zum Schuldner werden an meinen 
Lieben’ (42). Imagery of martyrdom allows her to account for her separation from her 
loved ones, especially her daughter and assists her in overcoming any guilt she may feel 
at such separation. Wolf also implies that, as a political prisoner and mother surrounded 
by non-political prisoners (who were in the majority in her prison according to 
Wolfgang Abendroth (12)) and mothers, her burden and pain is greater than that of her 
fellow prisoners: one Christmas she is gathered with hundreds of other women to 
‘celebrate’ the occasion. Hundreds of women cry but she cannot: ‘Es gibt einen 
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Schmerz, den kein Seelentau lindern kann’ (113). Wolf implies that her ‘Sehnsucht nach 
Freiheit, nach lieben Menschen, nach daheim’ (113) is greater and deeper than that of 
the other women. Her pain as a mother and as resistance fighter is double that of her 
fellow prisoners and more than that of a male martyr, who, one is to presume, would be 
less concerned with the traditionally female job of caring for the family. Wolf becomes a 
paradigm for the ideal female political prisoner: brave and strong yet maternal. 
Consciously or not, Wolf seems to utilise those cultural ideas of the female political 
prisoner seen in the numerous biographical and scholarly appraisals of Rosa 
Luxemburg’s prison letters, which combine the ‘polar’ forces of political might and a 
maternal, caring identity to create the ideal female political prisoner.59
Wolf’s diary contains around twenty of her own poems, as well as regular references 
to classical music and literature.60 Her own sense and iteration of her creative and 
cultural capabilities seems to provide a source of comfort in her incarceration. Creative 
use of language and affinity with culture enables her to refer back to a previous identity 
and to inhabit a role as a humane political prisoner. Wolf positions the barbarity of the 
war and her incarceration in opposition to high culture and humanity: ‘Zwanzigstes 
Jahrhundert, wo ist deine Kultur? Menschheit, wo ist deine Würde?’ (70) Here, Wolf’s 
language has a Biblical element to it, reminiscent of Corinthians 15:55 ‘O death, where 
is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?’ Such language imbues her statement with 
increased authority and reinforces her identity as a harbinger of culture and humanity. 
                                                
59 For example Paul Frölich mentions that Luxemburg combines the positive attributes of each sex:
Frölich, p. 193.
60 Michael Moll has examined poetry within the context of National Socialist incarceration: Michael Moll, 
Lyrik in einer entmenschlichten Welt: Interpretationsversuche zu deutschsprachigen Gedichten aus 
nationalsozialistischen Gefängnissen, Ghettos und KZ's (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1988).
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Wolf emphasises her affinity with high culture in one excerpt, where she looks back to a 
time when she and her daughter went to the opera. Both are entranced by Mozart’s 
composition and Wolf compares herself and her daughter to him: 
Ganz nahe ist uns Mozart in unserer Armut. Auch er hatte einmal in einem 
armseligen Dachstübchen gewohnt, hungrig und von Kälte geplagt. Und doch er 
war so reich […] hatte ein schönheitstrunkenes Herz […] war ein Schöpfer, ist ein 
Unsterblicher. Seine Zeitgenossen haben ihn nicht beschützt (107). 
Wolf represents Mozart, like herself, as a talented martyr who was not understood in his 
time. In the foreword to Ich habe das Leben lieb, like the diary itself, Wolf represents 
herself as politically-minded and extraordinarily artistic. She explains that the prison 
guard was persuaded to let her write a diary after reading a letter from her daughter, in 
which she wrote, in response to not being permitted to write in prison: ‘Was wüßten wir 
wohl von Goethe, wenn es damals keine Schreibgeräte gegeben hätte!’ Here Wolf aligns 
herself with the so-called father of German literature, in a similar way to her comparison 
of herself with Mozart. What may be seen as arrogant in Wolf’s diary functions as a 
source of comfort for her in finding a historical narrative to be a part of during and after 
the possibly degrading and damaging experience of incarceration. Her comparisons are 
also an attempt to make clear to the reader how serious it was that she was not allowed 
to write. Conjuring figures such as Goethe and Mozart gives authority not only to her 
own individual plight but to the anti-fascist struggle as a whole. 
Wolf’s appeals to high culture are reminiscent of Luxemburg’s extensive 
descriptions of books, paintings and music in her prison letters. Furthermore, both 
authors rely heavily on nature as a means of representing their predicament, perhaps 
because there is little visual stimulation within the isolated solitary cell. Where possible, 
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the author turns her attention to those natural, non-carceral surroundings outwith the 
prison cell.61 There is a gendered element to this self-representation because, knowingly 
or not, Wolf calls upon a cultural discourse in which the acceptable kind of female 
political prisoner is literary, poetic and, nature-loving. 
Wolf’s self-representation as a Luxemburg-esque martyr is, however, not fully 
realised because she does not die at the hands of her enemies. A kind guard puts Wolf in 
the death cell (‘Todeszelle’) in Moabit prison in order to provide her with more food and 
better conditions. When Wolf arrives she is asked by a cellmate if she is a political 
prisoner: ‘Fast schäme ich mich zu sagen, daß ich nicht den gleichen Weg gehen werde 
wie sie’ (134). Wolf expresses shame at being allowed to live whilst those in the cell are 
to be executed. For Wolf, these are the ‘real’ female political prisoners. She writes: ‘Die 
Frauen sind sehr tapfer, verbergen ihren Schmerz’ (137). She recalls the story of a group 
of women who were arrested for protecting their anti-Nazi husbands and sons. She 
describes them as wives and mothers who bravely sacrificed their lives for their beliefs 
and loved ones. They fulfil Wolf’s vision of a collective group of female political 
prisoners who were arrested together and support each other as well as their fellow 
prisoners. Wolf does not see herself as part of this group; whereas she is usually 
forcefully strong, in this episode she is weak and unable to control her tears. She 
eventually asks to be transferred to another cell where she receives less food but is not 
burdened by the experience of the ‘Todeszelle’. There is the implication that she 
                                                
61 There is a strong link between nature and freedom in many representations of prison, not just in first 
person accounts of prison. See, for example Marc Rothemund’s film, "Sophie Scholl: Die letzten Tage,"  
(Germany: Broth Film, 2005). Language and indeed visual imagery can represent freedom, even a freeing 
of the self. There is considerable scope here for future research into prison writing through looking at the 
ways in which nature is represented and how that links to questions of self and captivity. 
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somehow fails to live up to the criteria that characterise the martyr and ideal maternal 
political prisoner. A part of this regret at being around the women is the guilt that Wolf 
must feel as a survivor when her resistance activities were just as subversive as those of 
the women. Interestingly, she mentions little of these feelings, instead concentrating on 
self-representation as a martyr: ‘Das sind meine schlimmsten Tage und Nächte hier […] 
Ich sterbe tausend Tode. Das Mitleid frißt mich physisch und psychisch auf’ (137). Wolf 
seems to suffer more than the women who are executed, her narrative allows her to 
become more of a martyr than they. 
Wolf as leader 
Wolf’s desired self-representation as a politically active prisoner is created, both by 
writing of herself as a martyr, but also by creating a fantasy dialogue in which she 
communicates with those in the world outside prison whose homes have been destroyed 
during air raids: ‘Ich flüchte mit euch, stehe mit euch vor dem Rest eurer Habe, führe 
eure Kinder an den Händen’ (58). In this dialogue, she represents herself as a martyr 
suffering with them: ‘euer Leid ist mein Leid’ (58). This entry also highlights Wolf’s 
compassionate character: she assumes a level of authority but also shows her affiliation 
to conventions of femininity in showing her caring, maternal side in her concern for 
‘her’ people. In the same entry Wolf refers to herself as a champion of the outside world, 
writing: ‘Arme Menschen der Großstädte, wie sehr, wie innig ist mein Herz bei euch!’ 
(58) Here she addresses all people in destroyed cities and shows her commitment to 
them, enacting an identity as someone who wishes to save them in their time of need. 
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This persona is further emphasised in Wolf’s representation of her relationship with 
other female inmates. This differs greatly from Rinser’s but can tell us much about how 
she deals with the issue of being an ‘incomplete’ political prisoner (in not facing 
execution). Wolf goes into less detail about the women she encounters than Rinser, 
indeed they are often merged into a faceless mass: the women in the work room are 
represented as a collection of identical, anonymous machines: ‘gebeugte Frauenrücken’ 
(64). Wolf relates this anonymous assemblage to herself. In one entry she assumes that 
the mass of women in her barracks are all mothers, all pained by prison and the war, as 
she is: ‘Über verhärmte, eingefallene Frauengesichter läuft ein Zucken. In großen, 
starren Augen brennt die Sehnsucht nach verlassenen Kindern daheim’ (44). Wolf sees 
her incarceration as a product of wartime and assumes that the war is the cause of the 
other prisoners’ misery too: ‘Trauer deckt die Erde’ (44). 
Wolf not only represents her fellow inmates as affected by the war but also as a 
politicised collective; rather than being shown as criminal, as many were,62 they are 
made akin to Wolf herself. In referring to this group of fellow prisoners she does not 
distinguish between the political prisoner and the normal prisoner and certainly makes 
no reference to the blurry issue of what constitutes a political prisoner: she sees the 
whole group as political. For example, in a poem entitled ‘Der Sturmwind’ she depicts 
her and her fellow prisoners’ struggle against a storm wind – an analogy for the struggle 
they face in prison. Wolf was not permitted to directly reference certain topics and so the 
symbolism of poetry allowed her to express her political beliefs. The struggle to 
                                                
62 Wachsmann explains that most inmates of Nazi prisons were ‘normal’ criminals: Wachsmann, pp. 10-
11. Wolfgang Abendroth, in his foreword to Wolf’s diary says that she was surrounded by non-political 
prisoners (12).
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overcome the hardship of prison is something that clearly affects both political and non-
political prisoners, but Wolf’s poem is an attempt to represent a unified collective, with 
a common belief in a better (implicitly Communist) future: ‘Doch wir in unserm festen 
Haus,/Wir fürchten nicht das tolle Wüten/ […] Wir wissen, daß die finstre Nacht/Schon 
schwanger geht mit neuem Morgen’ (50-51). Wolf positions herself and her fellow 
prisoners as a strong like-minded group, looking past the war to the future, as she so 
often does. Writing her diary allows to her to imagine that she is surrounded by a group 
of comrades, even though we know little about the fellow prisoners as individuals. 
Judith Scheffler explains that political prisoners ‘often discuss the plight of their sister 
prisoners with the same fervour and immediacy that they use in describing themselves. 
Frequently the prisoner’s identification with her people leads to her imprisonment in the 
first place.’63 The political prisoner often feels a significant connection to the troubles of 
non-political prisoners, and Wolf’s left-wing political engagement demonstrates that she 
too feels this bond with ‘the people’. In her diary she talks of this group of women in 
order to back up how she wants to see herself: as part of a strong collective instead of as 
an isolated and therefore weaker individual. She uses language to create a group in order 
to make herself feel stronger in her solitary confinement, as well as to reinforce her 
identity as a political prisoner. 
In the commotion surrounding the end of World War Two and the possible release or 
execution of prisoners, Wolf writes of her central role in the action and that she became 
the leader of the anonymous collective when they are transported away from Ziegenhain 
prison. She describes that she is active in helping the women retrieve their civilian 
                                                
63 Scheffler, ‘Introduction’ Wall Tappings, p. xvi. 
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clothing from the prison storeroom (156) and thereby commence their lengthy passage 
to freedom. Wolf too writes of herself as the representative in the railway wagon where 
she and sixty other women are transported to (and then away from) Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp: when a guard wishes to speak to the women, she calls Wolf’s name 
(163). Wolf separates herself from her weaker counterparts when describing the 
transportation out of Ziegenhain prison: ‘Fast zweitausend abgehärmte, magere 
Gestalten gehen im gleichen Schritt’ (156). Wolf implies that she is stronger than those 
she describes, only to immediately thereafter include herself in the group: ‘Unterm Arm 
tragen wir unsere geringe Habe’ (156). There is an implication here of a Rinser-esque 
conflict between wanting to be separate from the masses and wanting to belong to them. 
In portraying herself on the one hand as part of a collective – seemingly with the same 
ideological goals – but at the same time stronger than everyone else, she takes on a role 
as leader in being the most able member of the group. 
This identity is underscored in Wolf’s portrayal of her loyalty when she is twice 
offered the opportunity of escape. That she is given such a chance implies that she has a 
number of supporters who wish to save her. But she turns the offer down on both 
occasions, explaining in the first case:
Es ist unser aller Glück. Später erfahre ich, daß sich die Frauen geschworen hatten, 
alles so zu tun, wie ich es tue und mich nicht aus den Augen zu lassen. Meine 
Ausbruch wäre zu einer Massenflucht geworden. Das hätte der SS eine 
willkommene Gelegenheit geboten, uns alle niederzuschießen (157).
Wolf writes of herself as a member of a group, a great desire of hers in prison, which is 
realised at this crucial time. She also demonstrates that, as a leader figure who would be 
followed by many, she influences every female inmate in the whole prison. In her 
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portrayal, it is her self-sacrificing devotion to this nameless group that has saved them 
all from death. At the second opportunity she shows her self-sacrificial nature more 
clearly: ‘Aber ich fliehe nicht. Was soll mit den anderen werden?’ Although Wolf does 
not die in her fight for other people, as Luxemburg did, she proves to the reader and 
herself that she is willing to die for them. When both male and female German political 
prisoners are officially freed in a special ceremony in Fuhlsbüttel, Wolf is the one who is 
called out first, becoming the head of a group consisting of only political prisoners. 
Autonomy within the prison narrative
Wolf perhaps uses her portrayal of herself as a leader in order to substitute for the more 
politically active life she may have led outside prison. Additionally, Wolf’s self-
representation as the leader of the anonymous mass she has created in her own image 
establishes her authoritative position over her fellow prisoners. In not fleeing, she 
implies that she is needed in order to help the prisoners, as if she is a saviour, with more 
power than others. Furthermore, Wolf makes it clear that she chose to help others when 
given the opportunity to escape, imbuing her narrative with agency and self-
determination. This performance as leader not only helps Wolf to align herself with ideal 
political prisoners such as Luxemburg, but also counteracts the degradation and terror of 
her last few days in prison. She and her group are loaded into cattle wagons, kept in 
squalid conditions, deprived of food and face possible extermination in Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp. That Wolf focuses primarily on her role as a leader, seemingly in 
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control of her and others’ fate, allows her to resist an imposed passive identity as object 
rather than subject. 
Such an assertion of agency is emphasised at other points in the diary too, especially 
in relation to labelling as criminal. Whereas Rinser mentions a number of incidents in 
which she is referred to as a ‘common’ criminal, this issue only comes up once in Wolf’s 
diary and she presents herself in a much more controlled way than Rinser. On being 
transported to hospital to be treated for a glandular infection, Wolf writes that she is 
referred to by the guards as ‘eine ‘Langjährige’’ who has to be carefully watched and is 
to be handcuffed. Wolf refuses to be tied up, at which point an officer steps in and asks 
her ‘‘Sind Sie Polin, oder haben Sie ein Verbrechen begangen?’ Wolf asserts: ‘Ich bin 
keine Polin und keine Verbrecherin. Ich bin Deutsche. Meine politische Gesinnung, 
meine Einstellung zu diesem Regime haben mir zwölf Jahre Zuchthaus eingebracht. 
Aber ich lass mich nicht fesseln!’ (89) She calmly but emphatically distinguishes herself 
as a political prisoner and is proud of her status. Unlike Rinser, whose angry retorts 
indicate a lack of agency (as well as demonstrating her outspoken, justice-seeking 
character), Wolf writes of her composure and gains control of the situation. The officer 
does not chain her hands, implying that he too sees her as a less violent, ‘dangerous’ 
prisoner, perhaps one who deserves more respect than non-political prisoners. Mary 
Bosworth has remarked that resistance in prison is, in most cases, unsuccessful,64 but 
Wolf’s refusal to be handcuffed and subsequent resistance of a criminal/dangerous 
identity is a victory, at least in her version of events.
                                                
64  Bosworth, p. 150.
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In mentioning the respect she is treated with by an officer (who is of a more 
authoritative rank than a mere prison guard), Wolf shows that others believe she should 
be shown respect: her representation of the officer’s actions fits with how she wishes to 
be treated and how she wishes to perceive herself. Indeed, apart from one violent 
incident at the end of the diary, Wolf writes that she is treated with great respect 
throughout her internment. She is even given special care by a guard in Moabit prison 
who gives her extra food. According to her text, it seems that others see her as a political 
prisoner and not only that, they help her and are sympathetic to her and her cause, 
contrary to how most guards are represented in Rinser’s diary. That Wolf portrays 
people in such a way supports her righteous political self-representation but also gives 
her a sense of equality with her superiors and an illusion of control over her 
incarceration. The positive reaction of others towards her reinforces her identity as a 
dignified and authoritative political prisoner.65 Rinser’s diary does not give this sense of 
her equality with her guards because she uses it to separate herself from the prison 
authorities and place herself above them.
Rather than writing of any particular failures, Wolf is keen to stress her victories, or 
special treatment in prison, showing herself as an agent in order to raise herself above
the disempowerment of imprisonment. In contrast to Rinser, it seems that it is what Wolf 
does not describe about her imprisonment that is important to an analysis of her self-
representation. Wolf may write about feeling miserable in prison but she keeps such 
descriptions on an abstract level and does not go into detail about how prison affects her 
                                                
65 Although this self-representation contrasts with that in Rinser’s diary, it is reminiscent of Albie Sachs’ 
prison diary from a South African prison in the 1960s. Albie Sachs, The Jail Diary of Albie Sachs
(London: 1966), although this diary was much more commercially successful than Wolf’s.
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self-esteem. She only mentions that she is seen as a criminal once, and even then she 
manages to assert her dignified, political identity. Furthermore, the degradation of prison 
is only mentioned in detail at the end, and counteracted by her emphasis on her role as a 
leader. Although Wolf does mention some negative aspects of prison, she seems less 
vociferous about prison’s negative effects than Rinser, giving the impression that, apart 
from the horror of solitary confinement, she is treated rather well. There is little 
reference to any humiliation she experiences as a prisoner or to any damaging 
experiences she may (or may not) have had. There is a brief implication that Wolf feels 
shame at being a prisoner when she is one day suddenly taken out of prison: ‘Wie ich 
bin, in schmutziger Zuchthauskleidung und zerissenen Schuhen komme ich auf den 
Transport’ (129). As Rinser does on several occasions, Wolf shows a concern for her 
unsightly appearance, perhaps demonstrating the loss of femininity and consequent 
shame that the female prisoner may feel. But Wolf does not go into the same level of 
detail as Rinser; she concentrates only on the shabby state of her clothes, rather than on 
her own body – her face, hair and degree of cleanliness. She does not describe her shame 
to the same degree that Rinser does. Furthermore, Wolf may mention the degradation 
and demoralisation that come along with imprisonment but only in an evasive manner: 
‘In Unfreiheit leben, das ist [die] furchtbarste Erniedrigung im Leben des einzelnen wie 
im Leben der Völker’ (41) and: ‘Untätigkeit, sie wirkt demoralisierend, zersetzend, im 
Leben des einzelnen, wie im Leben der Völker’ (42). This is a rather hesitant way of 
conveying the humiliation and depression of confinement: Wolf applies it to herself in a 
distanced, third person style and puts it in a wider context – it is not just she who is 
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punished, but a whole nation of people suffer as a result of the war too. Unlike Rinser, 
Wolf seems much less willing to articulate how prison affects her directly.
It is the political prisoners and ‘true’ martyrs whom she encounters in the 
‘Todeszelle’ whom Wolf describes in the most detail, despite the fact that she writes that 
she got to know hundreds of women during her time in prison (171). In writing of the 
anonymous mass of women she avoids any descriptions of them as individuals, perhaps 
to limit any association of herself with criminal women. Wolf does, however, write 
about a non-political prisoner with whom she shares a cell. This is the only mention she 
makes within the diary itself of a ‘real’ female criminal, describing the woman as a 
‘Mörderin’ who repeats litanies throughout the night: ‘Stunde um Stunde geht diese 
gespenstische Kasteiung’ (both 147). It could be that Wolf sees her cellmate as a 
monstrous, mad character, given her unsettling behaviour and her past as a murderer. 
This recalls the stereotypes of the hysterical female criminal described with reference to 
Rinser’s fellow prisoners. But Wolf is more ambiguous in her representation of the 
murderer than Rinser. She eventually moves out of the cell, saying: ‘Ich fürchte mich 
vor den schlaflosen Nächten’ (147). Wolf claims she is not scared of the woman herself, 
rather she is concerned about the practical prospect of not being able to sleep. She is also 
sympathetic to the girl, referring to her as ‘die Unglückliche.’ The cellmate’s story is 
also represented sympathetically, with emphasis placed on the woman’s regret over her 
crime rather than the deviance itself: ‘Viele Jahre quält sie sich schon und kasteit sich’ 
(147). Despite her sympathies, Wolf writes of her distance from her cellmate, not even 
mentioning her name. Wolf describes the story of the woman’s infanticide, but it is a 
guard rather than the woman herself who tells it to her. Wolf does not write of any direct 
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communication between herself and her cellmate. In moving out of the cell she further 
demonstrates her distance from the nameless woman, using her narrative to insist that 
she and this woman have no connection. 
In using the diary in response to the ‘pains of imprisonment’, Wolf is able to turn the 
harmful, isolated experience of long-term imprisonment into a positive and useful one, 
akin to that historical and cultural narrative found in the German Bildungsroman; a sub-
genre which follows ‘the psychological development of one central protagonist.’66 That 
which Wolf writes is there to serve as a means of catharsis as well as to strengthen her 
identity as a female political prisoner. This happens not just through either omitting or 
neutralising any unpleasant or degrading incidents, or unsavoury characters, but also 
within the context of her whole life narrative. In one of the flashbacks in which Wolf 
looks back on enjoyable moments of her life, there is an implication that her current self 
is an improvement on her previous, often reckless self: ‘Das Feuer der Leidenschaft, das 
oft wild aufloderte, ist niedergebrannt, doch nicht erloschen. Geblieben ist eine ruhige 
Flamme, die in treuer Pflichterfüllung weiterglüht’ (145). Throughout the whole diary, 
Wolf shows the reader that the seemingly damaging, punishing experience of prison has 
only made her a stronger person in her political convictions and spirit: ‘Die qualvollen 
Jahre haben mich nicht geschwächt, mein Vertrauen in die Zukunft wurde gefestigt.’ 
(86) 
Wolf explains that the pain of prison improves her mind: ‘Der Schmerz ist mir zum 
Erkenntnisquell geworden, aus dessen Tiefe ich schöpfen durfte’ (86). Wolf’s 
                                                
66 Todd Kontje, The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre (Rochester, NY: Camden 
House, 1993), p. 8.
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knowledge is improved by her time in prison, unlike Rinser who feels that the lack of 
intellectual stimulation, combined with the influence of her less educated criminal 
cellmates, make her less intelligent. Wolf believes that her self-knowledge is also 
improved by prison: ‘Reifer bin ich geworden in dieser Zeit unerhörten Erlebens, klarer 
sehe ich die Fehler, die ich früher als kleine Schwächen zu entschuldigen suchte, und 
mit dem Erkennen verbindet sich zugleich der Wille, sie zu bekämpfen und ganz 
abzulegen’ (53). However, she does not go into detail about exactly what weaknesses 
she previously had, focusing only on the positive aspects of her character and thereby 
showing less self-awareness than Rinser. What Wolf does emphasise is that she is better, 
wiser, more mature and ready to fight the good fight. Rather than bringing her down as it 
is supposed to, she writes that prison only makes her stronger and thus defeats its 
purpose, a narrative of resistance that is common to female prisoners according to 
Bosworth.67 Wolf raises herself above the misery and the lack of control of prison by 
continually saying that her experience is worth the pain for what she personally gains 
from it, but also draws on her identity as a martyr to imply that those outside prison gain 
from it too. A sort of mantra runs through the diary: ‘Ja, es lohnt sich, in der Tiefe gelebt 
zu haben, um den Wert des Lebens ermessen zu können’ (74). She needs to account for 
the years she has lost against her will by telling herself, and the reader, that she is not in 
prison for nothing and has become a better person, once again achieving a level of 
agency over those years in prison. Herein also lies the implication that Wolf is reformed 
by her incarceration. Her diary shows that she comes out of prison a better person than 
                                                
67 Bosworth, p. 135: ’despite their limited choices, the women in prison constantly endeavoured to resist 
the restrictions placed upon them inside. They frequently described themselves as having been 
strengthened by the experience of prison.’
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when she went in. According to her diary, prison has cured what she sees as her 
previous, flawed identity. Paradoxically this issue of reform aligns to the rehabilitative 
aim of modern (but non-Nazi) penal institutes.68 However, Wolf comes out with fortified 
rather than reformed political convictions. Her reform has had the opposite effect from 
what the National Socialists wanted: prison has allowed Wolf to become the sort of 
person she wants to be, rather than the person that her captors want her to be.
Conclusion
The self-representation as an improved subject, ideal woman and ‘good’ political 
prisoner provides the author with a means of resisting the damaging effects of 
imprisonment. The diary gives each woman a sense of agency: it allows her to choose 
who she wants to be at a time when her identity is under threat, allowing her the 
opportunity to re-label or ‘rewrite’ her self during incarceration. 
Rinser’s rewriting of herself occurs through disempowering those fellow inmates and 
prison authorities around her by describing their supposedly deviant gender 
performances. In setting herself in contrast to them, she creates an image of herself as an 
ideal woman: sexually naïve, educated and non-criminal. Whereas Rinser’s account 
deals with her identity as a woman, Wolf’s concentrates more on her political identity. 
In her diary she becomes a political leader, positioned within the kind of historical 
narrative identified in the prison letters of Rosa Luxemburg. Wolf combines this 
political identity with a maternal one, creating a self endowed with an acceptable 
                                                
68 Nazi prisons serve as a disruption in the reforming history of the prison since, in contrast to the Weimar 
penal system, their goal was extreme punishment rather than rehabilitation – Wachsmann, p. 81.
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superior and authoritative status within the prison environment. Both authors use 
narratives of superiority in their self-representation as political prisoners to put 
themselves above the degradation and isolation of prison, but Wolf does so without the 
same degree of criminalisation and belittlement of others found in Rinser’s account. 
Within these narratives of superiority a striking contrast emerges: Rinser treats most of 
her fellow prisoners like ‘real’ criminals, be they political or not, whereas Wolf treats 
most of hers like a mass of political prisoners. 
Rinser shows the reader that she is, at least partly, aware of her arrogant and superior 
attitude to others and this self-awareness gives the reader a sense that she has heightened 
agency: she is able to analyse and judge not just the behaviour of others but her own 
behaviour. She becomes both the observer and the observed, occupying a position held 
by the sometimes judgemental readership. Wolf, however, avoids any degrading subjects 
and seems to have tunnel vision for positive, self-boosting matters rather than allowing 
the reader to see her specific weaknesses, as Rinser does. Wolf’s emphasis on her 
strength as well as her literary, artistic ability creates a self-representation in which she 
becomes a sort of superwoman. It is by avoiding references to her own flaws that Wolf 
tries to achieve a sense of self and of agency in this self-representation, whereas it seems 
that some of Rinser’s agency is gained through her self-conscious emphasis on her 
weaknesses and flaws.
Rinser’s text was far more popular than Wolf’s, partly because of its earlier 
publication period and Rinser’s status as an author, but also because, as a sophisticated 
writer, Rinser adapts herself for an audience. In her somewhat defensive account, she 
seems aware that she is being judged by an outside perspective. This awareness extends 
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to the forewords of her diary, it changes over time in response to her audience (as well 
as to her own changing perception of herself), as demonstrated in the conflicting 
narratives and differing versions of herself presented in her forewords and 
autobiography.
Wolf was inexperienced at writing for an audience and, in her lack of basic 
description and attempts to strengthen her sense of self, she risks alienating the reader by 
elevating herself without giving any sense of consciousness about the sort of persona she 
is creating. Wolf’s diary is focussed on linguistic ‘repair work’: narratives which either 
vent her frustration or boost her sense of self, rather than describing her imprisonment 
for the benefit of a wider audience. In contrast, her 1973 autobiography, Ein Leben ist 
viel zuwenig, gives far less detail about prison life and concentrates instead on the events 
before and after prison in which Wolf worked actively for the Communist party. It was 
more widely distributed than the diary, partly because it was published in the GDR (a 
climate in which such published accounts of Communist history were promoted by the 
government) and partly, one suspects, because it is a more complete and reader-friendly 
account.
Two kinds of prison narrative emerge here: the subject-focussed narrative ‘repair 
work’ of Wolf’s diary and the narrative, such as Rinser’s, which appeals more to a 
readership. But in identifying these different kinds of writing, there lies the implication 
that Wolf’s text is the one that provides her with more agency, that the established 
prison writer such as Rinser in some way compromises her sense of self for an audience, 
and thus loses that sense of autonomy found in diary-writing. But this is problematised if 
we consider the autobiographical act inherent to prison writing: that of preserving a 
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sense of self. Rinser identifies as an author and an intellectual, so one could argue that, 
in ‘compromising’ herself to her audience through writing in a conventional, suitable 
way for them, Rinser preserves that very identity as a professional writer.
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Chapter Three: ‘War ich nicht selbst jemand?’ Locating the 
maternal self in Margret Bechler’s Warten auf Antwort.
Introduction 
Margret Bechler’s (1914-2002) collaborative autobiography Warten auf Antwort: ein 
deutsches Schicksal is an account of confinement in East Germany between 1945 and 
1956, spanning the duration of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) as well as the early 
years of the German Democratic Republic, which was formed in 1949. First published in 
1978 and a commercial success, the text has generated eight editions and is currently in 
its twenty-second printing. This success is attributable to the extraordinary and tragic 
nature of Bechler’s story. Arrested by Allied forces at the end of World War Two for 
denouncing an anti-fascist resistance member during the war, Bechler spent the next 
eleven years in prisons and camps in East Germany and was even sentenced to death for 
‘Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit’ during the Waldheim war crimes trials of 1950, 
a verdict that was later reduced to a life sentence. According to Bechler, her husband, 
Bernhard Bechler (1911-2002), was aware of her incarceration but he declared her dead, 
remarried and went on to a successful military career in the GDR. Bechler had two 
children from whom she was separated during her incarceration and who, at the time of 
writing her account, she had not seen since her arrest more than thirty years earlier. 
Bechler was incarcerated in both Soviet camps and GDR prisons between 1945 and 
1956. During the first half of her incarceration, she was held in the Bautzen, Jamlitz, 
Mühlberg and Buchenwald camps. All Soviet camps on German soil were dissolved in 
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1950 and detainees were transferred to prisons.1 In February 1950, Bechler was taken to 
Waldheim prison in Saxony. That she was held in camps for half of the time that she 
spent in incarceration raises pertinent issues for my research. My objective is to analyse 
prison writing rather than writing from prison camps because they are different systems 
of punishment. The institution of punishment has a significant effect on both the 
experience and how that experience is articulated; the experience of a Soviet camp is 
bound to be very different from that of a prison. This is particularly clear when we 
compare the poor conditions and barbaric treatment of prisoners in the Mühlberg camp 
where Bechler was held between 1947 and 1948 with the relative comfort in which she 
lived when held in Waldheim prison in 1950. Not only do the conditions in camps differ 
from those in prisons but each individual carceral space is different from the next. 
Because of the varying institutional frameworks, no two institutions will affect the 
subject’s experience in the same way.2 Bechler’s text exists as an account from both
institutions. In my analysis of it I do not wish to imply that prisons and camps inflict 
comparable levels and types of punishment but I do not confine my analysis to her 
representation of her time in prisons, as I feel that any discussion of her narrative should 
apply to how she represents her self throughout the whole text.3  
                                                
1 Finn, Die politischen Häftlinge der Sowjetzone, p. 64.
2 See e.g .Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und 
Gattungsgeschichte der Gefängnisliteratur, p. 8. Weigel discusses the different types of prison institutions 
and the influence of these on different types of writing. Also see: Keßler, p. 156. Keßler discusses the 
issues surrounding how literature reflects the 'reality' of imprisonment, as well as how the experience 
shapes what is written about it. Ioan Davies too stresses the importance of context on the language that is 
used to represent it – all total institutions affect experience and the subsequent narrative differently, 
Davies, p. 15.
3 There may be differences evident in her portrayal of her time in each total institution but these are 
problematic to pinpoint and outwith the scope of my current research. The problems of such an 
undertaking arise given the difficulties inherent in ascertaining what effect each carceral system has on the 
subject. Although the institution itself has a big effect, it is not the sole factor in Bechler’s representation 
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Bechler’s text falls within the genre of ‘autobiography’, even though the words 
‘Autobiographie’ or ‘Memoiren’ do not appear anywhere in the title pages or the text 
itself. 4 However, the name of the subject matches that on the cover in the most recent 
editions of the text (in the first edition from 1978, the names on the title page are Mine 
Stalmann and Margret Bechler, as I discuss later), indicating that the text is to be 
categorised as autobiography.5 The paratext also adheres to autobiographical criteria: in 
most editions, Bechler’s photo is on the cover, alongside photos of her and her family in 
the middle of the book. This real-life documentation establishes Bechler as a real person 
and her text as non-fiction. This is part of what Lejeune would call an ‘autobiographical 
pact’: an implicit agreement between author and reader in all autobiographical texts that 
what they are reading is fact rather than fiction.6 But the belief that the text is 
autobiographical does not end with the paratext or the author’s name; its content must 
also reinforce its non-fiction label and its author must be believed to be telling the truth 
in order for the autobiographical pact to be maintained.7 ‘Truth’ is a contestable 
category, but at the very least, the author must show that she attempts to tell the truth: 
‘Wenn die Autobiographie nicht im Stande ist, die ‘wahre Wirklichkeit’ zu 
protokollieren, so hat sie doch ‘wahrhaftig’ zu sein, d.h. nach bestem Wissen und 
                                                                                                                                               
of her time in incarceration. There are other variants to be considered such as the effect of prolonged 
imprisonment on the subject as well factors external to the prison space such as family circumstances. 
4 I use this term to refer, not to all life-writing, but to a more specific type of writing: that of recording the 
life’s events in first person form after they have happened. 
5 Philippe Lejeune, Signes de vie: le pacte autobiographique 2 (Paris: Seuil, 2005), p. 32. For Lejeune, the 
existence of what he refers to as a ‘signature’ is one of the main indicators that the text is 
autobiographical.
6 See Ibid., for a fuller discussion of the autobiographical pact. 
7 Of course there is a parallel strain of autobiography, exemplified by James Frey’s controversial 2003 
‘memoir’ A Million Little Pieces, that becomes famous and successful partly because it has been proved 
untrue. Such cases, however, are exceptional, although worthy of further examination in their relationship 
to the autobiographical pact.
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Gewissen zu berichten. So jedenfalls führen sich zahlreiche Autobiographien namentlich 
früherer Jahrhunderte ein’.8 The reader must believe that the author is trying to provide a 
true account of herself in order to relate to the text as autobiography. In order for 
autobiography to succeed as non-fiction, it must be perceived as truth – an authentic 
rendering of events. I shall examine the numerous ways in which Bechler’s text operates 
as an ‘authenticated’ account of her time in incarceration, presenting an image of 
‘realness’ to the reader. 
A key concern in the examination of Bechler’s text is that she did not write her 
autobiography herself: it is a collaborative account, written with Mine Stalmann; this 
throws up additional problems relating to authenticity. Alongside my examination of the 
quest for authenticity, it is important to question what function writing autobiography 
rather than diary serves the author in her attempts to deal with the effects of 
incarceration, to (re)build a sense of self after the crisis of imprisonment and, in 
Bechler's case, the crisis of losing her children. Long-term incarceration throws up a new 
set of concerns in the analysis of women’s prison writing: Bechler must negotiate 
between the world of prison into which she has become immersed over the years and the 
world of her audience, challenging as well as adhering to expectations of how 
‘respectable’ women should be. In doing so, she attempts to reveal both to herself and 
the reader who the 'real', authentic Margret Bechler is. Bechler’s representation of her 
character development and changing position throughout her years in prison provides a 
way of representing the female prisoner not seen in the texts of Rinser and Wolf.
                                                
8 Wagner-Egelhaaf, pp. 3-4.
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The function of prison autobiography
Whereas the diary helps its author locate herself during incarceration, autobiography 
serves retrospectively to establish the author’s sense of self. Autobiographical scholars, 
especially post-structuralists, have theorised a self always in flux and prone to 
contradictions.9 Self-representation is subject to change as long as the writer is alive, 
because their self-perception can vary as the years of their life pass. Such an unfixed self 
is evident in an analysis of Luise Rinser’s conflicting narratives: Rinser gives differing 
self-representations in her diary, its forewords, and her later autobiography. An 
autobiography takes a significant period of time to write, sometimes years. Bechler’s 
was composed over a number of different time frames and from different sources: a 
tape-recording of an interview with a journalist in the late 1950s; Bechler’s own notes 
written over a six-year period; and contributions she made in the 1970s when Mine 
Stalmann was writing up the account.10 Since Bechler’s account was written at several 
points over the twenty years between her incarceration and the book’s publication, she 
had time to change how she perceived herself and how she wished to be perceived by 
others. However, it is difficult to gauge how far self-representation alters over time 
because of the author’s changing self-perception from moment to moment rather than 
year to year. It could be argued that contradictions are always present since the subject is 
divided in the present, regardless of how much time passes. Paul Jay cites Roland 
                                                
9 For closer theoretical examination see: Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves
(Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1999), and James Olney, ed., Autobiography: Essays 
Theoretical and Critical (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
10 Mine Stalmann and Margret Bechler, Warten auf Antwort: ein deutsches Schicksal (Munich: Kindler, 
1978), p. 413. This information is taken from the epilogue to the 1978 edition but was removed in later 
editions. 
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Barthes’ autobiography: ‘ “I am not contradictory, I am dispersed,” ’ in reference to 
those contradictions that exist whenever one speaks of oneself, regardless of which time 
frame in which the utterance occurs.11
There may be a substantial philosophical framework in which the ‘dispersed’ self is 
the focus of attention, but there exists a widespread parallel belief that autobiography 
presents a ‘whole’ self. This serves an important function for the autobiographer trying 
to establish a sense of who they are. The existence and process of writing autobiography 
gives the impression that identity is complete and fixed. Paul John Eakin explains of 
autobiographical writing: 
we are not what we were; self and memory are emergent, in process, constantly 
evolving […] Responding to the flux of self-experience, we instinctively 
gravitate to identity-supporting structures: the notion of identity as continuous 
over time, and the use of autobiographical discourse to record its history.12
Autobiography creates the impression of a consistent identity over time and therefore it 
can, in many cases, represent the author’s pursuit of continuity and wholeness of self. 
According to Judy Simons, the autobiography helps ‘to impose a sense of wholeness on 
the disparate and transient concept of selfhood.’13 This retrospective self-location is 
particularly important when it comes to prison writing. In the diaries of Rinser and Wolf, 
we see their response to the change of self imposed on them by incarceration and their 
attainment of agency within the disempowering environment of prison. The writing of 
autobiography presents another means of responding to the destabilising experience of 
imprisonment and a means of attaining autonomy over the self damaged by 
                                                
11 Paul Jay, "Being in the Text," MLN 97, no. 5 (1982), p. 1057.
12 Eakin, p. 20. 
13 Judy Simons, Diaries and Journals of Literary Women from Fanny Burney to Virginia Woolf
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 13.
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incarceration; the prison autobiography acts as a means of cementing identity, because it 
gives the writer the opportunity to articulate their sense of who they are in printed text 
and to a public audience.
The retrospection involved in writing autobiography, rather than diary, is a key means 
of gaining control over the experience. A significant amount of time passes between the 
event and the author’s description of it.14 Because of this, the former prisoner and 
autobiographer, unlike the diarist, has had time to change how she perceives her 
experience and is, perhaps most importantly, no longer within the particular situation of 
crisis represented by prison. Although they are edited retrospectively, the diaries of 
Rinser and Wolf are intended to show the authors’ immersion in the moment of crisis: 
they show their shock at being trapped in prison and have no knowledge of when or if 
they will be released.15 The diary acts as a source of comfort and control during this 
period of immersion. The author of autobiography is no longer trapped in that moment 
of imprisonment and disempowerment; she has temporal distance from the events she 
describes and from her past self. Crucially, the author knows how the prison narrative 
will end: there is more certainty and control over the experience and how that experience 
is rendered.
The distance of years endows the author with self-awareness, i.e. the ability to look 
back to past events and her past self, and judge them accordingly. Elissa Gelfland 
                                                
14 Traditionally, autobiographies (such as those of prominent politicians) are written when the subject is at 
a later age and span a whole lifetime. This contrasts quite remarkably with the recent spate of celebrity 
autobiographies, especially in the U.K., which are often written when the subject is in their late teens or 
early twenties. 
15 Suzanne Juhasz writes ‘the perspective of the diarist is immersion, not distance.’ Suzanne Juhasz, "The 
Journal as Source and Model for Feminist Art: The Example of Kathleen Fraser," Frontiers: A Journal of 
Women Studies 8, no. 1 (1984), p. 16.
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explains that the choice of genre is pertinent to the prison author’s self-representation 
because the autobiography alerts the reader not to the writer’s deviance but to ‘the future 
righted appreciation of the whole woman and her whole life.’16 The retrospection central 
to the autobiographical form serves her self-representation and any justifications of her 
‘crime’ well, because it is her ‘present’, post-incarceration voice speaking and imposing 
upon the past self, the wisdom and supposed wholeness of the current self. Weintraub 
tells us:
When the autobiographer has gained that firm vantage point from which the full 
retrospective view on life can be had, he imposes on the past the order of the 
present. The fact once in the making can now be seen together with the fact in 
its result. By this superimposition of the completed fact, the fact in the making 
acquires a meaning it did not possess before. The meaning of the past is 
intelligible and meaningful in terms of the present understanding.17
Weintraub may contentiously assume that there is a stage at which the self reaches 
completion, but this excerpt still has value for the study of retrospective accounts of 
incarceration because it shows that in the autobiography it is the present self that is 
represented; in our context it is the post-prison author judging her past experiences and 
her past self through the process of writing. Such imposition of the ‘current’ self upon 
the past one is also demonstrated in Rinser’s retrospectively written forewords to her 
prison diary in which she identifies turning points in her character and casts judgements 
upon that past self portrayed in the diary.
In retrospective writing, the author has the power to re-write the experience into a 
‘whole’ narrative with a beginning, middle and end, unlike the diarist, whose text is 
                                                
16 Elissa Deborah Gelfand, "Women Prison Authors in France: Twice Criminal," Modern Language 
Studies 11, no. 1 (1980), p. 59. 
17 Karl Weintraub, "Autobiography and Historical Consciousness," Critical Inquiry 1, no. 4 (1975), p. 826. 
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often a series of entries with no ‘literary’ structure (although prison writing often 
transgresses generic conventions, since, in some cases, it starts and ends in conjunction 
with the period of imprisonment18). This creation of a unified identity involves the 
construction of a character arc, especially in the prison autobiography, in which the 
author goes through life-changing experiences. The author retrospectively charts her 
character’s ‘journey’, giving her life a literary narrative, and, as with Lore Wolf’s Ich 
habe das Leben lieb, evoking the Bildungsroman literary model. This makes the account 
more readable, since it involves a recognisable script to which the reader (and author) 
can relate. 
Despite the agency to be gained in the writing of autobiography, retrospective self-
representations are open to the criticism of being inauthentic. After all, constructing a 
text complete with character arc and literary structure could be seen as distorting the 
‘truth’. Furthermore, the ‘present’ self of the autobiography, in describing a past 
experience and identity, could be accused of being unable to ‘capture’ that previous self, 
because it is writing at a later time. This raises the issue of memory: how do we know 
that Bechler’s memory was accurate? Bechler recounts quite specific and detailed events 
from her eleven years’ incarceration, including conversations she had in prison. It is 
unlikely that she would have remembered them word for word, which exposes her to 
accusations of fabrication. In moulding her experiences into a literary, readable 
                                                
18 As seen in Lore Wolf’s diary, as well as: Mascha Rolnikaite, Ich muss erzählen: Mein Tagebuch 1941-
1945, (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2004), and in Stefan Lorant, I Was Hitler's Prisoner
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939), which was first published in English in 1935 and later in the original 
German. Both Rolnikaite and Lorant documented their incarceration in concentration camps and prisons 
during the Third Reich. Interestingly, Luise Rinser’s diary does not end with her release because she ran 
out of paper after only a few months of diary-writing. 
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structure, Bechler may gain agency and a sense of identity, but she must be careful to 
appear as authentic as possible. 
Because the prison diary is written when its author has less time to deliberate or to 
construct a story with a literary structure to it, it is less susceptible to accusations of 
inauthenticity. The diary could be read as ‘truer’ and ‘more real’ than the 
autobiographical account, written years after the events it describes. Of course the 
published diary undergoes an editing process, during which certain elements are 
possibly added or omitted, so there is retrospective activity involved in the publication 
of both the diary and the autobiography. This means that another self can be imposed on 
both the diary as well as the autobiography: that ‘self’ may be the diary’s author (if the 
author is the editor as Rinser was) editing the text at a later time, or an entirely different 
self and voice if the editor is another person, such as Ulrike Riemann, the editor of 
Warten auf Antwort. Crucially, though, the diary at least seems more authentic and direct 
than the autobiography, regardless of whether or not it actually is.  
There is a definite attempt to authenticate the text in Warten auf Antwort: each 
chapter opens with an introduction – written by the book’s editor Ulrike Riemann, which 
provides the ‘factual’ historical context to Bechler’s incarceration, confirming her 
narrative’s place within real, and indeed momentous, past events. It seems her text has a 
particularly ‘real’ link to the world outside the text too. As an autobiography, Warten auf 
Antwort is, of course, written for the general public but Bechler’s account also markets 
itself as a personal, earnest attempt to regain contact with her estranged children, with 
whom she had not yet been reunited at the time of writing up the account, more than 
thirty years after she was first incarcerated. A foreword to the 1978 edition written by 
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the text’s co-author, Mine Stalmann, reveals Stalmann’s tentative hopes that the book 
might actually help reunite Bechler with her children.19 That the book is posited as 
serving a function in the outer world is of particular significance when taken in relation 
to Austin’s concept of the illocutionary act – the idea that words ‘do’ something rather 
than just reflecting the world or making statements about it. Although the notion of the 
speech act is broadly recognised in literary studies and often applied to fictional works 
of prose or poetry or drama, it is in autobiographical works where speech acts can have 
the greatest ‘action’, simply because an autobiography is about a real life and real 
people.20 Bechler’s account takes this ‘action’ further than in the letters of Luxemburg 
and the diaries of Rinser and Wolf because she is attempting to exert a specific influence 
on the outer world, using language to get her children back. 
The book may be presented as a means of communicating with Bechler’s children, 
but practically speaking it remains unlikely that it ever reached them, at least not before 
1989. Bechler’s children lived in East Germany and the book was published in the West. 
There is a small possibility that they may have been able to obtain it, although Bechler 
does claim that her children were indoctrinated against her and had no desire to be 
reunited with her, given her status as ‘Mörderin’ (409-410). It is unclear to what degree 
her children would have even wanted to (illegally) obtain her book. The book may 
purport to be written for her children but this is by no means its only purpose. Bechler’s 
publishers were involved in the creation of the text too. It is likely that they wanted to 
use the text as a method of attacking the GDR, part of West Germany’s agenda to 
                                                
19 Stalmann and Bechler, p. 9.
20 See: Bruss, especially the introduction. 
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publicise the oppression of the East German dictatorship. What remains crucial, 
however, is that sense of a heartfelt dialogue with her children that permeates the text: as 
if the public is given insight into an extremely painful and private event and through this 
to the ‘real’ Bechler. She appears not only to be exposing her inner self for her audience 
but doing something with words in real life. She is using words to reunite herself with 
her children, creating the sense that a real act is taking place outwith the narrative as it is 
being read and through this creating an even more authentic, ‘real-life’ autobiography. 
This matter of authenticity is problematised further in Bechler’s text because, as I 
discuss below, it is not just her voice that speaks and represents her past self, that voice 
is accompanied by the voices of those with whom she wrote her collaborative 
autobiography. 
The pursuit of authenticity in collaborative autobiography
Bechler’s autobiography was co-written with the journalist Mine Stalmann, who, 
alongside Jochen von Lang (who transcribed a tape-recorded interview with Bechler)
and Ulrike Riemer (the book’s editor) created the book from Bechler’s extensive notes 
and tape recordings.21 Bechler had written an initial manuscript of the book herself –
which stretched to seven hundred pages and was not accepted for publication – but 
Stalmann created a four-hundred-page book from these notes, which was accepted.22
Warten auf Antwort thus contains at least two individual voices within one ‘I’. 
                                                
21 According to the introduction and afterword of the 1978 edition of the text. 
22 Stalmann and Bechler, 1978 edition, p. 413.
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According to G. Thomas Couser, all collaborative autobiography ‘speaks with a 
cloven tongue […] because it conflates two consciousnesses […] in one undifferentiated 
voice.’23 There is a discrepancy between the ‘I’ as written in the text, and the person to 
whom that ‘I’ refers – it should refer to Bechler but it was written by Stalmann. It could, 
however, be argued that the ‘I’ of the text is separated from its author in all writing. It is 
widely accepted that in the fictional spheres of prose, poetry and drama, the ‘I’ of the 
text is not the writer, although autobiographical elements are to be found. From a 
modernist literary perspective, author and subject can be seen as separate entities, not 
just in fiction but also in autobiography. Paul Jay states that autobiographers in the 
modern literary period, Proust and Joyce in particular, tended to ‘acknowledge the 
inherent disjunction between the writing self and the subject of its text.’ 24  
For Lejeune, the existence of collaborative autobiography draws attention to the 
difference between the ‘I’ of the text, and its writer in all autobiography.25
Collaborative autobiography exposes that all autobiography is mediated: in 
admitting that more than one person wrote it, it highlights that the ‘I’ of the text is 
always separate from the person who wrote it. What has been neglected by critics of 
collaborative autobiography, such as Thomas Couser and Paul John Eakin, is the 
possibility that there may be more than two voices within the collaborative 
autobiography, because of the participation of editors and publishers. In all 
                                                
23 G. Thomas Couser, Altered Egos: Authority in American Autobiography (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), p. 208. 
24 Jay, p. 1051. 
25 Philippe Lejeune, "The Autobiography of Those Who Do Not Write," in On Autobiography 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 186. For further examination see: Michel 
Foucault, "What is an Author?," in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews, ed. Donald Fernand Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), in which 
Foucault  discusses the interdependent relationship between the author and text. 
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autobiography, including the published diary or letter, it is not just the subject who 
speaks: there is always mediation involved. As an editor, Ulrike Reimer may have 
amended Warten auf Antwort, as an editor would non-collaborative autobiography, 
she represents yet another voice and another subjectivity in the text. 
Collaborative autobiography may function as an exposure of the way that all 
published literature or autobiography operates and as an illustration of the post-
structuralist disjuncture between the ‘I’ and the author, but according to Lejeune’s 
concept of the ‘Autobiographical Pact’, it is that belief that the ‘I’ is the author that 
contributes to the text’s more commercial (rather than academic or intellectual) success 
as an autobiography. The author’s name on the cover, or their ‘signature’ as Lejeune 
calls it, is ‘part of a textual device (cover, title, preface, etc) through which the reading 
contract is established.’26 The reader must know that the text’s author is its protagonist 
and narrator in order for it to be read as autobiography. The belief that the author is a 
real person and the writer of the account becomes part of the reading of the story itself, 
rather than a reflection of any ‘reality’ outside the text. That Bechler’s name is the only 
one on the cover (apart from in the book’s first edition) conveys to the reader not only 
that her story is true, but that she is the only author; that the ‘I’ in the text refers to her 
only.
In this sense, there is a degree of insincerity in the fact that Bechler is presented as 
only a secondary author in the first edition of Warten auf Antwort – Stalmann’s is the 
primary name on the cover and she also writes the foreword. Because it has been openly 
stated on the book’s cover (in the first edition) that the text is collaborative, the reader is 
                                                
26 Lejeune, "The Autobiography of Those Who Do Not Write," p. 193.
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being hereby told that they do not have direct access to the subject of the text, because 
she is mediated by the writer. It may be Stalmann’s voice that the reader is reading, 
rather than that of Bechler. It can be disconcerting and uncanny to the reader that 
someone else ‘speaks’ for her, as if someone else is pretending to be her. The reader 
may question if they are reading the ‘real’ Bechler, thus potentially disrupting the 
autobiographical pact between reader and writer: if the text does not involve the author 
writing about her own experiences, then can it be regarded as proper autobiography? 
Although Stalmann is presented as the primary author in the first edition and even 
writes its foreword, in subsequent editions her name is removed from the title page and 
she contributes only a brief epilogue. In this she says that because she was unable to 
uncover the other side of Bechler’s story (from her ex-husband Bernhard Bechler), she 
does not wish her name to be on the title page (412). It is particularly striking that 
Stalmann appears as the party who is most concerned with objectivity, with finding out 
the true story, rather than Bechler, as if she, in her position as ghost-writer, pursues 
authenticity more than Bechler does. Whether this change of signature (as Lejeune calls 
it) really does stem from a conflict with Bechler, or the publisher, or whether it is 
actually because of Stalmann’s moral position as she claims, is not known. Both Bechler 
and Stalmann are deceased and little information is available from the publishing houses 
Ullstein and the now non-operational Kindler Verlag, who initially published the text. 
Conveniently, in withdrawing Stalmann’s name from the cover, Warten auf Antwort
looks, if we disregard the existence of Stalmann’s rather discreet epilogue, like a 
‘normal’ non-collaborative autobiography, fulfilling the autobiographical pact, and 
seeming to provide full unmediated access to the ‘real’ Margret Bechler who seems to 
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be speaking for herself. Although Stalmann writes that it was her own choice to 
withdraw her name, it was perhaps felt that the book would sell more successfully if it 
were marketed as an account written only by Bechler. I will be examining the text as 
Bechler’s text, but not without an awareness of the concerns inherent in doing so. It is 
not only her voice speaking, indeed someone else is controlling her words; this means 
there are potential problems relating to an analysis of Bechler’s performance of agency. 
The role of Bechler’s audience
Both diaries and autobiographies operate as documents of personal catharsis and self-
formation (as I discuss below) as well as public products, in which the author attempts to 
create a self-representation which fits both her own sense of self and that of her 
imagined audience. Jerome Bruner’s discussion of the negotiation between personal 
autonomy and commitment to the audience in all life narratives is useful here,27 but so 
too is the wider corpus of study looking at the concept of the imagined audience. 
Whereas doubt exists over how much the published diary is written with a public 
audience in mind, autobiography is always written to be read by an audience. The author 
too, acts as an audience member, speaking to herself through her narrative. It is difficult 
to pinpoint what kind of audience Bechler (or Stalmann or the publishers) had in mind 
because of the heterogeneous nature of audience. There have been long-standing debates 
surrounding the ‘imagined audience’ dating back to the classical rhetoric of Ancient 
Greece, which posited an essentially antagonistic, one-directional relationship between 
                                                
27 Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” p. 78.
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speaker and audience, in which the speaker tries to persuade the audience. This differs 
from the more communicative conception of rhetoric theorised in modern rhetorical 
studies.28 R. J. Willey explains that there exists an ongoing debate in this more recent 
research concerning ‘whether writers address actual readers external to their texts or 
whether they invoke an audience within their texts, teaching their readers through textual 
cues how to relate to and read a given text.’29 Ruth Mitchell and Mary Taylor see writing 
as ‘a means of acting upon a receiver’30: they privilege the addressed audience over the 
invoked, implying that it is the audience that shapes the author and the text. Russell
Long, however, stresses that the audience is a ‘created fiction,’ that writers can never 
know their readers and seek to shape them, rather than be shaped by them. Walter Ong 
refers to two understandings of the audience as a fiction: ‘First, that the writer must 
construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role 
…Second, we mean that the audience must correspondingly fictionalize itself’.31 For 
Ong, the experienced writer has creative power in being able not only to imagine an 
audience, but to modify them too. 
The invoked/addressed audience debate raises issues of agency, as briefly mentioned 
at the end of Chapter Two in relation to Luise Rinser’s prison diary. Is the writer 
passively compromising herself in addressing her audience, or is she actively shaping 
her audience through her narrative? It seems the theory of the invoked audience 
                                                
28 Robert J. Connors and others, Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 40. 
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R.J. Willey, “Pre-Classical Roots of the Addressed/Invoked Dichotomy of Audience,” in A Sense of 
Audience in Written Communication, ed. Gesa Kirsch and Duane Roen (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 
1990), p. 26.
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Ruth Mitchell and Mary Taylor, “The Integrating Perspective: An Audience-Response Model for 
Writing, ” College English, 41, no. 3 (1979), p. 250.
31 Walter J. Ong, "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction," PMLA 90, no. 1 (1975), p. 12.
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overemphasises the writer’s power and undervalues that of the reader, whereas the 
addressed audience theory does the opposite, devaluing the agency of the writer in 
relation to her audience. It is perhaps more useful to perceive the relationship as not only 
a combination of the invoked and addressed audience but as a balance between the two: 
the writer is always speaking to, as well as constructing an audience in her text. Minot 
argues that the writer must ‘both analyse and invent an audience.’32 Bechler may create a 
role for her reader, but there are significant constraints on that role, she does not have 
free rein in her text and must negotiate her way through what she sees as public 
expectations and her own personal ones. Her concern is to create an identity that both 
reflects the experience of prison as well as fitting in with what her putative audience 
expects. 
At this point it is useful to examine the social and historical context in which Bechler 
first published her text. Bechler’s text may document an experience that took place in 
the 1940s and 1950s but it was written and published in West Germany in the 1970s. 
Political upheavals which came with the 1968 student movement and the ensuing 
‘sexual revolution’, meant that traditional female gender roles in West Germany had 
shifted since 1946, when Rinser first published her diary. The accepted role of women 
was beginning to change to incorporate a less domestic, more politically active and 
sexually open role. But a backlash against the women’s movement had also begun: the 
tendency to ‘mock feminism in the most derisive terms had become commonplace,’ 
                                                
32 Walter S. Minot, "Response to Russell C. Long," College Composition and Communication 32, no. 3 
(1981), p. 337.
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according to Herzog.33 Bechler, then, was writing at a time when there were increasing 
disputes within public discourse concerning the role of women in society. Her account is 
therefore open to contrasting levels of criticism or praise depending on the type of 
audience that reads it, be they liberal feminists, conservative women and men, or those 
in-between certain ideologies.
There were, however, certain cultural beliefs that dominated the public sphere (and 
indeed still do), especially those involving women's involvement in National Socialism. 
Bechler’s autobiography was being written and published at a time when there was an 
increased effort to address the atrocities of the Third Reich within public discourse. 
Public acknowledgement took the form of memorials and publications, after the relative
silence of the 1950s and first half of the 1960s. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich’s 
Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern (1967) marked a change in how the Holocaust was dealt with 
in the German public sphere and instigated a more widespread, public approach to the 
discussion of the National Socialism. Although it had become more common to talk 
publicly about one’s role within the Third Reich, this was a controversial task for 
Bechler, given her position as a Nazi wife and implicitly as a sympathiser and/or 
perpetrator. Luise Rinser’s representation of the female prison guards as the most 
criminal women she encounters during incarceration reflects a widespread perception of 
the woman who supported or sympathised with National Socialism as a particularly 
dangerous kind of criminal.34 Such women have been represented as worse criminals 
than their male counterparts, demonstrated in the notoriety attached to the brutal 
                                                
33 Dagmar Herzog, Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton, 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 237.
34 See chapter 2, especially discussion of Rinser’s representation of the guard Frau L. 
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concentration camp guard Ilse Koch, which outweighs the infamy of the more numerous 
and equally brutal male guards. In such portrayals women are depicted as inhumane, and 
monstrous, but most of all, unfeminine, deviating from the feminine role assigned them. 
Claudia Koonz makes reference to the particularly brutal behaviour of female guards but 
emphasises how few there were compared to men, and suggests that they ‘seemed more 
cruel because their behaviour deviated farther from our conceptions of ‘feminine’ 
models than men guards’ behaviour deviated from stereotypes about men.’35 The violent 
National Socialist woman became a scapegoat: she faced more castigation and 
punishment than her male counterpart, because she deviated not only in committing 
brutal acts but also in crossing a gender boundary. 
It is in response to such accusations of deviant or non-femininity that the figure of the 
mother was often employed. The symbol of the ideal mother was and continues to be a 
potent mode of representation; but it was particularly within the public discourses of the 
Third Reich that there was discussion of what ‘good’ motherhood entailed. National 
Socialist propaganda advertised the value of domestic womanhood: the ideal Nazi 
woman was to produce as many ‘Aryan’ children as possible and to keep a clean, 
orderly home. Those who conformed to such expectations received the Mutterkreuz
medal.36 In National Socialist Germany the symbol of the mother was thus embedded in 
public consciousness. Angelika Ebbinghaus, in her study of the self-representations of 
women involved in National Socialist violence remarks that those women accused of 
                                                
35 See: Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics (London: 
Methuen, 1988), p. 404: her emphasis.
36 Nancy Ruth Reagin, Sweeping the German Nation: Domesticity and National Identity in Germany, 
1870-1945 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 113.
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criminal activity in their National Socialist past use their maternal role to justify any 
deviant behaviour under the regime: ‘Die meisten Fürsorgerinnen haben ihrer 
Auffassung nach immer nur aus mütterlicher Fürsorge gehandelt.’37 Many women 
emphasised the motherly element to their deviant or violent activity – maternal caring 
was their primary duty, which functions as a means of neutralising any criminality.38
Although Bechler could not be described as violent in the same way as National 
Socialist concentration camp guards, her text acts as a response and resistance to an 
imagined audience who may see women like her as deviant and fascist. There is an 
imposition of a non-feminine identity upon Bechler, both by her audience’s views of 
fascist women and by the prison itself. It is in prison that she is separated from her 
children and therefore unable to fulfil her role as mother and wife. This defeminisation is 
compounded by the defeminising environment of prison. On arrival in remand prison in 
Zwickau when she is first arrested, Bechler is confronted by the regulations of a very 
different world from her previous one – it is a world in which she loses the right to be 
referred to as female: ‘Ohne mich anzusehen, löschte die Wachtmeisterin das Frau vor
meinem Namen sorgfältig aus.’39 Hair is seen as a physical manifestation of Bechler’s 
‘femininity’ and she is horrified at the possibility that she, like other prisoners, may have 
to have her head shaved to prevent lice (67). She tries to avoid such a defeminisation for 
as long as possible. Although Bechler is unable to be a wife or mother in prison, this 
                                                
37 Angelika Ebbinghaus, Opfer und Täterinnen: Frauenbiographien des Nationalsozialismus, ed. Ingeborg 
Mues (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch 1997), p. 11.
38 That they acted out of an overriding sense of duty too was a dominant method of exoneration used by 
Germans in the years after 1945. See: Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die 
Unfähigkeit zu trauern: Grundlagen kollektiven Verhaltens (Munich; Zurich: Piper, 1977), and 
Ebbinghaus, especially her ‘Vorwort’. 
39 Margret Bechler, Warten auf Antwort: ein deutsches Schicksal, 2nd ed. (Munich: Ullstein 
Taschenbuchverlag, 2001), p. 46. Subsequent references will be given in the main text. 
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extends to her post-prison life too: she cannot get her family back and does not remarry. 
Her account functions not only as a response to long-term imprisonment, but also to a 
continuing loss of her pre-prison life and femininity, imposed on her not only by her 
imaginary audience but by herself as audience member too. Bechler addresses those 
concerns of her imaginary audience and, simultaneously invokes that audience through 
creating a narrative in which her agency is paramount and in which she shapes the 
audience’s response to her self-representation, as I detail below.
The ultimate female victim
Bechler constructs a domestic, maternal self-representation throughout her text: the book 
is dedicated to her children and the photos accompanying the main text trace Bechler’s 
history as daughter, wife and mother. The emphasis throughout the text is on Bechler as 
a good woman rather than a criminal. Her response to her involvement in Anton Jakob’s 
murder comes mainly at the start of the account and in it Bechler justifies her actions 
chiefly by maintaining throughout that she denounced him in order to save her children 
and herself from being sent to a concentration camp, which, according to her, would 
have been the only alternative if she did not report him. Bechler recounts her response 
when questioned about her actions and accused of being a fascist: ‘Ich sagte, ich sei 
weder Fascist noch Nationalsozialist, ich sei Deutsche, und ich hätte gehandelt, wie ich 
als Mutter hätte handeln müssen’ (54). Although Bechler was not as directly or heavily 
involved in war-crimes as the women in Ebbinghaus’s study, it seems her justification of 
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her participation in Jakob’s execution is the standard excuse of many women involved in 
Nazism: her duty as a mother was her main priority. Bechler thus utilises strong cultural 
beliefs of motherhood and duty at a time when she is accused of fascism, criminality and 
inhumanity. 
Bechler draws a distinction between good and bad motherhood in her account. She 
portrays herself as a better mother than many of the women she comes across during her 
internment. She often goes out of her way to care for youngsters and those in need (for 
example: 78, 184, 197) – showing that she can still be a good mother, even though 
imprisonment prevents her from being a mother to her biological children. In the 
Mühlberg camp which consists predominantly of former National Socialists (128), 
Bechler contrasts her maternal identity with that of the ‘bad mothers’ (i.e. National 
Socialist women) in the camp. She separates herself from these women again when she 
rejects the camp’s annual mother’s day celebrations, during which the National Socialist 
women prove themselves to be bad mothers whose behaviour towards the children in the 
camp is described as ‘unmütterlich und egoistisch’ (144). Bechler by contrast takes great 
joy in working hard in order to help a fellow prisoner, Lilo, make a more attractive outfit 
out of her shapeless prison attire. Bechler documents Lilo’s reaction to these implicitly 
bad mothers: ‘Die sind doch alle Mütter, sagte Lilo, warum benehmen sie nicht so, sie 
denken nur an sich, uns beachten sie nur, wenn wir etwas für sie tun sollen’ (137). 
Bechler shows that she alone possesses the characteristics of a good mother: 
selflessness, compassion and helpfulness. 
According to National Socialist propaganda, the mother’s duty during the Third 
Reich was not just confined to the domestic sphere but pertained to the broader National 
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Socialist political doctrine. Women’s domestic duty fed into the growth of the German 
nation as a whole: their main commitment was to produce and raise as many Aryan 
children as possible with which to further the strength of the Third Reich.40 Hitler even 
compared child-bearing Aryan women to men undertaking military service.41
But Bechler has made it clear that she is not a National Socialist mother by separating 
herself from those ‘bad’ National Socialist ‘mothers’ during incarceration. Neither does 
she portray her own implicitly more ideal maternal role as a political one. She insists 
that, as a good mother, she can have no political direction. In asking herself about her 
own political beliefs at the start of the account she writes: ‘Und ich? Wo stand ich?’ 
(16), but can only refer to the beliefs of the men around her: ‘Ich liebte meinen Vater, 
der Monarchist war. Ich liebte einen Mann, der Nationalsozialist war. Ich liebte meine 
Kinder, die zu klein waren, um irgend etwas anderes zu sein als meine Kinder und seine’ 
(16). Bechler positions herself firmly in the domestic, feminised role of daughter, wife 
and mother and uses this role to exempt herself from occupying a political position. At 
this early stage in the account, political direction implies fascism. There is a strong link 
here between support for National Socialist politics and criminality, because those who 
actively supported this political system were internationally stigmatised and represented 
as criminals after 1945. The good mother – Bechler – has at this stage no political 
beliefs, as a means of avoiding judgment as fascist and therefore criminal. As I discuss 
                                                
40 Kate Lacey, "Driving the Message Home: Nazi Propaganda in the Private Sphere," in Gender Relations 
in German History: Power, Agency and Experience From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth Century, ed. Lynn 
Abrams and Elizabeth Harvey (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 190. 
41 Patrizia Albanese, Mothers of the Nation: Women, Families and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century 
Europe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 33.
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below, Bechler’s interpretation of motherhood and of political belief changes 
significantly as her journey through the prison world progresses.
That Bechler is forced to denounce Jakob is presented not just as a consequence of 
her maternal nature but also of her status as an honest but powerless victim. She 
describes living in Altenberg (in Thüringen) with her two children during World War 
Two, while her husband – a National Socialist officer – was fighting on the Russian 
front. According to Bechler, from 1943 onwards, a succession of people began visiting 
her house and sending her letters to inform her that her husband had joined the 
antifascist movement on the Russian front, but maintains that she did not believe their 
claims. Bechler stresses that, although she tried to protect the people who came to her 
door from being apprehended by the Gestapo, she was not strong enough in the case of 
Jakob. She writes of how she was coerced by her vigilant, treacherous neighbours into 
taking action when Jakob (whom she represents as a fairly unpleasant man anyway, 
limiting the reader’s sympathy with him) comes to her door (23). Representing herself as 
a victim allows Bechler to avoid taking responsibility for her actions. Ebbinghaus 
explains of the women in her study: ‘Der psychologische Vorteil dieser 
Unschuldsbehauptung liegt unter anderem darin, die Welt so in gute Opfer und böse 
Täter aufspalten zu können; wobei das Opfer per definitionem keine Verantwortung für 
sein Handeln übernehmen muß.’42 There is a significant, often unacknowledged space 
between the concepts of victim and perpetrator, referred to as the ‘grey zone’ by Primo 
Levi. He uses the term to denote to the complexity of victim and perpetrator roles during 
                                                
42 Ebbinghaus, p. 15.
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the Holocaust, specifically, but not limited to, Auschwitz.43 For Levi the roles of the 
victim and perpetrator are often merged, especially in the concentration camps where 
prisoners often governed (and abused) other prisoners. The two roles cannot be clearly 
defined for Levi, but in Bechler’s attempt to absolve herself, she keeps within the ‘black 
and white’ categorisation of the victim to avoid any association with the perpetrator 
category. Such an approach is employed not just to exonerate herself to her imagined 
audience but also to herself. It acts as a means of self-protection, in which she shields 
herself from blame. 
In her representation of her feelings towards National Socialism, Bechler makes it 
clear that her adherence to fascism was reluctant and passive. She writes that she was 
not a member of the Nazi Party and refused to greet neighbours with ‘Heil Hitler!’ (21); 
she describes her husband Bernhard as ‘der einzige Nationalsozialist in dieser Familie’ 
(15). But, as someone who did not actively resist the regime, she could be described as a 
‘Mitläuferin’. She confesses a certain degree of sympathy and reveals that she believed 
in many of its tenets (14). In doing so she endeavours to give the reader a more 
authentic, ‘honest’ account of her past feelings towards antifascists with repeated use of 
the word ‘damals’ to prove that those feelings belong to her previous identity as Nazi 
wife: ‘damals war ich wie so viele fest davon überzeugt, daß es in einer Situation, wo 
Deutschland in Gefahr war, nur eines gab, nämlich zusammenzuhalten. Das Ausmaß 
nationalsozialistischer Gewaltherrschaft habe ich zu der Zeit nicht durchschaut’ (18). Of 
the anti-fascists who sent her letters she admits self-consciously: ‘ich will da nichts 
                                                
43 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved (London: Joseph, 1988), especially the chapter entitled ‘The 
Grey Zone’. 
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beschönigen, hielt ich diese Leute für Vaterlandsverräter’(19). Bechler’s attempt at 
honesty represents her fulfilment of a basic convention of autobiographical writing. One 
of the functions of her exposure of her ‘real’ feelings and her honesty is to prove that she 
is an honourable autobiographer and to temper the reader’s attitude towards her 
potentially deviant pro-Nazi past self.
Bechler adheres to other devices used by ‘Mitläufer’ to justify why they went along 
with such a barbaric regime, stating: ‘Wie viele meiner Generation war ich mit jener 
Vaterlandsliebe großgeworden’ (19). Bechler here conveys that she was part of a whole 
generation which had been indoctrinated, thereby shirking any individual responsibility. 
Her self-representation is that of a woman trapped by the actions of her thoughtless 
husband, by the oppression of National Socialism and the watchfulness of those around 
her. At this point, Bechler is a passive, maltreated follower of the regime. She tries to 
gain some agency in her attempts to protect the anti-fascist visitors and create other 
small resistances to the regime but these attempts are shown to be in vain.  
This self-representation as victim is taken further in that the defining feature of 
Bechler’s account is of herself as an unjustly punished, victimised mother. From the 
outset, Warten auf Antwort confronts the reader with a representation of Bechler as a 
tragic, maternal figure: the cover of the 2001 edition displays a picture of her with her 
young children Heidi and Hans-Bernhard. Bechler’s tragic fate, or ‘Schicksal’ as the 
book’s subtitle calls it, is that she is a mother who has been separated from her children. 
A further tragedy lies in Bechler’s claims that her husband, Bernhard, knew of her arrest 
but remarried and abandoned her in prison in order to further his career, prohibiting her 
any contact with their children. In the context of the continuing cultural potency of 
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‘motherhood’, Bechler has thus received one of the worst punishments possible for a 
mother and wife. It is the ultimate defeminisation, which both overshadows and is 
exacerbated by the defeminisation of imprisonment. Warten auf Antwort has been 
described as ‘erschütternd’, ‘tragisch’ and ‘ungewöhnlich’44. Bechler is a woman 
victimised in the most extreme way and her story thus becomes more meaningful and 
readable to her audience, given its extraordinary yet recognisable nature. The 
implication is that, as a particularly tragic victim, Bechler requires sympathy rather than 
castigation. The reader’s response is further shaped by Bechler’s descriptions of the way 
that she is treated during imprisonment. Prisoners and guards around her are often 
sympathetic to her tragic predicament and give her special treatment. The humanity of 
those around her is a recurring theme in the text, that Bechler identifies early on when 
she first hears of her husband’s defection and an officer is particularly kind to her: ‘Von 
diesem Augenblick an wußte ich, daß meine Mitmenschen mich nie verlassen würden, 
und ich habe recht behalten’ (31). This shows the reader that Bechler is someone worth 
caring about, encouraging their own sympathy towards her, mirroring the behaviour of 
the characters in her narrative.
Bechler’s self-representation as victim continues quite far into her account of her time 
in prison. During this stage she strives to avoid characterisation as criminal through 
separating herself from many of the prisoners around her. Bechler’s case differs from 
that of Rinser and Wolf, because in the early years of her imprisonment she separates 
herself from political prisoners. These political prisoners are criminalised because they 
                                                
44 See reviews by: Werner Hellman, "Deutsches Schicksal," Deutsche Zeitung, 20 October 1978.  Ilse 
Leitenberger, "Das Buch der Woche: Ein deutsches Schicksal," Die Presse, 3 January 1979, Ernst A.  
Stiller, "Margret Bechler - ein deutsches Schicksal," Der Tagesspiegel, 7 February 1979.
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are former Nazis, in prison for their participation in the regime. Bechler is horrified to be 
associated with such women and labelled a Nazi criminal by a young boy who urinates 
on a vehicle in which she and other prisoners are being transported. He calls the 
passengers ‘Verbrecher,’ who are to blame for the current state of Germany. Bechler 
writes of this incident: ‘es war mir schrecklich, so gesehen zu werden’ (106). Bechler 
further de-nazifies, de-politicises and de-criminalises herself by demonstrating her 
exclusion and persecution by Nazi groups in prison. Of her relationship to the ‘Planauer 
Frauen’, a sewing group arrested for making Nazi uniforms, Bechler says: ‘für diese 
politisierende Nähstube blieb ich immer eine Außenstehende, ich war eben keine 
Nationalsozialistin’ (58). Bechler is persecuted for her lack of political belief as well as 
for her husband’s actions (in turning against National Socialism when based on the 
Russian Front), describing herself as: ‘Nichtmitglied und zudem Frau eines Verräters’ 
(129). She even suggests that she identifies more with victims punished within the 
National Socialist regime than those in her own prison or camp who are being punished 
by the Soviet regime. Inmates in the Mühlberg camp consist of a number of former 
BDM-leaders (Bund Deutscher Mädel, a Nazi organisation for girls), who have high 
ranks in the camp hierarchy and who torment Bechler. She writes that because of this 
abuse, she became ‘die letzte Verfolgte des Naziregimes’ (129). Indeed she admits: 
‘heute nach so vielen Jahren vermag ich es fast mit einem Anflug von Heiterkeit zu 
sagen’ (129) The years that have passed between the experience of prison and the 
writing of her account have allowed her to construct an identity in which she is no 
longer the criminal, but the victim, and to some degree the ‘acceptable’ victim of the 
Third Reich. She resists responsibility and minimises her own role as a sympathiser of 
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the regime through demonstrating how she too suffered. Elaine Martin mentions the 
post-1945 discourse of victimisation in Germany in which many former Nazis 
highlighted that they too suffered during the Reich ‘as a shield against recognition of 
personal responsibility, feelings of guilt, and the articulation of mea culpa.’45 Bechler 
takes this one stage further by turning herself not only into someone who suffered during 
the regime, but into someone who was actively persecuted by Nazis. Her account of her 
incarceration allows her to become a proper victim, giving her an acceptable identity, 
unlike other Nazi sympathisers.
There emerges a correlation between Bechler as victim and her account as a highly 
authentic document of events. There is a sense of the authentic throughout Bechler’s life 
narrative, in the historical introductions opening each chapter and in the intimate 
dialogue it seeks to establish with Bechler’s children. The text’s title implies a 
particularly strong level of factuality and reality. Rather than being directly referred to 
by its autobiographical sub-genre, as in Luxemburg’s letters, and Rinser and Wolf’s 
diaries, Bechler’s account is sub-titled ‘ein deutsches Schicksal.’ In this label there is a 
distinct narrowing of the gap between the narrative – the language Bechler uses in her 
text – and the actual experience that those words represent.46 The subtitle therefore gives 
the impression that there is less room to doubt the authenticity of her account because it 
                                                
45 Elaine Martin, Gender, Patriarchy, and Fascism in the Third Reich: The Response of Women Writers
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), p. 190. This is also indicated in: Joanne Sayner, Women 
Without a Past?: German Autobiographical Writings and Fascism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), p. 188, p. 
190 and p. 206.
46 One could draw comparisons with the way in which Holocaust testimony has been regarded as proof
rather than representation – see: James E. Young, "Interpreting Literary Testimony: A Preface to 
Rereading Holocaust Diaries and Memoirs," New Literary History 18, no. 2 (1987), pp. 403-6. However, 
because of the fundamental differences between the experience of Auschwitz and that of the traditional 
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locates the narrative so closely to the experience it represents: her account is not to be 
disputed because it appears to be the story rather than just to represent it.47 There is a 
further sense of non-disputability in her text because of the tragic nature of her life story 
and her status as ultimate female victim. There is a reluctance to question legitimacy 
when such unfortunate events befall the subject of autobiography because of the 
potential for causing offence to her as well as to others who have had similar 
experiences. That Bechler’s story is represented as both ‘Schicksal’ and the worst thing 
that can happen to a woman, positions her seemingly above representation, as if her fate 
transcends narrative: there seems to be less room to question her honesty or innocence. 
Bechler’s account seems to become the narrative of the experience, rather than a 
narrative.48
In order to combat labelling as a National Socialist, Bechler writes of herself as both 
a victim of National Socialism, and of the Soviet government. In this role as a victim, 
Bechler demonstrates that she lacks political direction: ‘Langsam würde es mir zu 
dumm, immer zwischen dem kommunistischen und dem nationalsozialistischen Stuhl zu 
sitzen. War ich nicht selbst jemand?’ (119). She is trapped in a liminal space between 
opposing authoritarian systems, seemingly with no sense of agency. Interestingly, in 
asking ‘War ich nicht selbst jemand?’ in the context of the opposing political authorities 
of Communism and National Socialism, Bechler aligns political allegiance with her own 
                                                
47 Such authentic representation is by no means confined to Bechler’s account: Wilhelm Ernst Freiherr 
Gedult von Jungenfeld, Ein deutsches Schicksal im Urwald (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1933), Hellmuth 
Lenz, Deutsches Schicksal an der Memel: Die Wahrheit über das Memelland (Munich: Lehmann, 1935), 
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raum- und volkspolitisches Erziehungsbuch (Berlin: Beltz, 1937), interestingly, many such titles were 
published in the 1930s within the Third Reich.
48 I discuss this concept of the authentic in more detail in relation to Elisabeth Graul’s Die Farce in 
Chapter Four. 
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sense of self. In this excerpt she implies that, because she is a victim of these regimes 
with no political allegiance, then she lacks a sense of self. As I will show, the rest of her 
account functions as a means of locating that self and of gaining agency. 
Bechler’s autonomy is diminished not only in self-representation as a victim but also 
within the disempowering structure of the prison. One way in which she initially 
attempts to gain agency is through her self-representation as a martyr. Bechler writes, in 
response to being treated badly in prison: 
da suchte ich mir einen Ausweg, suchte einen Sinn: Wir hier drinnen müssen 
neben der eigenen Schuld auf uns nehmen, was das ganze Volk zu tragen hätte, 
damit die dort unbelastet einen neuen Anfang finden können. So wollte ich es 
sehen, so tröstete es mich (106). 
She takes on an active role in choosing to carry the guilt of her nation. Bechler even 
compares her situation to that of Jesus Christ, becoming a Christian martyr: ‘Aber ich 
sagte mir damals: Auch Jesus is hingerichtet worden, der hatte überhaupt nichts Böses 
getan’ (257). Bechler draws on religious imagery in her search for self, something that 
Shadd Maruna sees as a particularly useful type of narrative to allow the former prisoner 
to come to terms with their incarceration. These two examples demonstrate Bechler’s 
attempts to gain agency as a means of counteracting her passive identity as victim and 
prisoner.49 But, in writing ‘so wollte ich es sehen’ and ‘damals’, Bechler implies that this 
was how she spoke to herself in order to cope during imprisonment rather than at the 
time of writing. Self-representation as martyr helped her cope during prison but it does 
not seem the most satisfactory means of gaining agency for Bechler now: now she uses a 
                                                
49 See Maruna, Making Good for a study of the role of narrative in the former convict and prisoner’s sense 
of self. Maruna’s text, however, cannot be fully applied to the narratives of political prisoners given that 
they are non-criminal, but it still stands as a testament to the crucial role of life-narratives in the process of 
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number of other means of attaining agency, as I discuss below. Nevertheless, her attempt 
to identify as a martyr acts as a bridge into her self-representation as non-passive, and I 
now explore the other ways that she empowers herself during long-term imprisonment. 
From non-prisoner to non-criminal inmate: the empowerment of 
prisonisation
Bechler may be looking for her non-passive ‘self’ but this involves establishing that 
which she is not within the prison environment, especially given her need to prove her 
innocent character. During the initial phase of her imprisonment, Bechler portrays 
herself as a non-prisoner in her efforts to appear non-criminal. In Zwickau prison, where 
she stays during the first weeks of her imprisonment and interrogation, Bechler shows 
that she does not belong in prison partly because she does not know ‘wie man sich in 
einem Gefängnis zu benehmen habe’ (50). Prison is wholly unfamiliar to her, as she 
emphasises rather defensively: ‘Ich hatte noch nie ein Gefängnis von innen gesehen, wie 
sollte ich auch?’ (45). Bechler is a respectable middle-class woman after all, and, as her 
representation of her sometimes snobbish attitude to her fellow prisoners (such as her 
first cellmate, the lower-class Müttchen Müller, 46) shows, she is not used to being in an 
institution associated with lower-class or deviant women. 
Bechler describes that she is often given special treatment during her incarceration, 
because people show pity for her given her tragic predicament. She is separated from 
other prisoners: in the prison camp at Bautzen her talent for sewing is spotted and she 
starts working in a separate location from her fellow prisoners (73). It is an 
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advantageous separation: her boss is a caring man who looks after her well. Bechler 
writes that the other prisoners, specifically the former Nazis, are jealous of her closeness 
to figures of authority and the special treatment she is given because of her talent for 
sewing (89). It is not only from the former Nazis that Bechler physically separates 
herself. She is allowed to work in the camp hospitals in Bautzen and Buchenwald 
instead of with the other workers. Here Bechler becomes part of a collective of hospital 
workers rather than identifying with other prisoners – when she says ‘we’ it is with 
reference to her own separate group (200). The hospital workers are represented as a 
separate and superior type of inmate who are given extra food and a better standard of 
care. More significantly, their appearance marks them as non-prisoners: the ‘real’ 
prisoners have shaved heads because of the proliferation of head-lice in the camp, 
whereas hospital workers do not (222). They have retained a feature that distinguishes 
them as clean, civilised and female. Bechler has thus staved off entry into the prison 
world and some of the accompanying defeminisation of prison.
Near the start of her account, however, Bechler remarks: ‘Man lernte das 
ungeschriebene Gesetz der Gefängnisrangfolge schnell’ (95). Prison is a different world 
to which she quickly becomes accustomed and into which she assimilates and becomes a 
prisoner. By the end of her account Bechler writes of herself as an ‘erfahrene Häftling’ 
(353) although her integration still involves a level of separation from other prisoners, as 
I will discuss below. One convention of the prison writing genre, if it can be perceived 
as such, is the transition of the subject from ‘citizen’ to ‘prisoner’. Within the social 
sciences such a process has been theorised using the term ‘prisonisation,’ coined by 
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Donald Clemmer in 1940 to describe the prisoner’s assimilation into the prison world.50
Prison is seen as a subculture into which the new prisoner is thrown and in which new 
social conventions have to be learnt in order to survive. In this sense the term is 
reminiscent of Peter Paul Zahl’s concept of Unterleben, which involves subordination to 
the total institution as a means of surviving it. But Clemmer’s concept of prisonisation 
involves adjusting not only to the rules as set by the authority, but to those within the 
prisoner hierarchy itself. The level of assimilation into the prison culture varies 
according to each prisoner and prison, but often depends on how long the prisoner 
resides in the institution. Bechler shows that she too becomes prisonised during her 
eleven years spent in incarceration, but shows that this is a process in which, although 
she assimilates to the prison environment, she is not subject to prison’s influence, as 
Foucault’s concept of the prisoner as a ‘docile’, passive body suggests.51 Indeed, 
Bechler’s assimilation into the prison is characterised by a gradual gaining of agency 
and status within its hierarchical structure. 
Central to the process of integration as an empowered rather than ‘docile’ prisoner is 
Bechler’s representation of her identity as part of a group. In order to avoid a deviant 
identity, Bechler has to show that she belongs to the ‘right’ group: she separates herself 
from National Socialist factions and criminals in the first half of her account, in order to 
avoid labelling as such.52 Bechler is often vague about those women with whom she 
                                                
50 Donald Clemmer, "Prisonization," in The Sociology of Punishment and Correction, ed. Norman 
Johnston et al (New York, Chichester: Wiley, 1970), pp.479-484. See: Candace Kruttschnitt and 
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51 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, p. 136.
52 In the first half of her account, Bechler was incarcerated mostly with prisoners who had been arrested in 
the months following the end of the war, for their role in National Socialism (many were sentenced by 
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spends time, indeed the lack of detail about her cell-mates is reminiscent of Lore Wolf’s 
construction of an anonymous collective in her diary. At numerous stages, Bechler 
mentions ‘we’ but does not specify to whom she is referring. Such a lack of information 
is common to autobiographical narratives in order to keep the story flowing, but it also 
conveys Bechler’s dissociation of herself from potentially deviant women during 
confinement. As Wolf did in her prison diary, Bechler presents her ‘we’ in a vague but 
distinctly non-criminal light: when she and an unspecified number of female prisoners 
are placed in a freight car and told they are being transported to a prison for 
‘Schwerverbrecher’, one of the prisoners exclaims ‘Aber wir sind doch keine 
Verbrecher’ (209). Bechler’s group’s innocence is thus voiced and conveniently 
preceded by a passage detailing the kind-hearted, non-criminal qualities possessed by 
Tea, Bechler’s friend, whom she describes as ‘Dieser wirklich gütige Mensch’ (209). In 
describing the good, non-criminal nature of her ‘we’, it seems Bechler is making a 
statement about her own character. 
During the latter stages of her confinement Bechler is placed in a cell with a new 
group of political prisoners whom she refers to as: ‘Neupolitische, also solche die sich 
nach den Gesetzen der DDR schuldig gemacht hatten’ (367). Bechler’s descriptions 
show that she is happy to be involved with these non-National Socialist women and that 
they have a positive influence on her: ‘die Neupolitischen hatten mehr Reserven und 
Lebenshoffnung, das übertrug sich auf mich. Auch war der Gemeinschaftssinn groß’ 
                                                                                                                                               
Soviet Military Tribunals). During the late 1940s and early 1950s thousands of these prisoners were 
released in various amnesties. Finn, Die politischen Häftlinge der Sowjetzone, p.64 and pp. 77-78. In the 
years following these amnesties, many (but not all) of the National Socialist ‘criminals’ were replaced 
with increasing numbers of anti-GDR prisoners, which is one reason why there is a shift in Bechler's 
group identity.
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(367). Bechler becomes part of a group which has an acceptable political identity for her 
West German readership (who are also expected to be critical of the GDR). This new 
group of Bechler’s consists of active resisters to authoritarian oppression; they are the 
‘good’ type of political prisoner with whom she wishes to be associated.53 But Bechler 
still represents her politicised group as somewhat anonymous: she does not go into 
significant detail about any of these women apart from a brief mention of the rebellious 
political prisoner Ilse Bauer (367). Additionally, she only implies that she spends a lot of 
time with them rather than stating this directly. It may be that Bechler’s affiliation to 
such a group was less strong than she insinuates or that the group itself did not exist as a 
politicised unit. 
Barbara Harlow mentions the importance of ‘collective solidarity’ for giving the 
political prisoner strength to get through the ordeal of prison.54 Despite its anonymous 
and vague nature, Bechler’s use of ‘wir’ acts as an empowering narrative device because 
it demonstrates that it was not she alone who went through the trauma of imprisonment. 
Writing that this happened to other, possibly innocent, certainly in many cases good, 
people, gives her self-representation a strength and non-criminal element that it would 
not have if she were just talking about herself. When she describes herself and other 
prisoners being left for hours in a transport vehicle, she writes ‘ich glaube, uns alle 
beschlich die gleiche Angst, vergessen worden zu sein’ (104). Bechler gains comfort and 
strength from the fact that others (whom she assumes to have the same feelings as 
                                                
53 They are not, however, acknowledged as political prisoners, rather labelled as dangerous criminals by 
the SED government and authorities. I discuss this in more detail in relation to Elisabeth Graul’s account 
in Chapter Four. 
54 Barbara Harlow, Resistance Literature (New York; London: Methuen, 1987), p. 145. I do not hereby 
imply that non-political prisoners do not have collective solidarity, however, my analysis is limited to 
discussion of political prisoners.
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herself) are going through a similar crisis. There is a distinct safety to be found in 
numbers. In showing that she belongs to a group, Bechler gains a sense of agency and 
self: this is something that she had much less of when she wrote of herself as separate 
from the National Socialist groups of women in the Mühlberg camp. 
The agency to be attained through group identity is symbolised in Bechler's 
description of losing her hair, an episode halfway through her account which also serves 
as a symbol for her initiation as a ‘proper’ prisoner. In this part of the narrative, Bechler 
and her colleague Hanna are dismissed from their hospital jobs (for selflessly smuggling 
food out to other prisoners) and transformed from hospital workers – separate from other 
prisoners – to members of the normal prisoner collective by having their heads shaved. 
Head shaving is a fear that has haunted Bechler and her group of hospital workers 
throughout the narrative: it is a symbol of a loss of femininity brought about by prison: 
‘Wir konnten uns das nicht vorstellen: Frauen mit kahlen glänzenden Schädeln’ (222). 
Indeed, the prison authorities instruct the women to wear headscarves at all times, 
because they cannot bear to look at their shorn heads (226). To the prison authorities, 
baldness is a particularly shameful consequence of imprisonment for the women. But 
when it actually happens, Bechler turns the experience into a positive one which 
reinforces her agency and group identity, rather than concentrating on feelings of shame. 
Losing their hair may be a distressing experience, but Bechler demonstrates that it 
initiates her and Hanna into a strong group of women who almost embrace having no 
hair: ‘Sie erzählten, es sei ein seltsames Erlebnis gewesen. Erst Grauen natürlich, dann 
aber eine neue Offenheit, eine andere Blickweise’ (226). Bechler too comes to see the 
head-shaving as a positive and self-strengthening loss: ‘Wir hatten unser Haar verloren, 
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das blieb schmerzlich, aber wir hatten etwas Wichtiges gewonnen: eine tiefere 
Erkenntnis unserer selbst und eine stärkere Gemeinsamkeit’ (227). Without hair, Bechler 
identifies more strongly with a group and thereby gains agency. In Bechler’s account of 
events, the experience is not about a loss of femininity, it is represented as a ceremony 
which will allow her a more positive sense of belonging within the prison world as well 
as a stronger sense of self in response to the destabilisation of prison. 
It is this group identity, initiated by the head-shaving episode, which turns the prison 
into a kind of home and a retreat for Bechler, as demonstrated in her portrayal of her 
relationship with the new group of anti-GDR political prisoners. Bechler’s relationships 
with her anonymous group come to replace those she has on the outside world. Her 
assimilation into the prison world as opposed to the outer world is emphasised when she 
receives her first ever prison visit, from her godmother, whom she calls Aunt Lene, in 
1955. Bechler is greatly disappointed at her alienation from this person and from her 
pre-prison life. Although she is pleased that her godmother has made an effort to come 
and see her, she is aware that Aunt Lene has no ‘Verhaltensregeln’ for the prison 
environment. This is confirmed by Aunt Lene’s overt and unreciprocated friendliness to 
the guard: ‘Die Wachtmeisterin wahrt eisiges Schweigen’ (368). That her aunt does not 
know prison protocol emphasises that Bechler does: she belongs in prison. Aunt Lene is 
part of a different world and Bechler is part of her own separate microcosmic ‘we’: 
Wir sehnten uns nach Besuch, aber oft kamen wir niedergeschlagen und 
bedruckt aus dem Zimmer heraus. Man spürte nichts als Fremdheit. Ich wußte 
nicht, was in den Köpfen meiner Besucher vorging, wenn sie die 
Wachtmeisterinnen einbezogen oder gewollt politische Bemerkungen machten. 
Und ich sah auch, daß sie mich nicht verstanden. Da hatte man sich große Mühe 
gegeben, menschenwürdig auszusehen, und dann sagten sie, dir geht es aber gut 
(368).
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The restrictive nature of the prison visits (and indeed any legitimate communication 
from prison) as well as the paradox of trying to appear well-groomed means that Bechler 
and her fellow inmates are unable to communicate to pre-prison acquaintances how they 
really feel. Prison acts as a barrier to their expression of their real, authentic selves to the 
outer world.55 Her group within the prison world has its own communication system and 
social order in which different behavioural expectations exist from those on the outer 
world, creating a chasm between Bechler and those on the outside. For Bechler, only 
fellow prisoners can understand each other’s predicament during incarceration and 
support each other. As such they act as a substitute for her estranged family on the 
outside; indeed her bonds with them are stronger than those she shares with her 
remaining family – even her mother who lives in West Germany – demonstrating her 
estrangement from both East and West Germany. 
Prison becomes a haven from an unfamiliar and disempowering outer world. Bechler 
was incarcerated for eleven years and had little knowledge of what was happening 
outside. The world of the GDR is alien to her; for example, she writes: ‘Entnazifizierung 
und Bodenreform, was bedeutete das?’ (116). At least in prison Bechler has some idea 
of what is going on around her; she makes herself familiar with her environment and 
becomes an established, influential prisoner. Bechler has many good friends and close 
connections both with other prisoners as well as some prison guards. It is as a member of 
a group and, by extension an active part of the prison world, that she is able to exert 
                                                
55 Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und Gattungsgeschichte 
der Gefängnisliteratur, p. 19. Weigel also mentions other barriers to authenticity, as I discuss in more 
detail below. 
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more control over her environment and everyday life. Her contacts make prison a more 
familiar environment, indeed she even describes it as home on occasion (153, 308).
Bechler’s connections with others are especially strong when she is in the men’s prison 
in Waldheim awaiting a death sentence: ‘Ich hatte Kontakt im Haus, ja sogar eine 
Postverbindung zu meiner Mutter. Aber sie [die Volkspolizei] wußten nur, daß sie 
existierte, nicht, wie sie zustande gekommen war, das ganze Haus hatte sich gegen sie 
verschworen, sogar ihr eigener Spitzel’ (318). Bechler’s influence reaches far and wide 
and is so strong that she is able to evade the police. The agency she attains in prison does 
not mirror that which she has in the unfamiliar outside world. 
Barbara Harlow writes of the more extreme case of Akhtar Baluch, a Sindhi woman 
held in Pakistani prisons for subversive political activity in 1970. Baluch too formed 
strong bonds with her fellow inmates, and when being returned to prison from the outer 
world, Baluch writes in her diary: ‘ “I was so anxious to get in, I felt as if I had returned 
home from a foreign land.” ’56 Bechler is in a different culture from Baluch and does not 
necessarily have Baluch’s strong social and political connections with her fellow 
prisoners, but both authors’ accounts demonstrate that being assimilated and having 
strong bonds with other prisoners can make the prison seem more familiar or comforting 
than the outside world, especially when the outside world, as in the cases of Baluch and 
Bechler, is an unsettling place to live. For Baluch, prison is almost a choice, a place she 
wishes to enter in order to retreat from political upheaval and take refuge in and strength 
from her strong alliances there. Prison only gradually becomes a retreat for Bechler: she 
does not want to go there, as Baluch does, but the disempowerment of incarceration is 
                                                
56 Harlow, Resistance Literature, p. 141.
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counteracted by the agency she attains within prison. Through representing prison as a 
retreat, Bechler reclaims the experience: she is no longer a victim and certainly not a 
docile body but a prisoner reinforced by a strong group, who has a high place within the 
prison hierarchy, and much influence.
Bechler’s ideological trajectory 
Bechler uses her narrative to reclaim (a level of) control over the disempowering 
experience of involuntary incarceration, by showing how the institution's subjection 
of her not only improves her by making her stronger but also allows her to locate 
what she represents as her 'real' self. This self is strongly bound to Bechler’s 
representation of her changing political beliefs. For Bechler, given her controversial 
position as a Nazi sympathiser, her self-location involves dealing with her National 
Socialist past and belief system as well as beginning to locate a political identity 
outwith the deviant one of the fascist and criminal. It is important to remember that 
Bechler’s sense of self is closely tied to her adherence to a political belief system, as 
exemplified when she asks: ‘War ich nicht selbst jemand?’ (119), when discussing 
being trapped between the opposing political systems of Communism and National 
Socialism.
Bechler shows the reader how her attitude towards Nazism changes during the period 
of her imprisonment. This conversion is arguably not unique to being in prison, rather it 
is connected with being a German citizen post-1945, since many former Nazi 
sympathisers changed their political views after the fall of the Third Reich, especially as 
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a result of the denazification programmes in West and East Germany.57 Bechler’s text 
traces her growing disregard for National Socialism, but her account of her ‘reform’ 
from Nazism is contradictory and problematic. Although she claims that she was a 
reluctant Nazi sympathiser, she gives the reader the impression that her commitment to 
the tenets of fascism was actually quite strong because of the extent to which she 
represents her conversion into a non-Nazi. A turning point in her attitude towards the 
regime comes early on in the account: ‘waren wir so blind gewesen?’ (36). And yet she 
continues to demonstrate her changing feelings towards the regime throughout the text: 
‘Je länger ich in Mühlberg war, desto mehr wurde mir klar, warum ich zur 
Nationalsozialistin keine Eignung hatte’ (143). Bechler’s time in prison makes her anti-
Nazi feelings clearer and clearer. Numerous turning points gather in her narrative, 
culminating in a reformed attitude towards Jewish people late on in her incarceration. 
She befriends a Jewish doctor in a rather unsubtle demonstration of her non-Nazi 
standpoint. Bechler ends up using the Jewish doctor’s toothbrush (a rare item in prison)
and encounters yet another turning point in her narrative: her attitude towards Jews 
changes. Of the time before prison she writes: ‘Ich habe nie ein Haßgefühl gegen einen 
Juden oder die Juden gehabt, ich hatte nur das Gefühl, sie seien von anderer, mir 
fremder Art,’ but after this incident she says ‘hier änderte sich etwas in mir’ (311). 
When it comes to her National Socialist beliefs, it seems that prison reforms Bechler in 
the way that it is supposed to (unlike Rinser and Wolf who become more convinced of 
                                                
57 Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Die Wahrheit verpflichtet: Texte aus fünf Jahrzehnten zur Geschichte der DDR
(Berlin: Links, 2000), p. 258. See also: Im Namen des Volkes?: Über die Justiz im Staat der SED,  (Bonn: 
Bundesministerium der Justiz, 1996), and Clemens Vollnhals and Thomas Schlemmer, Entnazifizierung: 
Politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen 1945-1949 (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), for a more detailed discussion of denazification in Germany.
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their previous beliefs). But this incident is problematic and possibly incriminating 
because it exposes the extent to which Bechler was influenced by Nazism, even until this 
late stage in her incarceration. This reminds us that there is, in Bechler’s mind, a 
constant threat that she may be exposed to accusations of Nazism.
In further establishing her identity and countering a National Socialist one, Bechler 
traces her increasingly proactive behaviour, which in turn aligns her with acceptable 
models of political imprisonment. The longer Bechler stays in prison, the more she 
actively contests her imposed criminal identity and speaks out when it comes to 
injustices. From the start of her narrative, Bechler shows resistance when faced with 
authority, humiliation or injustice: for example, she refuses to strip when ordered to 
(although eventually concedes) and she plans to escape but is dissuaded because of the 
risk to her fellow prisoners (62). It is not until she is in Waldheim prison between 1950 
and 1954 that Bechler, fuelled by her disputes with the chief prison warden Schönfeld, 
begins to openly assert herself and initiate conflict in her resistance to prison rules. 
Bechler clashes with Schönfeld on several occasions because of his brutal treatment of 
prisoners and bullying nature, and receives severe punishments in the process. One 
example of this is her rebellious solidarity with a fellow prisoner, Melanie, who was told 
to stand with her face to the wall as punishment for waving to a male prisoner. Bechler 
chooses to stand next to Melanie and receives extra punishment (284/5). Her main focus 
of protest is on the inhumanity of the prison – on being sent to underground cells as a 
punishment for talking back to Schönfeld, Bechler reports: ‘Ich sagte, was er hier 
mache, sei ein Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit’ (300). This appeal for humanity is 
central to Bechler’s acts of resistance: she shows that there is a social, compassionate, 
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rather than selfish or pointless purpose behind her rebellion and that she is supported by 
her fellow prisoners and even some prison authorities in her protests (e.g. 301 and 303). 
In this role as ambassador for an improved, more humane way of life, Bechler, by her 
own account, attains the reputation, amongst prisoners and guards alike, of being akin to 
a political prisoner, in the most positive, acceptable (i.e. non-Nazi) understanding of the 
term. When authorities plant a spy in the cell next to her in order to befriend her and 
glean information from her, the spy pretends to be a political prisoner, rather than a 
criminal one (312). In describing this incident, Bechler shows that the political is the 
type of prisoner with whom she will most likely bond. Bechler’s strength of mind is 
highlighted when she is placed in a cell with a Jehovah’s Witness, who is known for her 
persistent attempts to convert her cell-mates. For the prison guards there is no possibility 
that Bechler, whom they call by her maiden name, Dreykorn, could be brainwashed: 
‘Dreykorn ist nicht zu beeinflussen, da besteht keine Gefahr, daß sie sich bekehren und 
taufen läßt’ (334). Indeed the Jehovah’s Witness and Bechler are eventually separated 
because of Bechler’s influence rather than her religious cellmate’s. Bechler is the one 
who has ideological influence and agency within the prison world and promotes the 
‘right’ kind of rebellion. 
A key step in Bechler’s development into a politicised prisoner is in her solidarity 
with what she refers to as the ‘Neupolitische’, whose beliefs she prefers (although she is 
not specific about them) to those in the outside world of East Germany. Indeed, she 
purposely cuts herself off from the outside political world; of her godmother’s visit she 
writes: ‘Sie erzählt mir […] von den großen Leistungen des neuen Regimes, bis ich 
sage: ach weißt du, das interessiert mich nicht so sehr, laß uns lieber von Menschen 
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sprechen’ (368). Bechler demonstrates her disapproval of the regime and its followers in 
refusing to hear it praised, instead wishing to hear about people, especially her children. 
In her proactive, humane performance and allegiances with this group of anti-GDR 
political prisoners, Bechler takes on the identity of a political prisoner, although she 
never defines herself using those exact words. Given her National Socialist ‘crime’, 
Bechler has to tread a careful path when representing herself as a prisoner, since the 
term ‘political prisoner’ has such a fluid meaning. After all, she could be defined as a 
political prisoner in the negative fascist understanding of the term. Her incarceration was 
a result of interactions between National Socialist Germany of pre-1945 and Soviet East 
Germany post-1945: she is punished by the Soviets for activity that was legal in Nazi 
Germany but became illegal post-1945.58 She is also often referred to as a 
‘Kriegsverbrecher,’ which in itself is a kind of political prisoner. Therefore, if she 
defines herself as a political prisoner she risks taking on a political identity that she 
denied having at the start of her account and could thus be exposed to labelling as 
National Socialist and criminal. Whereas politics, and by extension the political 
prisoner, is associated with Nazism and criminality at the start, Bechler now links it to 
anti-GDR resistance. Although she avoids using the term in relation to herself, she 
nonetheless taps into the common cultural model – exemplified by Rosa Luxemburg and 
Karl Liebknecht – of the political prisoner as the righteous and proactive (rather than 
                                                
58 See: Susanne Leonhard, Gestohlenes Leben: als Sozialistin in Stalins Gulag (Frankfurt am Main: 
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passive) victim of an oppressive system, the martyr-figure who sacrifices herself for the 
good of others and fights for justice.
It is through the experience of long-term confinement that Bechler identifies as a 
political prisoner; this is a common feature in prison narratives, and many other 
prisoners, male and female, seem to become politicised during prison, rather than 
arriving into prison with a political consciousness. Harlow mentions the case of Domitila 
Barrios de Chungara, a Bolivian woman who was imprisoned twice for participating in 
political activities and who suffered abuse in prison: ‘ ‘with everything I’d suffered in 
the arrests, in jail, and in Los Yungas, I’d acquired a political consciousness. In other 
words, I’d found myself.’ ’59 It is in prison that Chungara finds her identity, and that 
identity is political. This strikes a chord with Bechler’s questions about her own identity 
(‘War ich nicht selbst jemand?’) when she is trapped between the National Socialist and 
East German regimes. Bechler’s search for her self is a search for political identity in the 
liminal space between the two regimes. In finding her political belief in prison, Bechler 
suggests that she finds her ‘self’. 
One key difference between Bechler and Chungara is that Bechler is less aware of 
gaining a specific political conscience than Chungara is. Although she bonds with the 
anti-GDR political prisoners, she is not guided by one particular belief or affiliation to 
an organisation. She retrospectively constructs the identity of a woman who need not be 
taught political awareness; rather, given her strength of mind and her maternal nature, 
such awareness is portrayed as inevitable. Prison has given her identity but it is 
represented as a merging of rebellious and feminine identities rather than being 
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associated with a particular party or belief system. As I discuss below, this ‘self’ is 
founded upon an identity as maternal and feminine. 
Negotiation between two worlds
Despite demonstrating that she attains agency and a sense of ‘self’ in prison, Bechler 
continues to use ideal gender performance to neutralise potential accusations of 
deviant femininity in her self-representation. Since her integration into the prison 
subculture, there are two ways in which Bechler could be publicly regarded as 
criminal or deviant. Firstly, in the existence of her initial ‘crime’, which associates 
her with National Socialism, as well as her subsequent denunciation of Anton Jakob, 
which she must always defend. Secondly, there is her assimilation into the 
subversive environment of the prison, which has, despite its initial unfamiliarity, 
gradually become a retreat to her. Within the microcosm of prison, she accesses an 
alternative perspective on the world and on gender relations, not least in 
encountering the defeminising rules of prison. In addition to this possibly 
transgressive representation, many of Bechler’s readers may have predetermined 
beliefs about prison as a space filled with deviant women. 
It is worth noting that the prison is not a completely subversive world: Mary 
Bosworth maintains that although there may be alternative norms there, women do 
still judge each other on the basis of  ‘outer’ norms of femininity, meaning there is a 
strong connection to the outer world.60 Prison cannot be regarded as completely 
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different from the outside; however, there is still an element of transgression given 
the subversion attached to the prison space. Bechler documents her involvement in 
this subversive world and attempts to neutralise, or translate it into the more 
conventional outer world of the autobiography. She does this during the head-
shaving episode by aligning herself with a respectable group instead of highlighting 
the lack of femininity inherent in the loss of hair. Bechler does not describe any of 
the women in her new group in any detail, omitting details of any unsavoury or 
directly criminal members. The group that she joins may consist of prisoners but 
they are portrayed as non-criminal, therefore Bechler, as a new member, is non-
criminal too. 
This neutralisation and negotiation between outer and inner is illustrated further 
in Bechler’s descriptions of her relations with men during incarceration. She writes 
frequently of the attention she receives from men, especially when in the Bautzen 
camp (77). She shows more of a desire to talk to men than Luxemburg, Rinser or 
Wolf: her dentist in Mühlberg is a potential love interest: ‘es war anregend, ab und 
zu mit einem Mann sprechen zu können’ (141, 201). Such an attitude may come 
across as immoral, and perhaps even deviant, but Bechler is careful to represent 
herself as an ideal rather than deviant woman. For example, she starts a romantic 
relationship with a young male prisoner – Pahlen – who works as a caretaker. He 
proposes marriage to her when she is in solitary confinement awaiting a death 
sentence in Waldheim men’s prison (254). He is later caught receiving a letter from 
her and is punished severely by being kept in a cell without food. Bechler helps him 
by kissing a prison guard in return for providing Pahlen with food: ‘Für jeden 
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Kanten Brot, den er mit hinübernahm, hat er mich geküßt’ (274). There are two 
potentially deviant acts here: Bechler’s relations with another prisoner out of 
wedlock, as well as the exchange of intimacy for food, which could be perceived as 
indecent given its association with prostitution, which is seen in positivist 
criminology as the female crime.61 In order to avoid self-representation as deviant, 
Bechler lays emphasis on this exchange as another example of her ideal femininity. 
Firstly she makes it clear that it was the guard who kissed her – she was sexually 
passive rather than predatory. Also, she kisses the guard for the sake of another 
person’s survival, emphasising her role as maternal and caring. Furthermore, Pahlen 
never finds out about it, which means that Bechler is not seen as licentious within 
the prison. Although Bechler had a romantic relationship, the incident in which she 
kisses the male guard is the closest she comes to describing physical contact with 
anyone in prison, underscoring the non-sexual nature of her relationship with 
Pahlen. Bechler upholds her chastity and her sexual loyalty to her husband, whilst 
portraying the exchange of affections with the guard as an action that is appropriate 
to her prison (rather than non-prison) identity. Moreover, and perhaps more 
important to her negotiation between worlds, the reader is shown that Pahlen is 
generous and caring to Bechler: his letters and acts of kindness give her much-
needed comfort during her confinement: ‘Das sind alles Kleinigkeiten, aber sie sind 
so wichtig in einem solchen Augenblick, man lebt von ihnen’ (247). Her 
relationship with Pahlen is essential, a means of survival for Bechler within the 
prison world and this helps to surpass any subversion. 
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In her descriptions of her relationship with Irma, a nurse who cares for her in the 
hospital of the Buchenwald camp, Bechler once again negotiates a path between 
subversion and conformity. Bechler highlights Irma’s masculine features and behaviour 
– her fierce, intimidating disposition, eyebrows that meet in the middle (176), her 
‘Männertaschentuch’ and long strides (187). Bechler is fairly indignant at Irma’s lack of 
femininity and blames the men who do not treat her like a woman, but instead show her 
‘fürchterliche Kameradschaftlichkeit’ (188). Bechler wants men to treat women as 
women, showing her desire to uphold ‘outside’ hetero-normative principles. Irma takes 
an immediate liking to Bechler and even comes to her bed one night to embrace her, 
which comforts Bechler greatly (188); such an act is once again represented as a means 
of survival for Bechler. She writes that she is unaware that Irma’s intentions are 
romantic or sexual until a fellow prisoner tells her that Irma is a lesbian. Even then 
Bechler appears clueless: ‘Ich wußte nicht, was das war’ (188). This innocence of 
homosexuality upholds Bechler’s heterosexual, non-deviant character. Her motives for 
asking Irma to stop coming to her bed may partly be because she has become aware that 
Irma is a lesbian but are primarily because of what people say behind her back (188).
Bechler does not seem uncomfortable with Irma’s affectionate behaviour; it is the 
rumours circulating that are her main concern. However, she neutralises any implication 
that she participates in homosexual activity by describing the child-like role she 
performs in being protected by Irma: ‘Ich kam mir vor wie ein Kind’ (188). That Irma 
takes an almost maternal role in Bechler’s description creates a role for Bechler that is 
innocent and child-like rather than sexual or sexually deviant. 
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Within the alternative or subversive environment of the prison, Bechler demonstrates 
that she acts as ideally as she can. Imprisonment entails a new set of rules for survival. 
In her account, Bechler begins a relationship with Pahlen in order to combat the isolation 
of solitary confinement. It is because of this relationship that she becomes involved in 
the 'deviant' situation of sexual/intimate exchange, acting subversively in order to 
continue her performance as a mother and reinforcing her role as a superior woman. 
Furthermore, it is because, in her now child-like role, she craves comfort and affection 
that she is responsive to Irma’s advances. In Bechler’s account, being incarcerated 
changes how women may perform their femininity: there may be behaviour which, 
outside prison, is construed as deviant, but in the prison world it is a means of survival. 
Bechler makes it clear, however, that underneath that ‘deviant’ gender performance 
which is unique to the prison world; she is still performing as an ideal woman should. 
Unlike Rinser, who, in her 1981 autobiography, frankly describes experiencing sexual 
desire when in prison, Bechler does not.62 Bechler’s attempts to prove her innocence and 
ideal femininity exceed those of Rinser possibly because she is still separated from her 
children at the time of writing. She is still being punished because she is not allowed to 
be a mother. It is as if she still has to prove that she can be a good woman and mother.
In her negotiation between subversion and traditional gender norms, it is probable 
that Bechler compromises between how she feels about herself and how she thinks an 
audience will perceive or judge her. It could be said that Bechler addresses her imagined 
audience,63 thus lessening her autonomy. It is impossible to ascertain how much of a 
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compromise is made between her own perception of the experience and that presented 
within the narrative itself, but it does seem that there is a loss of agency here. It is the 
task of the prison autobiography (and indeed any published text about or from prison) to 
bridge the gap between the world of prison in which alternative rules apply and the 
outside world. But this endeavour need not primarily involve a loss of agency, because, 
as we will see below, Bechler’s text creates a model for the maternal political prisoner; 
she contributes to and shapes a discourse rather than just being shaped by the 
expectations of her audience. 
The feminine political prisoner
Bechler’s self-representation as a female political prisoner is one which involves 
assimilation into the prison world, and initiation as a real prisoner. However, she 
simultaneously separates herself from non-political female criminals and reminds the 
reader that her femininity is superior to their criminal behaviour. On being transferred to 
the women’s prison in Waldheim after spending three years in the men’s prison there, 
Bechler writes of her preference for the men’s wing. For her, the women’s prison is a 
more temperamental place, because of the volatile moods of the highly strung female 
prisoners: ‘Einige der isolierten Frauen veranstalteten regelmäßig einen Zauber, der 
kaum zu beschreiben ist’ (331). The female prisoners’ mental state is shown to be much 
more unstable than the men’s, and their temper tantrums indicate their childishness. 
They shriek too, a noise that Bechler describes as ‘nichts Menschenähnliches’ (331). In 
this case their shrieks do not come across as childish but as animalistic: here Bechler 
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suggests that women in this prison correlate to nineteenth-century positivist 
criminologists’ views of the female criminal as either childlike or non-human, and in 
many cases a monstrous being. 
Shortly after her arrival in the women’s prison, Bechler is forced to share a cell with a 
young street girl called Anita who is ‘schmuddelig, zierlich und zigeunerhaft’ and in the 
late stages of syphilis (348): a sexually transmitted disease that causes insanity. Again a 
female criminal is described using stereotypical markers of deviant femininity. Bechler 
describes the girl as ‘schon nicht mehr ganz zurechnungsfähig’ (345), mentioning that 
she is prone to suicide attempts and that her attacks of insanity coincide with the full 
moon (347). Anita’s mental illness contrasts with Bechler’s refusal to even feign 
insanity in order to avoid execution when she is on trial for murder. On being advised to 
act as if she is insane by a fellow prisoner she asserts: ‘Ich lehnte ab. Das sei nicht mein 
Weg’ (257). Bechler makes it clear that she is separate from Anita and later another 
syphilis patient, Erika, who again embodies the stereotype of the highly sexed hysterical 
criminal. Bechler belongs to another category of prisoner, the political prisoner, whose 
resistance to incarceration involves fighting for justice and humanity. 
Although Bechler portrays the girls as over-sexed and mad, she does not judge them 
as negatively as Rinser does. Bechler describes Melanie as both mentally unstable and 
sexually deviant in her temperamental behaviour and predatory flirtation with men. But 
when Melanie is caught waving at a male prisoner, and told to stand with her face to the 
wall, Bechler stands with her and faces punishment for this act of solidarity (284/5). In 
Bechler’s account, the deviant woman, although separate and ‘other’, can still be part of 
prison resistance. All prisoners can perform politically – indeed for many political 
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prisoners, the function of prison is not necessarily to reform criminal behaviour, rather to 
instil a political consciousness in all of the inmates; in prison, the ordinary criminal can 
be politicised (see my discussion of Chungara above). It is worth noting here that 
Bechler too has attained political identity through her incarceration, although she is 
careful, through her self-representation as victim, to emphasise that she was not an 
‘ordinary’ criminal in the first place. 
Bechler incorporates an identity as humane and cultured. The grand majority of her 
rebellious, political activities in prison indicate her belief in humanity rather than her 
adherence to an unjust set of laws: ‘Ich wollte mich nicht anpassen, wo menschliche 
Würde so verletzt wurde’ (374). For Bechler, humanity and culture go hand in hand, 
although she shows that the prison and camp represent a disruption to this linkage. This 
interruption is demonstrated when Bechler sets the Mühlberg camp’s inhumane 
treatment of former Nazis against its attempts at high literary culture, such as regular 
performances of Schiller plays: the two opposing aspects of culture and barbarism do not 
fit together for her (145). Since culture implies humanity, Bechler finds it disconcerting 
in such barbaric circumstances.64 Bechler is dismissive of the Mühlberg camp’s 
‘Kultura’ programme: ‘ein scheußliches Wort, es war, als schwände jede Kultur daraus 
durch das angehangte a’ (144). She implies that her interpretation of culture is superior 
to that put forth in the camp, underscoring her own cultured character in her reliance 
upon ‘good’ literature such as works by Goethe, especially during the monotony and 
isolation of solitary confinement (120, 185 and 338). In this self-representation as 
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cultured, she not only responds to a label as criminal through showing her educated and 
implicitly non-criminal character, but also demonstrates her superiority to the 
inhumanity and ignorance of the carceral systems in the SBZ and the early years of the 
GDR. 
In her self-representation as a humane and cultured prisoner, there is a sense that 
Bechler is a good political prisoner but also a good woman, reminiscent of Rosa 
Luxemburg’s self-representation in her letters. Not only does her humanity link her to 
political and intellectual culture and non-criminality but it connects her with widespread 
beliefs about the role of woman as self-sacrificing nurturer and carer. It seems her 
humane attitude to imprisonment is an extension of how she represents her crime: she 
was protecting her children, acting humanely and maternally. Bechler’s account thus 
merges the supposedly opposing ideas of rebellious politics and motherhood through its 
representation of her maternal humanity. 
In merging a political, defiant performance with ideal femininity, Bechler refutes the 
stereotype of the ideal woman as passive and weak through creating a maternal self-
representation which is strong, defiant and determined. Bechler proves how physically 
strong her links to femininity are when her head is shaved. Her particularly long hair 
continually broke the hair trimmer (227), insinuating not only a strong femininity but 
also an innate and physical tendency towards resisting injustice and humiliation. 
Resistance is here a part of Bechler’s physical self and part of her femininity. No such 
description is given of her friend Hana or of any other women who have shaved heads. 
Bechler may become part of a group but she constructs herself as a stronger woman than 
her fellow prisoners. Bechler’s refusal to be referred to as a prisoner rather than a 
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woman symbolises her defiant fight for her femininity: ‘als beim Zählappell eine andere 
Form der Meldung eingeführt wurde, auf neue Entwürdigung abzielend. Bis dahin hatte 
es geheißen: Zelle 39 belegt mit einer Frau. Nun sollte ich melden: Zelle 39 belegt mit 
einer Strafgefangenen. Ich lehnte ab’ (287). Bechler wins this fight. She is allowed to 
define herself as a woman rather than as a prisoner: she is more active and powerful than 
the Bechler who was no longer referred to as ‘Frau Bechler’ in the early stages of her 
imprisonment, and merges rebellion with femininity. 
In her proactive quest to uphold her self-perception as a good woman and mother, 
Bechler refuses an official pardon and early release; for her, accepting such a pardon 
would be tantamount to admitting that she is a criminal woman: ‘Ich bin kein 
Verbrecher, ich brauche Ihre Gnade nicht’ (361). Paradoxically, it is through staying in 
prison that she substantiates her innocence and ideal femininity. This proactive 
performance stands in contrast to the conduct of Tea, who was ‘sanftmütig genug, Urteil 
und Begnadigung hinzunehmen’ (353). Bechler’s praise here is somewhat disingenuous: 
the ideal female political prisoner should not be gentle and virtuous in the same way as 
Tea. As Bechler does, the woman (unjustly) accused of a crime should fight against 
injustice, and go to extreme lengths to prove her innocence rather than adhering to 
stereotypes of the passive, gentle woman.
In her performance as an imprisoned mother, Bechler also continually attempts to 
make contact with her children, against the advice of many around her, as well as her 
own mother (282, 363). Her determination is represented as the most natural thing for a 
mother: ‘Konnte eine Mutter sich schaden, wenn sie nach ihren Kindern fragte?’ (363). 
Maternal strength is seen alongside political integrity and rebellion when Bechler’s 
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repeated wishes to hear about her children are positioned alongside her refusal to be led 
astray by the contents of a Maxim Gorky book within her narrative (282): Bechler 
combines these two ‘poles’ into one self-representation. Maternal strength is, in her 
account, naturally synonymous with political action and strength of mind. 
The prisoner who does not obey the rules of the institution is, in Bechler’s account, 
the determined mother; she is the ultimate acceptable rebel. For Bechler, it is becoming 
a bad prisoner (in the eyes of the prison authorities) which enables her to confirm her 
ideal, maternal identity: ‘Ich war immer noch kein guter Häftling, ich wurde es nie’ 
(371). When she is described by the prison police as ‘ein ganz gefährlicher Mensch’ 
(379), this may be a display of her subversion but only in the opinion of her adversaries. 
Such a statement empowers Bechler because it highlights not only her resistance to her 
total institution, but shows that that resistance has an effect, that she has agency within 
the prison. She is only dangerous in the eyes of the prison; to her readers, she is a strong 
mother. Bechler thus draws on the humane femininity perceptible in Rosa Luxemburg’s 
letters and the cultural discourse surrounding her, but takes this much further through 
her demonstration of her maternal rebellion.
It seems Bechler creates an identity that, in refuting stereotypes of the ideal woman as 
passive and weak, situates her within a matriarchal tradition. She is a defiant but ideal 
mother, a lioness archetype and, although she does not write of herself using this sort of 
imagery, it is evoked in her self-representation. Such an archetype of femininity crosses 
the border into masculine stereotypes such as aggressive, rebellious or politically active 
behaviour. Relying on the archetype of the strong maternal protector allows her to 
negotiate any dubious gender roles she assigns herself. This is an acceptable female 
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identity only because the woman primarily acts in such a ‘masculine’ way in order to 
sustain her role as a mother or martyr. 
Bechler represents her rebellious and angry nature, but this is the right sort of 
rebellion, a rebellion that will fit with the gender and political expectations of her 
readership. She constructs a narrative that is appropriate for a time in which there was 
confusion about appropriate female gender roles. Her account demonstrates her 
conformity to the female role of chaste mother but incorporates rebellion and political 
activism into this. There may have been a more liberal attitude to sex at the time that 
Warten auf Antwort was published, in light of the sexual revolution and 1968 student 
movement (given that the text was published in West Germany), but Bechler’s self-
representation does not engage with this (presumably in an attempt to avoid criminal 
labelling). However, she does assimilate to what could be seen as post-1968 models of 
female political engagement, but this identity is presented indirectly through her use of 
traditional archetypes, which pre-date 1968.
In her self-representation, Bechler is first and foremost a mother rather than a 
political prisoner. The basis of her account is, after all, the tragedy of her separation 
from her children and victimisation by her husband and the SBZ/GDR governments, 
rather than being a historical ‘document’ recounting the incarceration of a female 
political prisoner. It thus fits into a different genre from the letters of Luxemburg and the 
diaries of Rinser and Wolf, a genre which focuses on a tragic or painful life. In it 
Bechler is distinguished as an imprisoned mother rather than a political prisoner. 
Bechler’s behaviour demonstrates that she acts as a protective mother should. She 
creates a model for the female political prisoner in which political activism is an 
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extension of maternal caring. For Bechler, motherhood no longer stands as an exemption 
from political involvement (i.e. involvement in Nazism), indeed it is a vital part of being 
active in the right sort of politics: that of anti-Nazi, anti-East German dictatorship. By 
the end she stays in prison because she is a good mother, radically altering the traditional 
concept of prison as a ‘male’ space. 
Conclusion 
According to her account it seems that prison unlocks Bechler’s ‘true’ self. It is within 
the prison space that she is able to live more honestly and truthfully: 
Wir sind durch dieses ungewöhnliche Leben auch beschenkt worden. Mit 
Erkenntnissen, die uns ohne die Belastungen der Haft nie zuteil geworden wären. 
Heute empfinde ich nicht selten, daß unsere Lebensnähe in den Lagern viel 
wahrhaftiger war. Natürlich hat ein Gefangenendasein viel Begrenzendes und 
Einschränkendes, aber oft hatte ich das Gefühl, als hätte ich damals intensiver 
gelebt (196, my emphasis).
In Bechler’s narrative, prison involves reaching into the basics of real life. The 
experience of head-shaving has also given Bechler a deeper understanding of herself 
(‘eine tiefere Erkenntnis unserer selbst’). This sense of deep reality is something that 
Luise Rinser is also aware of when she writes in her diary: ‘Ich sah das Leben nie so, 
wie ich es hier zu sehen bekomme: Nackt, häßlich, hart, aber unverfälscht und wirklich’ 
(66). In this sense, prison writing can assert the subject’s exposure to the raw, bare, 
‘reality’ of the world and to a seemingly more authentic means of perceiving the self.
Bechler’s real self, as created by the experience of prison, involves an improved kind 
of humane political awareness which feeds in to her maternal, defiant persona. She 
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becomes a better mother in prison through developing a political, protective 
consciousness. There is an implication that prison had a momentous effect on her life 
after her release because she went on to become a primary school teacher, taking her 
maternal, pedagogical role into her post-prison life. What is striking in such a self-
representation is its relationship to traditional notions of woman as naturally belonging 
to a domestic space. Being confined to a particular space such as a prison or camp is, in 
its restrictive, monotonous, non-public nature, akin to the domestic space into which 
women were previously confined. That the domestic space of the prison actually 
improves Bechler as a woman implies, rather startlingly, that prison is an ultimately 
refeminising place, something which counters many sociological interpretations of 
prison as both defeminising and ill-adapted to the needs of female prisoners. But we are 
not dealing with empirical notions of what prison ‘does’; we are looking at Bechler’s 
representation of prison. That she interprets the experience as refeminising reinforces the 
non-deviant nature of prison. The carceral space is reclaimed as a feminised rather than 
deviant, defeminising location for Bechler.
But it is not just through imprisonment that this ‘real’ self is laid bare, rather is it 
through narrative that she is able to realise her reformed, ‘true’ character. Narrative has a 
crucial effect on the creation of identity. According to Bechler’s text, it is the prison 
narrative that exposes an even ‘realer’ Bechler than prison itself does, because of the 
glimpses she gives the reader of her ‘real’ self in prison. There is a distinct discrepancy 
between Bechler’s representation of how she appears to people in prison and how she 
represents her real, inner feelings. She shows the reader that, in prison itself, she puts on 
a brave face, even when she does not feel brave inside. She admits, especially during her 
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conflict with Schönfeld, that her outer performance did not fit in with her inner, real 
emotions: ‘Daß sich dahinter Furcht verbarg, wußte keiner’ (288). Here she shows the 
reader – rather than most of her fellow prisoners and guards – her ‘real’ weaker side, 
stereotypically speaking her more feminine side, as she does when mentioning that she 
cries secretly, expressing her weakness and emotion only to the reader (132). Weigel 
writes of the barriers to authenticity created both within prison and in the outer world: 
‘in den verschiedenen Ausdrucksformen Gefangener ist die Authentizität ihrer 
Erfahrungen/Aussagen immer gebrochen durch informelle oder formelle Barrieren, 
durch institutionelle Strukturen, Erwartungen, Schreibanlässe und –motive.’65 It is in the 
prison world that the ‘real’ self cannot be expressed, whereas in autobiography, Bechler 
gives the impression that she is showing her ‘real’ self. Of course, as Weigel indicates, 
in the world of published life narratives different barriers, such as reader and publisher 
expectations arise, to which the author is subject. Despite these barriers, what remains in 
Warten auf Antwort is the sense that the reader is given special insight into Bechler’s 
‘true’ self.
And it is a ‘true’ self that has undergone a great deal of improvement. Bechler uses 
her narrative to demonstrate that prison was almost a privilege, because of the 
opportunities for self-improvement that it provided. For Bechler, such opportunities for 
authenticity are implicitly not available in the outside world. In presenting such an 
improved, more authentic self through her narrative, Bechler gains autonomy over her 
life and the disempowering experience of prison. It is important to remember that 
                                                
65 Weigel, "Und selbst im Kerker frei ...!": Schreiben im Gefängnis: Zur Theorie und Gattungsgeschichte 
der Gefängnisliteratur, p. 19.
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Bechler never chose to be in prison and separated from her family; she was desperate to 
contact them but was refused any communication by the authorities (for example, 282). 
Through showing the extent to which it improved her, Bechler is able to account for the 
lost years and the loss of her family, gaining a sense of having more control over that 
time: this is vitally important in coming to terms with the loss inherent in long-term 
imprisonment. Her words allow her to actively ‘do’ something; to reclaim her 
experience as an empowering part of her life. 
It is through narrative that she is able to (attempt to) gain control over her life, 
constructing her autobiography in a way that reflects how she wishes to perceive herself.
Narrative enables her to infuse the ‘mother’ signifier with a meaning which incorporates 
potentially subversive characteristics. Through associating such subversions with ideal 
femininity, Bechler neutralises their transgressive features. In this narrative she is able to 
move beyond the passive space of victimisation into one of autonomy and gain an 
identity that is both acceptable to herself and to her putative readership. It is through 
writing her account that she is able to construct an identity in which she has more 
agency than she did in her pre-prison life. The autonomy to be gained through language 
is encapsulated in Bechler’s attitude towards her name both during prison and 
afterwards. Bechler is, during prison, particularly defensive of her right to be referred to 
as a woman rather than a prisoner and wins the fight to be allowed to define herself as 
‘Frau’ (287). Bechler reclaims the right to be referred to as a woman in prison, and such 
a reclaiming of her status as woman and mother is to be found in her use of her married 
name on the cover of the book. By calling herself Margret Bechler on the cover and 
throughout the book, Bechler contests her divorce and subsequent loss of her name in 
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prison – in Waldheim prison she was persuaded to sign divorce papers and lost her 
married name (236). In using the Bechler name to write her autobiography, she publicly 
reclaims it, challenging what was done to her in prison and taking up her original role as 
mother and as wife. Using ‘Bechler’ allows her to partially right the wrongs done to her 
by prison and by her husband. She hereby takes control over a situation in which she 
previously had none. She thus gains a sense of self as an agent not only through prison, 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, through writing about prison. It is language and 
by extension narrative that gives her identity, as Jerome Bruner theorises.66
However, narrative is not an unproblematic means of gaining agency. It is not wholly 
powerful, especially when we consider that Bechler did not write her own words, or 
construct her own account: Mine Stalmann and the publishers are also in control of the 
narrative. Indeed, it seems that Mine Stalmann was the one who decided whose name 
was to go on the book’s cover, since she removed her name after the first edition. The 
published prison narrative and especially the collaborative one represents a diminished 
agency for Bechler. Perhaps Stalmann is imposing her own agenda upon Bechler’s 
narrative, distorting Bechler’s ‘original’ story for her own purposes. On the other hand it 
could be Bechler who exploits Stalmann, as is often the case when the subject is more 
famous than the author.67 Whatever the power relations or personal agendas of Bechler 
and Stalmann, what remains in the existence of the collaborative life narrative is the 
possibility of disempowerment on the part of Bechler. Also there is the presence of the 
imagined ‘addressed audience’ in Bechler’s (and indeed every writer’s) account. It is 
                                                
66 Bruner, “The Narrative Creation of Self,” p. 63. 
67 G. Thomas Couser, Making, Taking and Faking Lives: the Ethics of Collaborative Life Writing (1998), 
accessed October 2007; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2342/is_2_32/ai_54637199, p. 3.
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difficult to pinpoint the exact compromises that are made for an audience but one 
potential example is in Bechler’s avoidance of the label ‘political prisoner’. In 
representing her politicised character but not defining herself using the words ‘political 
prisoner’, Bechler shows that she is aware of the possible criticism of her audience, who 
may either refer back to her as a Nazi political prisoner, or a fraud, pretending to be an 
anti-GDR resister, when that is not what she is in prison for. The label political prisoner 
holds a lot of weight, and it is perhaps because of her imagined audience that Bechler 
does not allow herself to fully identify as such. The audience, the co-writer and the 
publisher represent further barriers to Weigel’s understanding of ‘authenticity’ in prison 
writing, and also to agency, because Bechler is not in ultimate control over the words 
that she uses. But such barriers to agency are inevitable in many kinds of writing and 
perhaps even intrinsic to the process of creating a ‘readable’ document. After all, 
perhaps using a professional writer, and a publisher, is necessary in order that Bechler’s 
self-representation traverses the space between prison and the public world 
appropriately. Bechler may seem to compromise in creating her narrative, but I propose 
that the autonomy that she gains through writing outweighs the compromises made in 
the process. Bechler’s text acts as a testament to the possibilities of self-creation and 
autonomy present within narrative. Language may not be able to do everything in the 
location of the self, but its benefits in such an endeavour are manifold. 
191
Chapter Four: ‘Die Gefangene ist die Überlegene’: agency and 
femininity in Elisabeth Graul’s Die Farce.
Introduction: disempowerment in prison and prison writing
The writer and civil rights campaigner, Jürgen Fuchs (1950-1999) wrote of his 
experience of East German incarceration between 1976 and 1977: ‘Und wenn man 
widerkommt, ist man ein anderer’.1 The German Democratic Republic is remarkable for 
the diverse ways in which it attempted to change the personalities of its prisoners in an 
effort to transform them into ideal citizens. This is of particular import to those arrested 
for their resistance to the regime, whom we would now regard as political prisoners. The 
‘Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands’ (SED) fervently denied the existence of 
political prisoners within the GDR, instead labelling them dangerous criminals. Leonore 
Ansorg writes: ‘Eine formale Trennung zwischen dem Strafvollzug an politischen und 
kriminellen Gefangenen existierte nicht. Da die DDR offiziell keine politischen 
Gefangenen kannte, gab es folglich auch keinen speziell auf sie zugeschnittenen 
Strafvollzug mit besonderen Normen und Regelungen.’2 This refusal to designate these 
prisoners ‘political’ combined with their extreme criminalisation had a significant effect. 
Ansorg writes that not being recognised in one’s status as political can degrade the 
prisoner: ‘Die moralische Diskreditierung von politischen Gegnern als Kriminellen 
                                                
1 Jürgen Fuchs, "Bearbeiten, dirigieren, zuspitzen: Die >leisen< Methoden des MfS," in Zersetzung der 
Seele: Psychologie und Psychiatrie im Dienste der Stasi, ed. Klaus Behnke, Jürgen Fuchs and Mitchell G. 
Ash (Hamburg: Rotbuch Verlag, 1995), p. 47.
2 Leonore Ansorg, Politische Häftlinge im Strafvollzug der DDR: die Strafvollzugsanstalt Brandenburg
(Berlin: Metropol, 2005), p. 9. 
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bildete eine Konstante in der politischen Strafverfolgung und im Strafvollzug der 
DDR.’3
It was not only through criminal labelling that the GDR attempted to impose an 
altered sense of self upon its imprisoned opponents. The interrogation process was 
intended to have an extremely disorienting effect upon the prisoner. There were 
seventeen Stasi remand prisons in the GDR and, unlike Margret Bechler, Elisabeth 
Graul (born 1928) was kept in such a prison – Hohenschönhausen in Berlin – for the 
first seven months of her confinement. Ansorg mentions of prisoners’ first person 
accounts that the experience of ‘Untersuchungshaft’ was described more often than the 
prisons or camps to which the prisoner was subsequently sent, because it left enduring 
psychological and physical effects on the prisoner.4 The authorities of the Stasi remand 
prisons employed psychological torture methods, in some cases alongside physical 
torture, in their interrogation of the prisoner. Hans Eberhard Zahn writes of the shift 
from physical to psychological interrogation tactics: ‘Weil die DDR ja schließlich als ein 
richtiger ‘normaler’ Staat anerkannt sein wollte, sollte die Untersuchungsverfahren 
‘human’ sein und allein mit der – im übrigen viel wirksameren – psychischen Folter 
arbeiten.’5 This new approach had its roots in Soviet methods of interrogation. Stalinist 
‘white torture’ aimed to change the prisoners’ beliefs and therefore their sense of their 
role in the world in order to obtain a confession and information about accomplices. 
According to Karl Wilhelm Fricke:
                                                
3 Ibid., p. 9. 
4 Ibid., p. 8.
5 Hans-Eberhard Zahn, Haftbedingungen und Geständnisproduktion in den Untersuchungshaftanstalten 
des MfS, (Berlin: Der Berliner Landesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der 
Ehemaligen DDR, 2007), both citations p. 22. 
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Unter Anwendung von Erkenntnissen der modernen Psychologie und Physiologie 
soll der Gefangene nicht nur zu einem Geständnis, sondern auch zur Einsicht in 
seine vermeintliche Schuld gegenüber der Gesellschaft gebracht werden. Ihre 
Methodik zielt zunächst dahin, die Persönlichkeit des Häftlings durch massive 
psychische oder physische Einwirkung zu zerstören.6
Psychological ‘Zersetzung’ consisted of methods such as sleep deprivation, isolation and 
night-long interrogations which aimed to change the prisoner’s orientation within their 
world: ‘Nachgerade wird der Häftling seiner Erlebniswelt entfremdet, er verliert sein 
geistiges Orientierungsvermögen, sein Bewußtsein schrumpft auf ein >bewußtes Sein< 
als Häftling.’7
At the same time there existed a parallel and potentially contradictory tendency in the 
GDR towards viewing prison not only as a place of social isolation and punishment, but 
also as a place of reform (‘Erziehung’ or ‘Umbau’ as it was called by the SED), a 
process by which the prisoner was to be transformed into an ideal GDR citizen. Fricke 
writes that according to GDR criminal law: ‘Die Freiheitsstrafe soll demnach den 
Rechtsbrecher einerseits unterdrücken und gesellschaftlich isolieren, andererseits 
erziehen’.8 Penal theorists of the time did not see extreme punishment and reform as 
conflicting.9 However, the aim of Erziehung was supposedly to change the political 
allegiance of the prisoner from dissent against the regime to concurrence with its 
ideological tenets. With this in mind, there were regular film screenings in GDR prisons 
                                                
6 Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Politik und Justiz in der DDR: zur Geschichte der politischen Verfolgung 1945-
1968: Bericht und Dokumentation (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979), p. 232.
7 Ibid., p. 232.
8 Fricke, Politik und Justiz in der DDR: zur Geschichte der politischen Verfolgung 1945-1968: Bericht 
und Dokumentation, p. 525.
9 Hermann Wentker, Justiz in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953: Transformation und Rolle ihrer zentralen 
Institutionen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), p. 393. Wentker describes a shift from a ‘humane’ penal 
approach to a more punitive one during the late 1950s. However, an overlap remained and it is possible to 
see both systems alongside each other in Graul’s account. 
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as well as re-education classes and prison libraries containing Soviet books.10 Reform 
was supposed to occur primarily through work – not an unfamiliar concept to either 
Communists or National Socialists.11 Labour was thought to impose a more proletarian 
work ethic upon the prisoner, part of the GDR’s attempts to rid its prisoners of their 
‘bürgerliches Bewußtsein’.12 The public line may have been that work transformed 
prisoners but Hermann Wentker argues that, at the time when the penal system was 
transferred to the MdI (the Ministerium des Innern or Home Office) in the early 1950s, 
the central concern was ‘eine möglichst optimale Ausnutzung von deren [der 
Gefangenen] Arbeitskraft’.13 Furthermore, Michael Walter suggests that the concept of 
Erziehung was primarily the GDR’s public strategy for dealing with its prisoners: ‘Die 
Behandlung der Gefangenen stand nach außen hin unter der Devise der Erziehung zur 
Einhaltung der Gesetze des sozialistischen Staates’.14 What happened behind the scenes 
was a different story, especially in the dilapidated and overcrowded Hoheneck prison.15
It is unclear how exactly work or indeed Erziehung was to change the beliefs of the 
prisoner and questionable how much the authorities expected this to succeed, but what 
we do know is that there was a drive towards changing prisoners’ political identity and it 
is one to which many respond in narratives of their incarceration. 
                                                
10 Finn, Die politischen Häftlinge der Sowjetzone, p. 155.
11 Gerhard Finn, Die Frauen von Hoheneck: Protokoll einer Anhörung (Bad Münstereifel: Westkreuz 
Verlag, 1995), p. 34.
12 Brigitte Kaff, "Gefährliche politische Gegner": Widerstand und Verfolgung in der sowjetischen 
Zone/DDR (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1995), p. 57.
13 Wentker, p. 398.
14 Michael Walter, Strafvollzug (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1999), pp. 48-9.
15 A number of first person accounts have been published which describe the rundown conditions in 
Hoheneck prison, for example: Petra Koch, Menschenwege - politisch inhaftiert auf Burg Hoheneck: eine 
wahre Geschichte (Berlin: Frieling, 2002), Ulrich Schacht, Hohenecker Protokolle: Aussagen zur 
Geschichte der politischen Verfolgung von Frauen in der DDR (Zürich: Ammann, 1984), Ines Veith, 
Klipp, Klapp, Holz auf Stein--: Frauen in politischer Haft: Hoheneck 1950-1989, (Berlin: A-Verbal 
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There is a gendered perspective to take into account when examining the GDR 
prison’s attempts to change its prisoners. Meinhard Stark writes of the Soviet remand 
prison, a precursor to the DDR one: ‘das Haftregime, die Aufenthaltsbedingungen und 
die Untersuchung hatten gerade das zum Ziel, die persönliche Integrität, die 
geschlechtliche und kulturelle Identität der inhaftierten Frau zu zerstören.’16 It could be 
said that the GDR prison forced a particularly disorienting identity upon its female 
prisoners because of its extreme criminalisation of political resisters. Hoheneck was the 
largest women’s prison in the GDR, where Elisabeth Graul spent most of her eleven-
year prison term. Former prisoners tell stories like Brigitte Kaff’s, who recalls being told 
by the guard on arrival at the prison: ‘Jeder kriminelle Mörder ist mir lieber – denn er 
hat nicht wie sie zur Planung eines neuen Volkmords beigetragen.’17 Kaff recalls that 
this phrase: ‘blieb für viele Jahre ein ständiger Refrain, der den düsteren Gefängnisalltag 
begleitete.’ Such labelling as criminal can have a defeminising effect on the prisoner 
given its connotations of the female prisoner’s body as sexually abnormal, and the 
subsequent implication that the subject’s femininity has somehow ‘gone wrong’.18 So 
too can internment within the space of prison – which is often theorised as a ‘male’ 
space given its historical association with men rather than women. There is the potential 
then, for imprisonment to impose an identity which is at odds with how the prisoner may 
have perceived her femininity beforehand. At the same time, female prisoners were 
                                                
16 Meinhard Stark, Frauen im Gulag: Alltag und Überleben, 1936 bis 1956 (Münich: C. Hanser, 2003), 
pp. 39-40. 
17 Kaff, p. 55. See also: Finn, Die Frauen von Hoheneck: Protokoll einer Anhörung, p. 25, in which two 
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often given ‘feminine’ tasks such as housework and mending in GDR incarceration.19
The defeminisation involved in criminalisation and incarceration therefore stood 
alongside rather vague attempts at ‘re-socialising’ them into ‘better’ women. What 
emerges as the main issue is the multifarious disempowerment of the prisoner at the 
hands of the institution. Aside from interrogation and re-education, the prison as a total 
institution controls the lives of its inmates on an everyday level and they have little 
choice and limited autonomy over how they spend their time within prison. Striking in 
an examination of GDR incarceration is the sense that the prison infrastructure places 
limitations upon how the incarcerated subject develops as a person, through forcefully 
instructing the prisoner on how their personality and sense of self should change.  
Prison writing and its readers
Prison writers use narrative to respond to and resist the disempowering experience of 
prison and through this to gain a sense of autonomous self, as we have seen in the 
previous chapters. Any kind of writing, regardless of its content, can be an empowering 
mode of resistance to the impositions of imprisonment. More specifically, writing can 
provide its author with the opportunity to take control over how they have developed in 
prison, combating the sometimes overbearing narrative of the dominant justice system 
with their own version of who they are and what their personal history consists of. But 
issues arise when that writing is exposed to a public. The audience can often represent a 
judgemental force, especially in the context of prison writing because there is significant 
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stigma attached to having been incarcerated. The prison writer writes as a defendant in 
court – Holdenried writes that ever since Socrates’ Apology: ‘Elemente wie 
Spurensicherung, Dokumentation, Belege und Verifikation durchziehen die 
Autobiographie so gut wie den Justizprozeß. Die Versicherung der Identität entspricht 
den Angaben zur Person vor Gericht’.20 The reader-judge decides whether the author is 
guilty of their ‘crime’ or not. There is, then, potential for disempowerment not only in 
the fact of imprisonment, but in the process of engaging with the task of writing itself. 
The imagined audience will tend to be an ever-present and judgemental force upon the 
writing of any text, a force exercising its own authority over that of the writer herself. 
The writer may use her narrative to defend herself and her actions to her putative 
audience. She may negotiate with her audience, addressing them in trying to appear 
innocent – a possibly disempowering form of self-representation. Nonetheless, there is 
authority or agency to be obtained through writing of the self in a particular way. 
This is pertinent to Elisabeth Graul’s 1991 text Die Farce. Written in 1990, the text 
records the author’s eleven years’ political imprisonment in GDR prisons between 1951 
and 1962, for her participation in an anti-GDR resistance group that had links to a right-
wing extremist organisation in West Germany. Graul had been involved in the group for 
several months from 1950 until leaving it in mid-1951, several weeks before her arrest. 
For Graul the need to explain herself to her audience and to be seen as innocent was 
especially strong, given the dubious political connections that precipitated her 
incarceration. The text was first published in a recently reunified Germany – a country 
                                                
20 Michaela Holdenried, Im Spiegel ein anderer: Erfahrungskrise und Subjektdiskurs im modernen 
autobiographischen Roman (Heidelberg: Winter, 1991), p. 187.
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attempting to come to terms with the immediate East German as well as the National 
Socialist past. In this environment, Graul faced judgement for her role in a group that 
had right-wing affiliations. The Widerstandskreis der Jugend der SBZ was a student 
resistance group based both in East and West Germany that opposed the oppressive 
strategies of the new East German administration and wished for a more democratic 
approach to governance. They were led by the writer and doctor Paul Lüth (1921-1986) 
who also fronted the controversial West German Bund Deutscher Jugend. This extreme 
right group (supposedly funded by American companies) was founded in 1950 and 
banned in 1953.21 It is to these accusations of deviance as well as to the ‘transgressive’ 
environment of prison that Graul responds in her account, constructing an ideal self in 
order to counteract any accusations of deviance. 
My aim in this chapter is to examine the ways in which Graul attempts to obtain a 
sense of who she is after the disorienting experience of imprisonment, and in response to 
the stigma associated with her crime and incarceration. I shall argue that, in writing of
herself in a particular way she attempts to gain control and even authority over her 
experience as well as over her imagined readership. This examination incorporates an 
analysis of the role of the ‘authentic’ or the ‘real’ in gaining an autonomous and 
authoritative sense of self. More specifically, I look at Graul’s representation of herself 
as the ultimate truth-teller and therefore the narrative authority. I then move onto 
examining how she constructs a character arc not unlike Bechler’s, in which her ‘real’ 
self is gradually unearthed during prison. Central to her narrative of personal growth are 
questions of femininity: I look at how Graul constructs herself as an ‘ideal’ female 
                                                
21 Jens Mecklenburg, ed., Handbuch deutscher Rechtsextremismus, (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 1996), p. 154. 
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political prisoner and one who has increased authority within the prison space. Moving 
on from my examination of Bechler’s Warten auf Antwort, Graul’s text provides us with 
further insight into the complex and unfixed nature of the ‘political’ and the ‘feminine’.
Autobiography, truth and literary truth
It is important, firstly, to examine the elusive notion of ‘truth’ in order to begin 
investigating the ways in which Graul constructs herself as a ‘good’ autobiographer. 
‘Truth’ is a key factor in the interpretation and reception of any autobiographical text 
and it was with that concept of ‘truth’ or non-fiction within autobiography in mind that 
Lejeune coined the concept of the ‘Autobiographical Pact’: that agreement between the 
reader and author of any text designated ‘autobiography’ that what they are reading is 
non-fiction, in other words, ‘true’. For Lejeune, it is because this pact has been 
established that the text can be read and understood as autobiography, although as 
mentioned in Chapter Three, the rules do not apply solely to the text’s generic 
designation: the rest of the text must be perceived as ‘true’ in order to reinforce its label 
as autobiography. This notion of the text’s truthfulness is, according to H. Porter Abbott, 
not an essential, empirical ‘truth’, rather it is a belief of such on part of the reader. 
Abbott remarks that the ‘difference […] between an autobiography and a novel lies not 
in the factuality of the one and the fictiveness of the other but in the different 
orientations toward the text that they elicit in the reader’.22 Whether or not the text is 
‘factually’ true is less important (and, indeed, far more elusive and contestable) than the 
                                                
22 H. Porter Abbott, "Autobiography, Autography, Fiction: Groundwork for a Taxonomy of Textual 
Categories," New Literary History 19, no. 3 (1988), p. 603, my emphasis.
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reader’s belief that it is true or factual. The most important factor is that the text appear
as true as possible in order to be meaningfully received as an autobiography (rather than 
as a work of fiction) by the reader.
But what exactly constitutes ‘truth’ is a more contentious question. It seems that it is 
a literary or poetic, rather than factual, truth that is venerated in German 
autobiographical writings. From Goethe’s Dichtung und Wahrheit to Christa Wolf’s
Kindheitsmuster, the ‘ideal’ German autobiography has been an amalgamation of artistic 
creation and biographical ‘fact’: ‘Importance is attached to interpreting experience 
within an imaginative context so that one may understand its broadest implications 
without falsifying the original biographical source.’23 ‘Truth’ in the literary 
autobiography becomes a combination of creation and fact, with imagination enabling 
the most effective transmission of ‘fact’. Indeed, Roy Pascal has suggested that it is the 
autobiographical novel, a fictionalised rendering of life experiences, that communicates 
a deeper truth than the straightforward autobiography, partly because in the novel the 
author is able to inhabit many different perspectives and use literary symbolism in the 
place of a factual relaying of events.24 Christa Wolf’s semi-autobiographical texts
Kindheitsmuster (1976) and Nachdenken über Christa T. (1969) may explore the 
author’s past as a child during National Socialism and then within the GDR, but Wolf is 
reluctant to state what her own autobiographical role is within these texts.
Kindheitsmuster is predominantly written from a second person perspective and 
Nachdenken über Christa T. does not make clear whether or not it is Wolf who is the 
                                                
23 Barbara Saunders, Contemporary German Autobiography: Literary Approaches to the Problem of 
Identity (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 1985), p. 3.
24 Roy Pascal, Design and Truth in Autobiography (London: Routledge and Paul, 1960), pp. 175-177. 
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narrator, or, indeed, the protagonist. Wolf’s work has initiated renewed debate and 
examination of the role of the fictional in communicating truth and the boundaries 
between truth and fiction. Wolf’s work instigated discussion of her own concept of 
‘subjective authenticity’, in which fiction enhances the authenticity of the account. The 
narrator in Nachdenken über Christa T. speaks of: ‘was man erfinden muß, um der 
Wahrheit willen.’25 Although Wolf’s subjective authenticity could be said to be a 
response to the oppressive creative climate of the GDR (where Nachdenken über Christa 
T. was initially banned), in which she was not at liberty to write of herself directly for 
fear of reprimand, there has been a strong sense within German cultural discourse since 
Goethe that fiction can communicate a higher truth than factual writing, implying that 
factual language cannot do the past justice. The examination of ‘literary’ autobiography 
has dominated scholarly research into life-writing in German Studies, at least studies of 
autobiographical texts written before the National Socialist era. 
But the framework for literary autobiography cannot straightforwardly be applied to 
historical memoirs documenting, most notably, experiences of the Holocaust, as well as 
experiences of oppression during the GDR. This is because the concept of truth within 
historical autobiography differs from that of the literary autobiographical work; truth in 
the representation of oppressive historical events means factual accuracy, a desire on the 
part of the author for factual clarity as a means of exposing injustices committed during 
the oppressive regime. The years immediately following the collapse of the German 
Democratic Republic saw a sharp rise in the publication of both literary and historical 
                                                
25 Quoted in Owen Evans, Mapping the Contours of Oppression: Subjectivity, Truth and Fiction in Recent 
German Autobiographical Treatments of Totalitarianism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), p. 17. 
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autobiographical accounts, with those who had lived in the GDR finally able to write 
openly about their experiences within the oppressive regime.26 Karen Leeder has 
identified a public requirement particular to accounts of the GDR past that they appear 
as accurate as possible in their rendering of history. Leeder explains: 
In the fraught atmosphere of the new Germany (especially in cases with Stasi
involvement) ‘truth’ has been taken by many to be a non-negotiable category […] 
It might be argued that, since the majority of people who lived the GDR 
experience will never have the opportunity to tell it like it was, those writers who 
do owe it to them to get as close as possible to historical truth […] Any writer who 
appears to abuse the inherent ambiguities of literary fiction runs the risk of being 
suspected of opportunism or cowardice.27
‘Truth’, in this context means factual accuracy, or at least an appearance thereof. There 
is a strong public demand for authenticity – Astrid Herhoffer writes: ‘Doch bildet die 
Frage nach Wahrheit die Achse, um die sich die meisten Rezensionen drehen.’28 This 
type of text is thus evaluated primarily on whether the reader believes it to be truthful or 
not. A public need for ‘truth’ has been seen previously in attitudes towards 
autobiographical accounts of Holocaust incarceration. Indeed the misrepresentation of 
Auschwitz in autobiography has been viewed as a particularly offensive act which 
undermines the tragic experiences of other victims and devalues the great suffering of 
the Holocaust itself. Binjamin Wilkomirski (otherwise known as Bruno Dössekker), 
Herman Rosenblat and Mischa Defonseca all published accounts of their experiences 
                                                
26 As discussed in Karen Leeder, "’Vom Unbehagen in der Einheit’: Autobiographical Writing by Women 
Since 1989," in Autobiography by Women in German, ed. Mererid Puw Davies, Beth Linklater, and Gisela 
Shaw (Berne; Oxford: Peter Lang, 2000), pp. 249-273, and Julian Preece, "Damaged Lives? (East) 
German Memoirs and Autobiographies, 1989-1994," in The New Germany: Literature and Society after 
Unification, ed. Osman Durrani et al (Sheffield: Sheffield Acad. Press, 1995), p. 352. Walter Janka’s 
memoir Spuren des Lebens, documenting his four years in prison and his showtrial in 1956 was 
particularly popular and much-discussed.
27 Leeder, p. 262. 
28 Astrid Herhoffer, "Auf der Suche nach Wahrheit," in Germany in the 1990s, ed. H. Hahn (Amsterdam; 
Atlanta: Rodopi, 1995), p. 27.
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during the Holocaust that were later exposed as, to differing degrees, historically 
inaccurate.29 All of the texts created a media stir and their authors were subsequently 
vilified. The controversy surrounding such accounts acts as a testament to this obligation 
of factuality within historical autobiography, as well as once again indicating the 
empowered judgemental role of the audience. 
All life narratives, and especially those reliant upon a fraught historical backdrop, 
function in a similar way to the accused’s statement of defence in court. The reader acts 
as judge and decides whether the author is guilty or not based on whether or not they 
think they are telling the truth. Holdenried tells us:
Das Eingeständnis von Schuld, wenn auch nicht in einem justitiablen Sinn, und die 
eine Vorverurteilung ansprechende Erkenntnis, von Anbeginn verurteilt zu sein, 
korrespondieren mit einer von außen an die Autobiographie herangetragenen 
Einforderung der Wahrheit, die oft genug tatsächlich justitiabel geworden ist.30
The reader decides whether the author is innocent or guilty, although, of course, they do 
not assign the same punishment as that given in a courtroom. In this context of 
judgement, innocence is strongly connected to truthfulness, and guilt to deception. A key 
component is therefore the writer’s endeavours to show their text as truthful and 
authentic and themselves as honest.
                                                
29 Binjamin Wilkomirski, Bruchstücke: aus einer Kindheit 1939-1948 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1998), Herman Rosenblat, Angel at the Fence: the True Story of a Love That Survived (New York: 
Berkley Books, 2008), Misha Defonseca and others, Surviving With Wolves: the Most Extraordinary Story 
of World War II (London: Portrait, 2005).
30 Holdenried, Im Spiegel ein anderer: Erfahrungskrise und Subjektdiskurs im modernen 
autobiographischen Roman, p. 187.
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Authenticity and authority in Graul’s prison narrative
That the literary autobiography, with its representation of what we might call higher 
truth, occupies such an esteemed and indeed authoritative place within German 
literature, presents something of a conflict for the former political prisoner Elisabeth 
Graul, and indeed her publishers.31 As with many political prisoners who document their 
experiences,32 Graul represents herself as a cultured, indeed an artistically gifted 
individual, with a talent for playing the piano.33 Graul’s self-representation as artistically 
talented extends to her portrayal of herself as something of a literary figure, rather than 
as a ‘mere’ autobiographer. Graul subtitled the first edition of her account of 
imprisonment ‘Autobiographischer Roman’. 
Leeder identifies a tendency towards the hybridisation of genres in autobiographical 
accounts of the GDR published in the years immediately following 1989. A number of 
works of autobiographical fiction were published during this time, among them Christa 
Wolf’s Was bleibt (1990); Angela Krauss’ Der Dienst (1990); Elke Erb’s Winkelzüge
(1991).34 It seems Graul mirrors this immediate post-Wende inclination to mark work as 
‘hybrid’ in designating her text an ‘autobiographical novel’. In doing so, she attempts to 
position herself amongst well-respected authors and create an intellectual identity. Not 
                                                
31 Although I view Graul as the main author in the writing process inasmuch as it assists her as a subject to 
come to terms with imprisonment, it is important to acknowledge the influence of her publishers in the 
creation of Die Farce. To what degree the ImpulsVerlag contributed to the final version is not known but 
it is safe to assume that they did, at least, play a role in how the text was marketed. 
32 Rosa Luxemburg, Luise Rinser and Lore Wolf are the most immediate examples of this, see also: 
Brandt, Sachs, Plogstedt, not to mention the playwright Ernst Toller: Ernst Toller, Prosa, Briefe, Dramen, 
Gedichte (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1961), who wrote prolifically during his imprisonment between 1918 and 
1923. 
33 This is emphasised by the photo on the last page of the text’s first edition which depicts a young Graul 
playing a piano. 
34 Leeder, p. 261. It seems there were more autobiographical novels published by women than men in the 
post-Wende period, although Wolfgang Hilbig’s Ich was also published at this time: Wolfgang Hilbig, 
Ich: Roman (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1993).
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only is such a cultured self-representation visible from Die Farce’s subtitle; there are a 
number of novelistic elements to be found in the main text itself. Unlike Margret 
Bechler’s largely chronological and straightforward account, Die Farce is characterised 
by its non-chronological structure. The sequence of Graul’s imprisonment is interspersed 
with sketches from her life both before and after incarceration. Her account begins near 
the end: it opens with Graul visiting the public prosecutor’s office of the former East in 
1990 to view her ‘farcical’ indictment and verdict.35 Graul’s account includes poetry and 
literary devices such as the ‘farce’ metaphor running through the text which conveys a 
metaphorical, non-literal ‘truth’ about the ridiculous injustice that the author 
experienced.36 Literary elements are common to autobiographical writing. But what 
emerges is the sense that, in writing in such a ‘novelistic’ way, Graul creates a literary 
text: its complex/non-linear structure and designation as an autobiographical novel 
evoke embedded concepts of ‘good’ literature – that which contains a seemingly 
‘higher’ literary truth based on creative ability. 
Graul here attempts to create an intellectual identity for herself as the author of such a 
text. This articulation of an intellectual self may well serve a function in Graul’s 
                                                
35 Elisabeth Graul, Die Farce: Autobiographischer Roman (Magdeburg: imPULS Verlag, 1991), p. 7. 
Subsequent references will be given in the main text. Such narrative (dis)order is reminiscent of Wolf’s 
highly influential Nachdenken über Christa T, published in 1969, which takes the reader backwards and 
forwards in its description of its protagonist’s life.
36 The farce trope is particularly common to accounts of GDR oppression and imprisonment, although 
Margret Bechler does not use it. For example: Amanda Bohlken, Die dritte Dimension der Tränen: DDR-
Flucht; Haft und Trauma; Heilungswege (Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 2007). See also: Fricke, Die Wahrheit 
verpflichtet: Texte aus fünf Jahrzehnten zur Geschichte der DDR, 2000 for more usage of the term. It is 
the coping strategy of many writers to mock and even emasculate the regime, unlike accounts of National 
Socialist oppression in which there is much less of a sense of ridicule. Cf. Koch’s account, which differs 
to one such as Luise Rinser’s Gefängnistagebuch. Perhaps the trope even connects to the development of 
‘Ostalgie’ post-Wende because there is a common belittlement of the GDR in both ‘Ostalgie’ and ‘Farce’. 
Additionally, the subtitle adds an extra dimension to a discussion of genre: in being called Die Farce, the 
‘autobiographical novel’ refers back to a theatrical genre, producing a multi-layered generic 
representation.
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response to being designated criminal. There is a widespread belief that art is not only 
redemptive but a sign of goodness, and prisoners who successfully demonstrate their 
artistic abilities can overturn criminal judgement and achieve a level of exoneration from 
their crime through literary activity.37
Using the model of the artist and intellectual may help absolve Graul from the 
criminal identity imposed upon her by imprisonment, but it is a problematic strategy 
because, even though a literary self-representation can decriminalise the subject of 
autobiography, so too does a self-representation as truth-teller and writer of an authentic 
account. However esteemed its literary tradition, the autobiographical novel represents a 
blurred boundary between fact and fiction, which confuses the reader about whether the 
text is truth (represented by ‘autobiography’) or fiction (represented by ‘novel’). In 
designating her text thus, Graul inserts an element of fiction and therefore factual 
unreliability into her life narrative. By the third edition, however, published in 1996, the 
subtitle had been changed to ‘Ein Stück Autobiographie’.38 It is not clear whether Graul 
herself or her publishers instigated this change in subtitle, but the title change does seem 
to reflect a desire that the text appear as truthful as possible in representing Graul’s 
experience. This seems to be a result of the text’s location within an environment in 
which authenticity was of crucial importance in autobiographical writings about GDR 
                                                
37 There is a significant tradition of the male criminal (not just political prisoners), released from prison 
after achieving status and public sympathy as a writer – from Jack Abbott of the U.S.A. – a violent 
criminal and talented writer whose release Norman Mailer petitioned for – to Austria’s notorious Jack 
Unterweger – released from prison after earning the support of Austrian intellectuals through his prolific 
writing.  See: Gary Rosenshield, "Crime and Redemption, Russian and American Style: Dostoevsky, 
Buckley, Mailer, Styron and Their Wards," The Slavic and East European Journal 42, no. 4 (1988), 
especially p. 678 and p. 683. As a female political prisoner, Graul may not fit into the same category as 
these male criminals, but I believe her text can still contribute to a cultural discourse in which artistic 
ability and intellect can have an exonerative effect. 
38 Elisabeth Graul, Die Farce: Ein Stück Autobiographie (Magdeburg: imPULS Verlag, 1996).
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oppression. Also, given that Die Farce was her first publication, Graul was not a known 
literary figure, unlike the established writers and ‘hybrid’ autobiographers Wolf, Krauss 
and Erb. Graul cannot be a literary truth-teller because of this status and because of the 
potential stigma associated with her status as a former prisoner. It is more appropriate to 
her desired role as innocent that she be represented as truthful above all, rather than as 
unreliable (and therefore less innocent). There is more advantage (and more authority, as 
we will see below) in appearing truthful and factual than there is in emphasising her role 
as a literary figure. 
Die Farce has certain novelistic characteristics but at the same time it is presented as 
an historical and factual, rather than a literary, autobiography. Even a cursory analysis of 
the first edition exposes an appeal to factuality: the author on the title page and the 
protagonist are both called Elisabeth Graul; there is a photo of Graul on the last page of 
the book, and a further photo on the book sleeve, together with a biographical note 
referring to her incarceration and life afterwards. All of this information corresponds to 
the content of the book itself. Furthermore, the account is written in the first person, and 
is littered with pieces of ‘real-life’ evidence such as exact dates to authenticate her story 
(e.g. 7). Graul is insistent on the factually reliable and truthful status of herself as the 
author of the account. She shows her commitment to uncovering the ‘true’ story of her
prison experience throughout the text, using her account partly as a means of protest 
against what she describes as others’ ‘Falschaussagungen’ (236). She takes on the role 
of journalist or detective by returning to Hoheneck prison almost twenty years after her 
release in order to correct what she describes as any ‘Gedächtnisfehler’ (239) about her 
experience there. She represents this return as – quite understandably – an intensely 
208
disturbing experience, but it is one that demonstrates the self-sacrificial extent of her 
determination for ‘truth’: ‘Es muß sein, ich will mein Gedächtnis prüfen und so genau 
wie möglich beim Berichten sein’ (240). She becomes a figure battling her own fears in 
order to find the authentic narrative. Graul even insists that truth is fundamental to her 
own character and sense of self. She berates a former political acquaintance for 
publishing an inaccurate article about her resistance group, writing: ‘Dieses Machwerk 
ist so schlimm und so verlogen, daß es mir Übelkeit verursacht’ (236). Factual 
inaccuracy repels Graul not just emotionally but physically, which demonstrates that 
telling the truth is integral to her as a subject. Graul shows that her performance as truth-
teller has not only been defined by her but by others too. She recalls that during her 
incarceration she was one of the few prisoners chosen by independent prison inspectors 
to tell the ‘real’ story about what goes on in Hoheneck prison (221-4). The inspectors are 
represented as more concerned with truth than are the prison authorities, and say to her: 
‘ “Wir sind an der Wahrheit über diese Anstalt interessiert, und die glauben wir nur von 
Leuten wie Ihnen erfahren zu können” ’ (223). Graul is thus presented as one of the most 
reliable narrators in prison. To reinforce this status as reliable truth-teller, Graul writes 
of her return visit to the jail in 1991 that the new prison director there is keen to know 
the ‘true’ history of Hoheneck prison and so turns to Graul for the truth, dismissing 
other, unreliable reports that had been published: ‘Es gibt Irritationen durch inzwischen 
veröffentlichte Bücher und Reportagen. Wie war alles wirklich? Das menschliche 
Gedächtnis ist nicht immer zuverlässig. Ich beantworte ihm seine Fragen nach bestem 
Wissen’ (241). Although Graul acknowledges her potentially unreliable memory, she 
still shows that her truth is taken above that of other (unspecified) public discourses, 
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suggesting that, since she is taken as a factual authority by the new prison supervisor as 
well as during incarceration itself, the reader must take her as such too. 
Herein lies the implication not only that there exists one sole true narrative to be 
found but also that Graul is the one who is prepared to find and articulate it. This is not 
far removed from the ‘quest for truth’ depicted in Nachdenken über Christa T., in which 
Wolf uses written and spoken evidence to reveal the real life story of her protagonist, 
(although she concedes that much of her story is fiction). But unlike Wolf, Graul cannot 
afford to reflect on the contestable and subjective nature of truth and of conflicting 
narratives because of her need, due to her text’s location as a historical account of 
imprisonment, to stress the existence of one ultimate truth and to show her own position 
as the designated speaker of that truth. There is here an important connection between 
Graul’s self-representation as truth-teller and her construction of herself as an 
authoritative figure. Not only does Graul show that she tells the ultimate truth, she exerts 
her authority over others’ truths in her account. Margret Bechler’s Warten auf Antwort
contains what could be seen as an attempt at authenticity in the introductions to each 
chapter, in which a seemingly objective voice imparts a political-historical context. 
Graul takes this a step further: in her quest for authenticity and, indeed, authority, she 
makes use of real archival documentation such as transcripts from interrogations and her 
trial as well as letters, reflecting what Karen Leeder has discussed as a post-1989 
tendency towards documentary-based literature to reflect life in the GDR.39 Leeder 
discusses the crisis of identity that occurred throughout the former GDR after 
reunification, referring to Frank Schirrmacher’s statement: ‘ ‘Ein ganzes Volk geht in 
                                                
39 Leeder, p. 253.
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die Archive, um seiner Vergangenheit zu begegnen’’.40 The archives became a place to 
confront one’s past identity, although they held biased and fairly unreliable material, 
what Leeder refers to as ‘an alternative history – an alternative autobiography – of the 
GDR.’ 41 The use of such documentation serves to maintain Graul’s position as a 
detective in pursuit of the truth – it is, after all, real-life, authentic evidence that she has 
collected. But Graul also demonstrates that these documents are not to be believed and 
often amends them by inserting her own comments into the excerpts she selects. For 
example, she cites from a prison report about her conduct: 
In ständiger Briefverbindung steht sie [Graul – KR] mit einer gewissen Frau Eva 
Pohle, die sie als ‘Mütterlein’ bezeichnet und von der sie auch besucht wird. An 
dieser Verbindung ist sie sehr interessiert, und es ist eine äußerst herzliche, jedoch 
sehr undurchsichtige (!) Freundschaft (199-200). 
The insertion of an exclamation mark in brackets succinctly represents Graul’s mocking 
disagreement with what has been written about her. 
Through this insertion, Graul casts doubt on the integrity and authority of the prison 
report and asserts that she is more reliable than those supposedly authentic Stasi
documents she provides: it is her truth that is more authoritative, her narrative is the 
dominant one, to be believed and to be taken above all others. Graul thus imposes her 
own truth upon others’ narratives and upon one rendering of ‘history’. In doing so, she
obtains a sense of authority both over her audience and the possible narratives they 
could use to disempower her, as well as over the GDR prison narrative that oppressed 
her for so long. Thus narrative provides a sense of agency with which to combat any 
disempowerment that comes along with addressing that imagined audience, as well as, 
                                                
40 Ibid., p. 256.
41 Ibid., p. 257.
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perhaps more importantly, creating a sense of an autonomous self after the 
disempowering experience of incarceration. 
Prison as damaging
Writing and the representation of ‘truth’ function as a key means of gaining a sense of 
authority, both over the audience and over the dominant GDR prison narrative of the 
Stasi files within Die Farce. Graul takes this further by using her account to take 
narrative control of how her personality changes during her time in prison. First, 
however, it is important to examine the ways in which Graul indicates how the 
experience of prison threatens to overwhelm her sense of self. Prison quite literally has a 
focal place within her life narrative: her account starts and ends in the present day, with 
her time in prison occupying a central position within the main text.42 The narrative of 
her time in prison is interspersed with flashbacks of her pre-prison life and sections 
describing how prison affects her in the years following her release. Although not all of 
the text is temporally set within the prison, prison is always there, both before and after 
the experience of actual incarceration, because each section is in some way related to her 
time in confinement. The sections detailing her life before prison explain how she came 
to be there, looking at her younger life and her involvement with anti-GDR politics. 
Those after her release describe the ongoing after-effects of her experience. Prison’s 
lasting effects are also visible in Graul’s descriptions of her traumatic interrogation in 
                                                
42 In contrast to: Erich Loest, Durch die Erde ein Riss: ein Lebenslauf (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 
1981), in which the writer’s account of his seven-year imprisonment in the GDR is positioned at the 
beginning and the end of the narrative, with his non-prison life narrative occupying a central position. 
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Hohenschönhausen remand prison, where she was deprived of sleep and underwent 
night-long interrogations, as well as having ongoing dental problems and losing a 
number of teeth. This extreme and obvious distress may be temporary, but there is a 
more constant and ongoing after-effect of confinement: Graul writes that she cannot 
emotionally escape her experience of confinement in the years after her release: ‘Man 
wird es nicht los, denke ich, man wird es nie ganz los…’ (188). The majority of Die 
Farce is written in the present tense: at the time in which she wrote her account, prison 
is still very much part of her life and of her sense of self. 
Not only does she represent prison as central, inescapable, and, indeed damaging, 
Graul too focuses on the loss of femininity she experiences, especially in her portrayal of 
her initial entrance into prison. Clemmer’s concept of prisonisation, which I touch on in 
relation to Margret Bechler’s account in Chapter Three, refers to changes in the subject 
over a significant period of time – often over several years. But many prison writers 
concentrate on the changes they undergo during the first hours and days of incarceration. 
Norbert Blaichinger refers to the initial stage in prison as the ‘Eingewöhnungsphase’.43
In Hohenschönhausen remand prison in Berlin, on entry into the prison, the detainee was 
placed in a special cell in order to be ‘transformed’ into a prisoner.44 Ellen Thiemann, a 
former prisoner of Hoheneck, mentions the ‘Zugangszelle’ there.45 Such a space 
represents the transition from the ‘free’ space of the outer world into the confined space 
of the prison. The majority of women’s prison accounts, from before, during and after 
                                                
43 Norbert Blaichinger, Frauen hinter Gittern: Menschen, über die man nicht spricht: ein Gefängnisreport
(Wien: Norka-Verlag, 2000), p. 35.
44 From a tour of Hohenschönhausen prison in Berlin. 
45 Finn, Die Frauen von Hoheneck: Protokoll einer Anhörung, p. 25.
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Graul’s era, mention this stage, often focussing on the ‘Leibesvisitation’ and the 
degradation caused by it.46 Graul describes her shock at being forced to strip naked in 
front of a guard: ‘Mir stürzen die Tränen aus den Augen. Ich fühle mich entsetzlich 
gedemütigt’ (24). After this, Graul’s civilian underwear is taken from her and replaced 
with men’s underwear: ‘Sie nimmt mir die Wäsche weg, gibt mir eine baumwollene 
Unterhose und ein ebensolches Männerunterhemd’ (24). Thus a non-feminine identity is 
imposed upon her by the prison institution, through the clothing assigned to her. The 
significance of material items to the prisoner’s sense of self is of particular import here. 
That her clothes are taken away from her represents an enforced shedding of previous 
identity, in this case a shedding of femininity.47 Graul makes it clear that she enters a 
‘male’ space, in which women’s needs are not accounted for. She shows how, in remand 
prison in Hohenschönhausen, she was made to feel ashamed and embarrassed during 
menstruation – when she asks a guard for sanitary material she does so ‘mit hochrotem 
Kopf’ and there is no effort on the part of the prison to make her feel less awkward 
about having her period: ‘Jedes einzelne Stück muß ich extra anfordern. Mancher 
Wachmann grinst’ (32). In Graul’s account, prison is represented as a space that is not 
designed for women, indeed it is shameful to have specifically female needs (such as for 
sanitary towels) there. 
                                                
46 For example, Schlicke, p. 33.
47 Although my focus is on gender, it is also possible to analyse Graul’s account in terms of a shedding of 
class, national, age identity. Prison does not just affect gender, there are a number of factors constantly at 
play. Furthermore, material objects – especially the subject’s own possessions from pre-prison – have a 
more concentrated meaning within the prison microcosm than they do in the outside world. This is seen in 
the diaries of Rinser and Wolf as well as in Bechler’s account and is yet to be researched in the field of 
prison writing.
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Graul emphasises that prison has a particularly damaging effect on how women look. 
Her narrative is remarkable for its concentration on her own and other female prisoners’ 
clothing. During her trial, Graul describes the members of her political group who also 
stand accused: 
Elend, abgemagert, gealtert sind sie. Dort sitzt Gudrun. Sie trägt wie wir alle noch 
dieselbe Kleidung, in der wir im Juli verhaftet worden sind. Jetzt ist es Februar. 
Gudruns Sommerkleid aus buntbedecktem Stoff weist große Löcher in gleichen 
Abständen auf. Alle roten Blumen sind herausgefallen […] Wie eine Truppe 
Stadtstreicher werden wir vorgeführt (15). 
Graul concentrates on the state of her female friend’s clothes, with no remarks about 
those of the men. The faded flowers on Gudrun’s civilian dress (prison clothing was not 
worn during the trial) may serve as a trite literary symbol of prison’s destruction of the 
delicate woman, but nonetheless, the message remains that prison is particularly 
damaging to women. For Graul, men’s clothing and by extension men are more suited to 
imprisonment: prison is a space in which the female prisoner does not belong, indeed it 
damages her perception of her femininity. 
Prison’s eradication of the woman’s ‘feminine’ appearance is an infliction to which, 
according to her account, Graul initially responds with resistance, rather than passive 
‘docility’ (in Foucault’s understanding of the term). She writes that when she is given 
the men’s underwear, including long johns, she refuses to put her civilian (i.e. female) 
clothing over them, as instructed, saying: ‘Wenn man mich so häßlich macht, soll man 
mich auch so sehen!’ (25). She here defies and subverts prison regulations by taking 
them further than intended by the authority, mocking that exertion of control undertaken 
by the prison in giving her men’s underwear. However, this rebellion is short-lived and 
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she is gradually persuaded by her cell-mate to fit in with how others prisoners appear. A 
level of subversion still remains, however, as she refuses to roll her long john legs up 
under her skirt in order to hide them: ‘Aber auf die Idee, die Hosenbeine hochzurollen, 
komme ich noch immer nicht’ (26). Graul makes it clear that she dresses this way 
because she is suffering from shock – she is even taken to the sick-bay because the 
authorities think she is ‘nicht richtig im Kopf’ as a result of her choice of attire (26). 
Despite Graul’s reasoning behind her behaviour, her disdain for prison rules serves to 
show her initial rejection of prison and prisoner identity. 
Nonetheless, Graul’s representation of her failed attempts at resisting the 
defeminising elements of prisonisation indicate that she is unable to stave off the 
entrance into a defeminised world. It is with resignation that she describes the damage to 
her body as a result of malnourishment in prison: ‘Als wir nach Wochen wieder einmal 
zum Duschen geführt werden, sehe ich die Knochen überall herausragen. Beim Blick 
über die Schulter finde ich, daß mein Po nur noch einem größeren Brötchen gleicht’ 
(65). Because of prison, Graul is unable to look like the woman she was before her 
arrest. This defeminisation involves a sense of loss not only of herself as a woman but 
the more extensive loss of herself as a subject too. Judith Butler has written that gender 
identity, however problematic, is needed in order to ‘be’ in the world; she discusses the 
widespread belief that if one can be neither male nor female then one cannot be a human 
being, a subject.48 In defeminisation then, comes a much more extensive loss of who the 
woman is as a person. Graul uses her narrative to resist this imposed identity partly 
                                                
48 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York; London: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 7-8. 
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through limiting those instances of defeminisation to the superficial level of clothes and 
general appearance. The role of appearance in creating a sense of femininity is most 
obviously demonstrated in Graul’s descriptions of the build-up to her release from 
prison in 1962, during which she prepares for re-entry into the outside world. Such a 
build-up has not been seen to this extent in the earlier accounts because Rinser, Wolf 
and Bechler were not notified of the exact date of their release. Clothes and hairstyle 
play a decisive part in Graul’s reintegration into the outside world. The preparations for 
her release involve, alongside memorising messages to pass on to her fellow inmates’ 
loved ones, wearing her hair in rollers. A guard chastises her for this, demonstrating that 
sophisticated hairstyles do not fit into the prison world, as defined by him (224). Despite 
the guard’s disapproval, Graul is allowed to keep her hair in rollers: such an overt form 
of femininity is allowed at this liminal stage. She is moving from the prison world, in 
which ‘feminine’ appearance is less prevalent, to the outside world, in which such an 
appearance is the norm. Of the experience of putting her new civilian clothes on she 
writes: ‘Keimendes Gefühl, sich wieder als Frau zu empfinden’ (227). In putting on her 
new clothes, she puts on her identity as a woman, carefully wobbling around in her new 
shoes like a child playing with adults’ clothes. But this excerpt makes it clear that the 
type of womanliness to which Graul is referring is appearance-based – she has not lost 
her inner sense of self as a woman, it is only the exterior part that she shows is lost in 
prison. 
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‘Deviance’ in the prison microcosm
Graul uses her account predominantly to show how her inner femininity developed and 
improved through prison. Prison is represented as a central and influential factor within 
Graul’s life narrative and one which she cannot escape. It is focal to her whole life but, 
as we will see, she turns it into an empowering, rather than damaging experience by 
writing of how it improved her and brought forth her ‘real’ self, bringing to mind the 
words of the Bolivian political prisoner Domitila Barrios de Chungara, cited in Chapter 
Three: ‘with everything I’d suffered in the arrests, in jail, and in Los Yungas, I’d 
acquired a political consciousness. In other words, I’d found myself’.49
The reader of Die Farce is not only supposed to be the viewer of an authentic and 
real document of German history, there is a strong sense that they are privy to the ‘real’ 
Elisabeth Graul too. This sense of insight is established in the early stages of the 
account, when Graul describes her interrogation in remand prison. Many of the 
questions posed by the interrogators are akin to those that Graul answers for the readers’ 
sake, as a kind of exposition of her prison narrative itself (especially those which justify 
her right-wing connections, as I discuss below). Although she provides superficial 
answers during the interrogations themselves, it is during the flashback sections of her 
account that she answers them properly (see, for example, 37-41). These sections 
provide what appear to be more honest and frank answers to the questions posed during 
the interrogations: it is the reader, not Graul’s interrogators, who is privy to her real 
story. The reader is privileged over the interrogators; it seems that they see the ‘real’ 
Graul. 
                                                
49 Harlow, Resistance Literature, p. 144.
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It is not only in relation to her interrogators or prison authorities that the reader sees 
the ‘real’ Graul, we also seem to be given more insight into Graul’s inner self than other 
prisoners in her surroundings. In her descriptions of her life before prison, Graul writes 
of a trip to Frankfurt: ‘Man zeigt uns die Paulskirche, den Römer und das uns 
schockierende Frankfurter Nachtleben. Wir sehen Nutten und Zuhalter; unsere Begleiter 
amüsieren sich köstlich über uns’ (59). Here, Graul is open with her companions about 
her shock at what could be seen as sexually ‘deviant’ activity. But in the prison space, 
Graul behaves differently in relation to others than she does in the outside world. In a 
new cell in Hohenschönhausen, she meets new cellmates:
Wir erzählen uns alles […] Viel ist von Liebe die Rede und all ihren Spielarten. 
Ich höre Überraschendes, nie Geahntes und registriere schweigend, lasse mir 
meine Unkenntnis aber nicht anmerken. Ich ahne, daß es weit mehr Möglichkeiten, 
sich zu lieben, gibt, als ich bisher kennengelernt habe (67).
Graul has already made it clear to the reader that she herself has no sexual desire in 
prison – reminiscent of Rinser’s claims in her prison diary. Of bedtime she recounts: 
‘Gesicht und Hände müssen zu sehen sein. Warum eigentlich? Wollen sie verhindern, 
daß man mit sich selber spielt? Wer aber hat in dieser Situation noch Empfindungen? 
Ich fühle mich jedenfalls wie abgestorben’ (67). But Graul’s apparent lack of libido and 
surprise at hearing about new sexual practices do not prompt her to disagree with her 
cellmates or to counter their discussion with her own views. Whereas in the non-prison 
setting of Frankfurt, Graul was open about her shock at sexual ‘deviance’, in prison she 
hides both her shock and her lack of knowledge, perhaps in an attempt at disguising her 
middle-class, university-educated background. Only the reader knows her inner reaction. 
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Prison is here, as in Rinser’s account, a space in which discussion of sexual 
gratification is the norm, indeed it is a space in which subversive behaviour is common. 
It is a world in which Graul is surrounded by prisoners she describes as ‘ordinär’ (122). 
But in this space, she writes that she cannot be seen to be avoiding such prisoners for 
fear of appearing arrogant (122). Keeping out of the way of ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’ 
people would be possible outside prison, but not within its walls. This space demands 
that Graul act in a different way than she would on the outside: disguising her beliefs, 
her class and her attitudes to sex. The real Graul may be shocked at certain sexual topics, 
but she makes it clear in her response to the sexual discussions of her cellmates that she 
is determined to fit in and be initiated into the prison culture by disguising her surprise 
and naïveté, even absorbing the information and learning from her more experienced 
cellmates. Prison may be an altered space for Graul but she emphasises that it is one to 
which she wants, even needs to adapt, in order to be initiated into a group and thus better 
survive the pains of confinement.50 There is here an indication that Graul acts in an 
‘unreal’, perhaps even transgressive way in order to survive being in the subversive 
space of prison. But the reader is also made aware, through Graul’s insights into her 
inner feelings, of the ‘real’ Graul: she is far less subversive and just wants to survive in 
this foreign environment. 
Graul’s representation of her romantic relationship with a fellow prisoner, Rosemarie, 
further addresses this issue. In 1950s and 1960s East Germany, homophobia was 
entrenched in public discourse. Indeed, writers of advice books for GDR citizens during 
                                                
50 This is along the lines of Peter Paul Zahl’s concept of ‘Unterleben’, in which the prisoner adapts in 
particular ways in order to survive incarceration – see Keßler, p. 158.
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that time continually represented homosexuality as ‘a perversion, pathology, or 
deviance.’51 Graul would have expected a more tolerant response from her contemporary 
audience of the 1990s but homosexuality still faced negative judgement as a deviant 
sexual orientation. Although Graul claims that she is not ashamed of her relationship and 
has no regrets about it, there is a sense that she is defending it and herself through 
writing of herself in as ideal a manner as possible in her descriptions of it. In her 
justification of her relationship, Graul represents homosexuality as essential, natural and 
normal in prison. For her, lesbian relationships in prison are primarily a way of surviving 
incarceration, through obtaining physical and emotional affection (akin to Margret 
Bechler’s portrayal of her and Irma’s friendship): ‘Die meisten Freundschaften […] 
bedeuteten Überlebenshilfe’ (123). Indeed Graul represents her own relationship with 
Rosemarie as an extension of their friendship that blossomed during her period of 
solitary confinement. This happens after her trial when Graul is transferred from 
Hohenschönhausen prison to Hoheneck prison in Saxony and is kept in solitary 
confinement for nine months. It is during what she describes as gruelling months of total
isolation that Graul first befriends Rosemarie, with whom she communicates using a 
type of sign language from the window of her cell (118-9). Graul takes great comfort 
from these conversations but it is the increasingly affectionate nature of the friendship 
that she describes as particularly important to her survival during isolation: ‘Allmählich 
werden die Wörter, die wir uns schreiben, immer liebevoller. Meine Fensterfreundschaft 
wird in meiner Isolierung zur Lebenshilfe’ (113). Through receiving warmth and 
affection, she combats the destructive effects of long-term isolation and indeed of prison 
                                                
51 Herzog, p. 197.
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itself. When her relationship with Rosemarie becomes physical on her release from 
solitary confinement, Graul represents it as a natural progression. When they first kiss, 
she writes: ‘Das ist ganz natürlich und nur eine Folge unserer Übereinstimmung’ (122). 
The need for love too is: ‘das natürlichste der Welt’ (122). Not only is homosexuality 
represented as natural to the prison environment, Graul also shows that it is the norm for 
female prisoners. She remarks: ‘Es gibt viele Pärchen um uns herum’ (122). Since many 
other prisoners have relationships, Graul is not the exception, rather she conforms to 
how prisoners in her world operate and cope with incarceration. But Graul makes it clear 
that this normal, natural and essential relationship is only so within her ‘unreal’ prison 
world and not in her outer one: the exceptional experience of being in prison seems to 
alter what Graul deems to be normal and essential to survival. Graul’s rather extensive 
portrayal of her relationships with men before and after her incarceration serves to prove 
– intentionally or not – that, in this outside world, she is heterosexual and remains so 
after her release. Her homosexuality is thus confined to her time in prison: it is not 
essential to her in the ‘real’ outside world of the published text. Graul does not, 
however, claim that homosexuality in itself is unnatural, indeed she emphasises her 
desire to tackle stereotypes of lesbian prisoners, criticising clichés of: ‘kurzhaarige, mit 
männlichen oder zumindest herben Zügen ausgestattete Typen, die auf der Lauer nach 
Neuzugängen liegen, jedes ansehnliche weibliche Wesen anmachen, sich ordinär 
bewegen und die Freundinnen wechseln, wie die Wäsche’ (122). But she does imply that 
homosexuality outwith prison would be unnatural for her. 
If we consider that Graul has represented prison as a separate world that causes her to 
perform in a manner that is unlike her ‘real’ non-prison self then, in representing her 
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homosexuality as limited to this particular world, there is an indication that we are not 
reading the ‘real’ Graul, rather Graul’s reaction to her exceptional, altered microcosm. 
Homosexuality is thus not essential, natural or normal to the ‘real’ Graul, and that limits 
the deviant implications of her relationship with Rosemarie. As a further means of 
justifying her relationship, Graul shows us that heterosexual binaries are upheld and 
reflect those found on the outside world through emphasising her passive and 
stereotypically female role with Rosemarie. Rosemarie is the one who initiates the 
physical aspect: ‘Als sie mich eines Tages küßt, wie mich bisher nur Männer geküßt 
haben, erschrecke ich zuerst ein wenig, überlasse mich dann ihre Zärtlichkeiten und 
erwidere sie’ (122). It is Rosemarie who kisses Graul – the use of ‘überlasse’ further 
substantiates Graul’s passive, ‘feminine’ role. Graul shows that Rosemarie also 
dominates their relationship, acting as the assertive, wise leader (122) and protector: 
‘Rosemarie nimmt mich in ihre Arme, und ich fühle mich geborgen’ (140). Graul thus 
keeps her feminine role, attributing the transgressive, predatory ‘male’ characteristics to 
her partner. 
Self-representation as a child
Graul describes Rosemarie’s protective character and in doing so positions herself in a 
child-like role. This self-representation as a child runs through the first half of Graul’s 
account, including those passages which document her early days in prison. Here Graul 
shows that she is in need of protection, which she receives from her first cell-mate, Frau 
223
Steeneberg: ‘eine liebe, sehr mütterliche Frau’ (27), who makes it possible for Graul to 
sleep secretly during the gruelling interrogation process. It is only after Rosemarie is 
released and their relationship ends that Graul moves out of this role, as I discuss below 
in relation to her increasingly maternal performance. Identifying as a child is a crucial 
tool for Graul to explain or justify any of her potentially transgressive activities, because 
it mitigates the subversive implications of her behaviour. It allows Graul to indicate that 
she is not culpable of any crime, or in this case of any sexual ‘deviance’. Such a self-
representation utilises prominent cultural ideals, reflected in nineteenth-century 
positivist criminology, which saw women as childlike and incapable of being 
responsible for committing crime or transgression, because of their less developed, weak 
minds.52 This type of female criminal corresponds to widespread beliefs of woman as an 
innocent, passive victim who, it was believed, received a more lenient punishment from 
a chivalric judicial system.53 Graul is therefore less likely to be seen by her imagined 
audience as subversive and deviant in the descriptions of her homosexual relationship, 
given the widespread beliefs that certain women and children are not responsible for 
‘crime’ and by extension for gender ‘subversions’. 
Graul also uses a self-representation as childish and immature to mitigate her 
involvement with the controversial resistance group. In the initial sections of Die Farce 
which describe her life before prison, Graul depicts her youthful character and reckless 
behaviour, describing her political group as ‘junger Idealisten’ (12). She also implies 
that it was her romantic involvement with a young man, Wolfgang, which precipitated 
                                                
52 Especially that of nineteenth-century positivist criminologists such as Cesare Lombroso and Guglielmo 
Ferrero, discussed in previous chapters. 
53 Rotter, p. 92. 
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her involvement with the group (51). Their relationship is unsuccessful and ends just 
before she ceases her political activity with the group; indeed both the relationship and 
her political resistance are represented as the mistaken choices of a romantic and naïve 
young woman (58). These descriptions reduce the potentially critical response that her 
involvement in a Nazi-affiliated organisation could elicit; her reasons for her 
involvement were not purely political, indeed they were the actions of an idealistic 
woman – the type of woman who fits in with widely accepted notions of ideal femininity 
as childish, emotional and romantically-minded, rather than political or, indeed 
subversive.
There is a strong sense of temporal distance and retrospection in the sections in which 
Graul writes of herself as immature and childlike. In her descriptions of her days at 
university, Graul portrays herself as a young, gifted and ambitious music student, who 
did not want to use her talents to teach others, rather to further herself (21, 22). But 
Graul shows that much time has passed between being in prison and writing up her 
account: ‘Heute ist der 5. Juni 1990 […] Ich bin fast 62 Jahre alt. Als man mich 
verhaftete, war ich 23’ (7). She also shows that she has changed significantly as a 
woman. Like Margret Bechler, Graul became a teacher in the years after she was 
released. She writes, from her present day perspective (‘heute’): ‘1948 wollte ich keine 
Klavierlehrerin sein, heute liebe ich den Beruf und meine Schüler, zu denen ich eine 
enge und schöne Beziehung habe. Fast sind sie wie meine Kinder. Es war ein weiter 
Weg bis dahin’ (156). Graul here once again affirms that before prison she was 
immature, reinforcing her child-like self in which she is not responsible for any 
subversive actions. The citation reveals that she was selfish before her incarceration but 
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that, although it took some time, Graul has, by the time of writing her account, gradually 
attained a more mature, maternal (and implicitly non-childish) sense of self in becoming 
a parental figure to her school pupils. As opposed to being selfish, she is now nurturing 
and caring – an improved woman. 
In this position of writing of her past self from her maternal present day perspective, 
Graul gives the impression that her former youthful self, is not to be taken as the ‘real’ 
Elisabeth Graul. The ‘real’ Elisabeth Graul is the one who is writing this account: she is 
the non-prison Graul and she is now maternal rather than childlike. Thus she separates 
herself from her past selves: the Graul involved in the resistance group and the 
imprisoned Graul who was involved in a homosexual relationship. 
Authority and the ‘real’ maternal self (the real outcome of prison)
It may have been, as Graul describes it, ‘ein weiter Weg bis dahin’, but her shift from 
child to better woman is represented as a characteristic that develops within prison. 
Furthermore, Graul imbues the signifier of the improved woman with a particular set of 
characteristics in direct response to her experience of incarceration. For instance, it is her 
activities with the music and theatre groups in prison that instigate her character 
development as a teacher figure. After Rosemarie’s release from Hoheneck prison, Graul 
is moved to Berlin Barnimstrasse prison and becomes involved in the ‘Kulturgruppe’ 
there. She soon becomes the leader of the group (164) and encounters a young prisoner 
called Marga, who has been left timid and distressed after killing her mother and 
keeping the body embalmed for a year before turning herself in to the authorities. Marga 
226
is excluded by other prisoners because of her gruesome crime, but Graul shows 
sympathy for her and insists that she was acting in self-defence against her exploitative 
and harmful mother, who had forced her into prostitution from a young age. Marga’s 
own biological mother may have been extremely flawed but Graul represents herself as 
an ideal maternal substitute through recruiting Marga to sing in her music and theatre 
group: ‘Ganz allmählich beginnt Marga aufzuleben und ein wenig Selbstvertrauen 
wiederzugewinnen. Und sie muß die Augen heben beim Singen, sonst sieht sie nicht, 
wie ich dirigiere…’ (167). Graul here takes care of Marga through teaching her, 
allowing her to rebuild her confidence through singing with the group and implicitly 
taking on the nurturing role that she suggests Marga’s real mother should have occupied 
from the start. Graul’s interpretation of ideal feminine behaviour comes, as we see from 
the above citation (from 156), from her position as a teacher, in which her pupils become 
substitutes for her real children (she did not have children after her release from prison). 
In her representation of the help she gives to Marga, Graul further equates her role as 
teacher with that as mother, drawing on the concept of nurture as found both in the 
mother symbol and in that of the teacher to tie the two roles together. Not only this, 
Graul shows that she succeeds in her role as a nurturer, establishing that identity as 
maternal pedagogue, one that continues throughout her time in prison and beyond into 
her life as a teacher.
Graul’s new nurturing role lacks the passivity that characterised her self-
representation as a child. In her role as Marga’s teacher she is protective of her within 
the prison environment, defending her against the other prisoners who demonise her for 
the gruesome murder. In her previous self-representation as a child, before Rosemarie 
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was released, Graul was the one in need of protection, but now she herself has taken on 
the active role of protector. Of her dealings with one such prisoner, Graul writes: ‘Eine 
geht soweit, als sie meine Zuwendung und Freundlichkeit Marga gegenüber bemerkt, 
mich zu fragen, wie ich mich mit so einer abgeben könnte. Ich frage nur zurück, was ihr 
denn ihr Kind getan hätte, daß sie es vernachlässigen mußte? Da ist sie still’ (167). In 
this role she exerts more agency over her own actions, defending her protective attitude 
towards Marga and exerting authority over others through her successful silencing of her 
cellmate.
That Graul is educated and cultured provides her with a significant level of authority 
in her representation of her time in prison, as with Bechler’s self-representation. Such 
‘cultural’ authority is demonstrated in Graul’s position as a teacher: she has superior 
intellect and knowledge to those she teaches and her job is to educate them. She thereby 
holds an authoritative position over them. She also gains higher status within the prison 
as a teacher: on her return to Hoheneck prison after her internment in Berlin 
Barnimstrasse, Graul, at the behest of the prison supervisor, establishes a music and 
theatre group there. Her activities with the group actually bring her into more contact 
with those higher up in the prison hierarchy than the prison guards, who are her 
immediate authority: she complains to ‘Makarenko’, the prison director, about the 
attitude of some prison guards to her group, and the guards are reprimanded (177). Graul 
shows the reader that she is able to put her knowledge and talent into action within 
prison in order to assert a degree of power over her authorities. Of course the guards are 
able to retaliate through bullying and humiliation, demonstrating that there is a 
multifaceted conflict between Graul and the prison staff (178). Despite the guards’ 
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revenge tactics there is a real sense that Graul obtains increasing authority over those 
who oppress her in her role as teacher and as intellectual. She is able to exert power over 
them within prison, subverting its power structures to a significant degree. 
Graul associates her subversive, resistant role with culturally embedded ideas of good 
womanhood. According to her, the guards have a resentful attitude towards her music 
group and seem to be threatened by the power she wields through it: ‘Ich habe zuviel 
Freiheit, finden sie, und ich lasse mir nicht alles gefallen, kämpfe für meine Gruppe wie 
ein Löwe. Das bringt mir Ärger ein; ich werde als aufsässig, undiszipliniert und 
überheblich bezeichnet’ (178). Graul may be paraphrasing the guards and using the male 
form of the word, but she still evokes the culturally potent archetype of the lioness – a 
protective and committed mother.54 In using the strong mother symbol, Graul portrays 
herself in striking similarity to Margret Bechler (see Chapter Three), with whom she was 
incarcerated for some time in Hoheneck. The lioness archetype presents a non-
threatening, indeed acceptable kind of female aggression and violence because, in acting 
in such a way, she is protecting her young, and thus performing her role as mother 
ideally. In the above citation, Graul’s rebellious (‘aufsässig’) reputation amongst the 
prison guards is linked to her interpretation of ideal femininity within the prison world 
through the lioness imagery: she acts rebelliously in order to protect others.  
With this in mind we see Graul’s defiant behaviour increase alongside her 
representation of her increasingly maternal actions. Graul is well-behaved during the 
earlier stages of her incarceration, and, although she rebels against her immediate 
                                                
54 The use of ‘Löwe’ is standard when using such an idiom and would only be changed to ‘Löwin’ if it 
was in direct reference to the protection of children. 
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supervisors in the above-cited passage, she still appeals to higher authorities through 
complaining to ‘Makarenko’. However, she rebels against the prison authorities as a 
whole through staging a controversial Schiller production with her theatre group. The 
evening involves performing pieces that relate directly to the experiences of the 
prisoners in Hoheneck. The event opens with the words ‘DER MENSCHHEIT WÜRDE
IST EUERE HAND GEGEBEN!/BEWAHRET SIE!’ (from Schiller’s 1789 poem ‘Die 
Künstler’ (191)). This receives rapturous applause from the prisoners and the guards 
realise that the event has rebellious undertones. However, Graul makes it clear that the 
guards cannot interrupt the production since they approved the piece in advance. Graul 
shows that she has outwitted the prison authorities into letting her and her group perform 
an incendiary piece. For her, they are unaware of the ‘real’ meaning of Schiller’s words
and would never check up on exactly what she is staging: ‘Schiller ist ‘klassisches Erbe’ 
und damit legitim’ (191). The prison authorities are shown to be ignorant and 
uneducated in comparison with Graul who is here an authority in the intellectual sense.
Yet again, Graul’s superior knowledge of culture has allowed her to obtain a level of 
control over her oppressors. The evening represents a significant victory of the prisoners 
over their captors: ‘Der Feier ist ein voller Erfolg, die Stimmung unter den Zuhörern 
freudig erhoben, und wir sind ein bißchen stolz, daß uns das gelungen ist […] Die 
Gefangene ist die Überlegene’ (192). Through her superior knowledge and 
understanding of art, Graul has been able to successfully speak out against those who 
control her, and not only that, she is able to speak to other prisoners about the common 
problems they experience during incarceration. Graul represents this kind of ‘public’ 
resistance as a momentous achievement within the controlled space of prison and an 
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extraordinarily successful mode of resistance. Furthermore, although the music group is 
banned, Graul does not receive any formal punishment due to her intelligent 
manipulation of the authorities, (i.e. operating under the guise of high culture). The 
prison authorities are unable to even control her punishment, reflecting the extent to 
which she uses her cultural knowledge to subvert power.  
The resistance that occurs in this extract is, however, limited to a certain type of 
insubordinate behaviour, which supports Graul’s identity both as a woman and a 
political prisoner. Schiller’s words that open the evening stress the importance of 
preserving humanity. That these words are met with such enthusiasm by other prisoners 
represents their belief that there is little humanity in the dilapidated, degrading 
environment of GDR imprisonment – Graul’s first few days in incarceration were 
particularly degrading as she is forced to eat on the ground and empty out the toilet 
bucket (20, 24). Graul’s use of the words represents the prisoners’ resistance to this 
inhumanity as well as her endorsement of culture as a means of increasing humanity. In 
her representation of the Schiller evening, Graul links the prison’s lack of humanity with 
its lack of culture: the authorities do not pick up on the meaning of Schiller’s words in 
the first place and cannot relate to them as Graul and her fellow prisoners do. Graul 
again links the concepts of humanity and intellect through the use of the word ‘Geist’, 
writing of her and her fellow prisoners: ‘Wieder einmal hat der Geist über den Ungeist 
gesiegt’ (192). It seems for Graul, literary insight and intellect are markers of humane 
behaviour, something the Hoheneck authorities lack. She shows that it is because of her 
belief in that which ‘Geist’ represents that she instigates resistance in prison. It is not 
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rebellion for rebellion’s sake: there is a distinct moral and culturally acceptable element 
to her actions. 
Graul makes it clear that the purpose of any rebellious activities on her part comes 
from her desire for more humanity within prison and this involves improving conditions 
and the treatment of prisoners there. This is represented as a particularly maternal 
endeavour. Graul was actually incarcerated in Hoheneck with Margret Bechler for a time 
and writes about their friendship, although Bechler makes no mention of Graul. Despite 
her admittance that she finds Bechler’s rebellious behaviour reckless, she describes it 
with much admiration: ‘Sie kennt keine Furcht und läßt sich nichts gefallen’ (151). 
According to Graul, Bechler and prisoners like her rebel as a means of attempting to 
resist what they see as unjust incarceration and treatment, rather than for rebellion’s 
sake. Graul shows that Bechler’s rebellious behaviour is strongly linked to her role as a 
wronged mother, writing of her tragic experience: ‘Härter kann man wohl keine Mutter 
behandeln’ (151). 
Bechler, in her position as a maternal rebel, becomes a kind of model for Graul’s 
increasingly defiant behaviour. Although she is not particularly rebellious at first, Graul 
slowly comes to emulate Bechler’s rebellious behaviour in standing up for her when she 
is bullied by staff: 
ich sage der Wachtmeisterin […] so gründlich die Meinung, daß ich […] 21 Tage 
verschärften Arrest bekomme […] ‘Verbrecher, Mistbande!’ sage ich laut, aber ich 
habe auch ein befreites Gefühl ob der bewiesenen Solidarität (152/3). 
Graul makes it clear that she is being subversive, aggressive even, as a means of 
protecting others and of promoting humanity within prison. Not only is it morally sound, 
Graul’s subversion is strongly linked to her developing identity as an improved and 
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nurturing woman and teacher, who is concerned with upholding and protecting the 
welfare of others. Like Bechler’s, Graul’s is a distinctly maternal rebellion, it is an 
acceptable, indeed ideal type of self-representation for her putative audience.
Incorrigible political prisoner and feminine reformer
Graul sets out not only the criteria for the good woman in prison but also for the good 
prisoner, with Bechler, amongst others, as her model. These criteria do not seem to rely 
on labelling as a political prisoner. In being designated a dangerous criminal by the GDR 
justice system, the political prisoner was often able to identify as a separate type of 
prisoner from her criminal counterparts, thus the label could be empowering because it 
implied political imprisonment. But, as Graul demonstrates, the term ‘political prisoner’ 
does not in itself guarantee an ideal prisoner. Graul may make it clear that Bechler is not 
a criminal, but she does not designate her a political prisoner either. There are a number 
of political prisoners of whom she is disapproving. Some former National Socialists 
(sentenced by Soviet Military Tribunals after 1945) were able to define themselves using 
such terminology, given that their crimes were often seen as a result of conflict between 
countries. Graul does not see such women as ideal prisoners, instead separating herself 
from them in an attempt to avoid any accusations of Nazism (134). But she also voices 
her suspicions and disapproval of some anti-GDR political prisoners, such as Inge, a 
political prisoner who is outspoken in the cell but obedient around the guards: ‘Sie ist 
politisch, verhält sich den Bewachern gegenüber ausgesprochen servil und hofft offenbar 
auf eine frühere Entlassung’ (194). Although she is a political prisoner, Inge is two-
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faced and not to be trusted. Graul is also disapproving of some political prisoners 
arrested for similar crimes to herself, describing their snobbery towards other ‘criminal’ 
prisoners with some disparagement (205). They too, are not ideal prisoners in Graul’s 
representation because they separate themselves from their criminal cellmates.
It seems the label political prisoner is, on its own, not enough to merit recognition as 
a good prisoner for Graul, despite its connotations of righteousness, innocence and even 
victimhood. One of the main criteria for becoming a good prisoner is to behave
rebelliously, as Bechler does (152). Graul takes this issue of rebellious performance 
further in her description of Bäumchen, a ‘criminal’ inmate convicted of infanticide, 
whom Graul befriends: ‘Sie zeichnet sich durch ein ausgeprägtes Gerechtigkeitsgefühl 
aus und scheut sich nicht, den Kampf mit dem Personal aufzunehmen, wenn sie sich 
ungerecht behandelt fühlt’ (204). Graul shows that not only is Bäumchen a victim of her 
husband’s brutality, but she is concerned with justice and does not obey authority when 
she disagrees with it. Because of these criteria, Bäumchen takes on a more ideal, 
implicitly a less criminal identity for Graul. She is less deviant in Graul’s eyes partly 
because of her ‘good’ behaviour. For Graul, some prisoners can be exonerated through 
their actions in prison, but this certainly does not apply to all criminals she encounters, 
especially given Graul’s prejudice towards the crimes of her fellow inmates: Bäumchen 
appears to be an exception, perhaps because of her status as victim. Although there are 
other mitigating factors in Graul’s portrayal of Bäumchen as a good prisoner, her 
representation substantiates that rebellion plays a more crucial role in the construction of 
an acceptable identity than being labelled as political does. Indeed, as Margret Bechler 
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demonstrates in Warten auf Antwort, rebellious behaviour can make the prisoner appear 
more political (and therefore non-criminal) than labelling as political can. 
In order to fit in with her own criteria for the ideal prisoner, Graul too, has shown her 
rebellion within prison through defending and imitating Bechler as well as through her 
resistance within the music and theatre group. She also demonstrates, in a somewhat 
contradictory way, her good relationship with ‘criminal’ women. She is judgemental of 
other prisoners, writing of non-political prisoners’ deviant sexuality, lower-class 
backgrounds, mental illness and mood swings associated with pre-menstrual tension (63, 
127, 162). However, she also represents herself as an increasingly compassionate 
woman in her views towards female criminals, thus creating an important turning point 
upon her character trajectory. Graul writes of her sympathy towards and understanding 
for women who have been sentenced for murder: ‘Ich begreife hier, daß der Mensch 
nicht mit seiner Tat gleichzusetzen ist, und werde ganz still vor solchen Schicksalen.’ 
(129). She also defends Marga, despite her macabre crime. Graul here marks herself out 
as a particularly understanding, compassionate prisoner. Her description of the other 
prisoners’ reaction to Bäumchen shows Graul as the most understanding of them all: 
‘“Kindesmißhandlung mit tödlichen Ausgang,” erfahre ich und ein solches Delikt reicht 
schon aus, daß einige unserer vornehmen A-6er [a type of political prisoner – KR]55 die 
Nase rümpfen und sich verächtlich benehmen’ (204). Graul wishes to find out more 
about Bäumchen’s life and the reasons behind her crime rather than coming to any rash 
judgements. Her compassionate attitude evokes models of the nurturing maternal 
                                                
55  Graul too was sentenced according to ‘Artikel 6 der Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik’, as mentioned on p.10 of her account.
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woman, thus suggesting that she is a better woman and prisoner than the other haughty 
political prisoners in her surroundings. 
By the end of her text, Graul portrays herself as being a particularly close friend of 
prisoners incarcerated for murder. She describes their emotional farewell: ‘die meisten 
meiner Mörder weinen’ (226-7). She also anticipates any shock that the reader may have 
regarding her allegiance with such criminal women in a conversation with a guard: ‘’Sie 
haben sich wohl mit denen verstanden?’ Fragt meine Begleiterin verblüfft. ‘Warum 
nicht?’ gebe ich zurück’ (227). Graul is proud of her relationship with the murderers. 
But it is worth noting that throughout the text Graul still shows her prejudice towards 
female criminals. In her status as a long-term prisoner, she is also particularly critical of 
short-term criminals; she shows that she is of a separate status from the ‘kleine[n] 
Krimis’ (130) in Hoheneck, who are women charged with criminal offences and 
sentenced to less that ten years in prison. Graul appears to look down on these women 
because of their (albeit unspecified) criminal past and their social status. As Rinser did, 
Graul describes women who have high sex drives and a tendency towards fits of rage as 
being ‘aus dem unteren sozialen Bereich’ (123); they are represented as a separate, less 
respectable category to Graul. Her conflicted attitude is encapsulated in her defence of 
Marga (discussed above), when she says to one prisoner: ‘Ich frage nur zurück, was ihr 
denn ihr Kind getan hätte, daß sie es vernachlässigen mußte? Da ist sie still’ (167). Graul 
here emphasises the woman’s crime, silencing her through highlighting the common 
belief that being a bad mother is the worst crime and gaining control over her through 
using that stigma attached to her crime against her. Graul is thus critical of other 
women’s crimes in order to defend another female criminal, showing both compassion 
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and prejudice. She is willing to defend deviant women such as Bäumchen and Marga, 
but only some of them and often separates herself from those she deems unsuitable, 
showing that she has not transformed as much as she would have the reader believe by 
this concluding section of her account. As we have seen in Rinser’s account, there is a 
conflict between the author’s desire to belong with criminals, to have solidarity with 
them, and her desire to separate herself as a superior kind of prisoner. Graul aligns 
herself with such prisoners to an even greater degree than Rinser, or, indeed any of the 
other writers in this thesis. She seems to show herself as an exclusive type of political 
prisoner: she is superior to and distinct from criminals but also particularly 
understanding and compassionate towards them. 
It may be a sometimes contradictory self-representation, but it is through writing of 
her increased compassion that Graul further shows how she becomes a better woman 
through prison. This emphasis on improved femininity may make her seem less 
transgressive or deviant, but it is problematic because it implies that prison refeminised 
her or reformed her into a ‘proper’ woman – that it changed her in the way that it 
intended. But in her emphasis on her rebellious and incorrigible character, Graul proves 
that she has resisted prison’s enforcement of its own value system upon her: she has 
improved as a woman because of herself, not because of the prison authority. But her 
resistance of a new prison self is not only enacted through her rebellious deeds; Graul 
also writes of herself as an unalterable prisoner, who could not be reformed into an ideal 
GDR citizen and changed according to how the prison wished. Graul describes her 
dismissive response to socialist propaganda in prison. Here she emphasises that, rather 
than convert prisoners, the screening of socialist films only serves to disturb and damage 
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them: ‘Die Verantwortlichen beweisen immer wieder ein hohes Maß an 
Geschmacklosigkeit und reißen bei vielen alte Wunden auf’ (193). In Graul’s account, 
the films do not do what the prison and indeed the regime intends. She is insistent about 
her and her fellow prisoners’ steadfastly political and incorrigible status in her response 
to them: ‘Der Versuch, ausgerechnet uns davon überzeugen zu wollen […] ist von 
vornherein zum Scheitern verurteilt’ (193).
Graul tries to fortify this identity through using others’ words to describe her 
incorrigible character: she writes that she is known by the Hoheneck authorities as one 
of the ‘Aufsässigen und Unverbesserlichen’ (221). Such a narrative technique serves to 
authenticate her own representation of her incorrigible status: Graul uses an external 
source here, maintaining that she is not the only one who perceives herself in such a 
way. Graul also includes prison reports written by her guards which she had retrieved 
from the Stasi archives, opened to the public in 1990. Such an inclusion is interesting 
because Graul makes it clear that she sees these documents as unreliable in their bias 
towards defending the GDR regime. She often contests any dubious information through 
inserting punctuation such as: ‘(!)’ to convey her opinion. But at the same time she uses 
them as authentic documents to reinforce her incorrigible status, reflecting a more 
general tendency towards publishing documentary literature in the immediate post-
Wende years and a drive towards portraying the experience of the GDR in as authentic a 
light as possible.56 In them she is described as ‘ein ausgesprochener Feind dieses 
Staates’ (200); they say of her: ‘Ihr ständiges Bestreben geht dahin, einen gewissen 
Kreis von Strafgefangenen für sich zu gewinnen, die gleichen Charakters und wegen des 
                                                
56 As discussed above in reference to Leeder and Herhoffer. 
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gleichen Deliktes bestraft sind’ (199) as well as claiming that she committed acts that 
endangered society (197). Indeed, it seems that they give a rather exaggerated version of 
Graul’s personality when compared with her self-representation using her own words. 
Graul does not identify herself as a dangerous woman, or as someone whose ‘constant’ 
concern it is to instigate rebellion in prison. Graul has the power to contradict anything 
she deems inaccurate by adding ‘(!)’, as she regularly does, or even excluding 
inaccuracies, but in these cases she does not. It seems she wants to be seen by the prison 
authorities as dangerous and writes of her pleasure at seeing how the reports represent 
her: ‘so erheitern sie [the reports] mich doch ungeheuer. Immer wieder bescheinigen sie, 
daß der gewünschte Erziehungsprozeß bei mir nicht erreichbar war’ (196). More than 
anything Graul wishes to convey that the GDR prison did not successfully reform her 
into a model East German citizen as it intended. Graul is pleased with the reports – they 
seem to ‘prove’ that she has not been ideologically indoctrinated by the prison, indeed 
that any change of character on her part goes against the prison and the GDR regime in 
general. 
A key element to Graul’s insistence on her incorrigible identity lies within her self-
representation as an authoritative prisoner who, instead of being changed by the prison 
structure, actually enforces her own changes and beliefs upon it. Graul represents herself 
as far superior to the GDR prison in terms of intellect and knowledge of culture. The 
reports are used to testify to Graul’s intellect in prison: ‘Es ist hier bekannt, daß sie ein 
gutes Wissen besitzt’ (199). Graul has proved that her cultural, intellectual ability is far 
superior to that of the prison authorities through outwitting them during the Schiller 
performance. After the Schiller evening, and Graul’s representation of her desire for 
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justice in the prison world, her sense of humanity too is shown to be far greater than that 
of those who run the prison. 
Indeed, by the latter stage of the account, Graul shows that she is in more of a 
position to understand the needs of prisoners and the best ways to reform them into good 
citizens than the authorities of both Hoheneck and Barnimstrasse prisons themselves. 
She writes of her insight concerning how not to resocialise prisoners, making it clear that 
she disapproves of the GDR (and the present German) penal system too: ‘Niemand wird 
durch Freiheitsentzug und Isolierung gebessert; zu oft tritt sogar das Gegenteil ein: an 
kriminellen Praktiken wird durch den entsprechenden Umgang noch dazugelernt’ (226). 
In her friendships with women accused of serious and violent crimes, Graul shocks both 
the prison authorities and the reader, who would not expect her solidarity with such 
controversial, ‘deviant’ women. But in doing this, Graul demonstrates to the prison 
authorities and the reader that she understands prisoners to a much greater degree than 
those in positions of authority ever could, whilst at the same time separating herself from 
them. In her successful teaching of Marga and indeed the music and theatre group as a 
whole, Graul demonstrates that she can reform certain prisoners, unlike the philistine 
prison and the GDR regime that it represents. It is Graul’s version of culture that is 
shown to be the most effective mode of reform, rather than that of the GDR, and she is 
thus represented as the ultimate reformer of those in prison.
There is a further implication, in the final pages of the account, that Graul’s 
enforcement of change stretches not only to her fellow prisoners but to the prison 
authorities and infrastructure of the institution itself. Although no such thing happens in 
Hoheneck, Graul writes that she provides music lessons to the head guard at 
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Barnimstrasse prison (170). Graul instructs not only prisoners then, she instructs those in 
positions of authority too, improving them through her musical and cultural knowledge. 
Thus it is Graul who, on this albeit small scale, reforms those in prison, rather than the 
other way around. On a much larger scale, Graul imposes her own change upon 
Hoheneck prison as a whole, describing the central role she played in improving the 
structure of the prison. Firstly, she writes that she instigated the dismissal of the despised 
prison supervisor ‘Makarenko’ through telling prison inspectors about his improper 
behaviour (222-4). He blames her personally for his discharge, demonstrating that she is 
responsible for this change to prison administration. On her release from Hoheneck, 
Graul makes a hard-hitting exit speech about conditions in the prison: ‘ ‘Ich habe hier all 
die Jahre immer von Umerziehung gehört […] aber zu jeder Art von Erziehung gehört 
mindestens Verständnis […] für den zu Erziehenden […] Ich habe kaum einen Ansatz 
von wirklichem pädagogischen Bemühen gemerkt’ (229). Once again Graul proves that 
she knows better how to reform prisoners than the authorities in Hoheneck. Most 
importantly, Graul shows the reader that she is effective because the Hoheneck prison 
director appears to listen to her words: ‘ “Ich werde über Ihre Worte nachdenken und 
danke Ihnen für Ihre Offenheit!”’ (230). On returning to Hoheneck to visit in 1991,
Graul finds a much improved prison in which the inmates have more freedom, space and 
a significantly better opportunity to educate themselves. There is also a fully functional 
music room with some of the instruments that Graul used in the music group that she 
established (244). Although decades have past since Graul’s internment there, 
suggesting that improvements to the prison would have been inevitable, there is an 
implication that Graul herself (through her work in the music group and passionate exit 
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speech) significantly contributed to instigating better conditions in the institution. Graul 
is represented as a reformer, on the side of a humane penal system which does not 
punish or indoctrinate, rather endeavours to re-socialise prisoners.
Conclusion: the ‘real’ Elisabeth Graul
In a 2005 interview Graul was asked: ‘ “Was hält einen Menschen dann noch im Inneren 
zusammen?” ’ She replied: 
Die Gewissheit, kein Opfer, sondern Täter gewesen zu sein […] Täter in dem 
Sinn: etwas getan zu haben für die Freiheit, für die Menschenwürde, für die 
Demokratie. Wir haben gewusst, was uns passieren kann. Aber wir haben auch 
gewusst, dass wir nicht nur Beobachter sein dürfen.57
Graul was here referring to her involvement in the anti-GDR group but this statement 
accurately sums up her self-representation in Die Farce. By the end of the text she has 
become active rather than passive and in this active role has gained an impressive level 
of authority. Graul has exerted her authority over the governmental system of the GDR 
by displaying her intellectual superiority and ability to improve the prison infrastructure 
and the prisoners themselves. Not only that, as an epilogue to the main text, Graul writes 
that in August 1991 she received her rehabilitation from the government of the recently 
reunified Germany – official acknowledgement of injustices against her during the GDR 
and financial compensation. In articulating this, Graul shows her victorious and 
authoritative position over both governments, counteracting the authority that they 
exerted over her in past years. 
                                                
57 Elisabeth Graul, Gefangene der SED,  (January 2005, accessed May 2008); http://www.mdr.de/damals-
in-der-ddr/lexikon/1781096-hintergrund-1777952.html. 
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Graul takes a superior position not only in relation to already existent judicial systems 
but to the reader as well. She uses her text to enact her role as a narrative authority, one 
whose truth is to be taken above others. Furthermore, in her self-appointed role as 
someone with privileged knowledge and understanding of how the prison system works 
and of how it should ideally work, the implication is that she knows more than the reader 
and is better able to judge how prisoners should be treated. Graul becomes the real judge 
here, implicitly taking on the role initially held by her reader and further empowering 
herself.
But Graul has shown herself to be an ideally feminine authority and agent, relying on 
the symbol of the mother and infusing it with criteria with which she can refute any 
accusation of criminality, subversion or non-femininity. Her increasingly maternal 
nature is imbued with authority through her alignment of the maternal with the 
pedagogical and in her subsequent portrayal of the power she obtains through teaching. 
This maternal authority links to her rebellious behaviour: Graul makes it clear that she is 
being subversive, aggressive even, as a means of protecting others; hers is a strong but 
nurturing and thus maternal rebellion. For Graul the political, the authoritative, and the 
ideally feminine go hand in hand under the mother symbol, creating a paradigm for the 
female political prisoner that echoes that set by the other ‘acceptable’ female political 
prisoners in this project. Graul’s female political prisoner is, however, represented as 
being of an even higher femininity than the writers in previous chapters because of her 
sense of compassion and, albeit contradictory, desire to be associated with criminal 
women. 
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Graul may grant her experience of prison a central and influential role within her life 
narrative but it is not portrayed as one which has overwhelmingly damaged her. Indeed 
it has improved her, and is crucial to that person who she is at the time of writing. Prison 
has been the catalyst for Graul’s growth into a more mature and autonomous subject, 
revealing the ‘real’ authoritative but feminine Graul. Prison may be a microcosm in 
which different, perhaps transgressive behaviour is required for survival, but it is also 
shown as the reason behind Graul’s shedding of that childish, less ideal self seen in the 
first half of her account. There is the sense that Graul ‘finds herself’ in prison both as a 
woman and as a writer: in the years after publishing Die Farce, Graul published eight 
books of prose and poetry, including the successful Shalom für Magdalena.58 It is the act 
of writing that allows Graul to construct this sense of authority over her past and over 
her audience. Through articulation, Graul is able to shape events, she is able to retain 
some aspects of her character and shed others, rather than being subject to the imposing 
effects of prison. Graul’s narrative may be constructed in order to be acceptable to her 
imagined audience, but writing still functions as a key means of resistance and of 
gaining agency.
                                                
58 Elisabeth Graul, Shalom für Magdalena (Munich: Langen/Müller 2000).
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Conclusion
It is not possible quantitatively to evaluate the effect that the act of prison writing has 
upon the writers in this thesis, but on a qualitative level we are able to see the positive 
value that can come from such an endeavour.1 Lore Wolf’s prison diary is the most 
pertinent example of this. More than any other writer in this project, Wolf’s diary 
indicates that writing makes her feel better and even liberates her emotionally from her 
incarceration. My research contributes to a body of evidence that suggests life writing 
can help the writer come to terms with imprisonment through the catharsis it provides 
but also through helping her to view the experience of prison as valuable to her sense of 
self. The act of prison writing specifically can be viewed as not only an assertion of who 
the self is but, perhaps more importantly given the disempowering environment of 
prison, as a means of obtaining a sense of agency. Writing has a positive purpose for the 
other authors too: Rosa Luxemburg is able to maintain her relationships through her 
letters; Luise Rinser’s diary helps her to reject an identity as criminal and speak to future 
generations about injustice under dictatorships; Margret Bechler’s account allows her to 
reclaim her status as mother and ‘good’ woman; and Elisabeth Graul’s autobiography is 
a means of showing the world – and herself – that prison, although it robbed her of her 
youth, was crucial to her sense of autonomous self.
In their different ways, the texts examined in this study suggest that prison brings out 
its author’s ‘real’ self and that real self is, in different ways, ‘feminine’. The authors 
imbue the negotiable, restrictive concept of ‘femininity’ with qualities which they use to 
                                                
1 Quantitative studies have been undertaken which examine the value that can come from writing in 
prison, see: Bernd Scheffer, "Schreiben hinter Gittern," in Schreiben. Schreiben lernen, ed. D. Boueke and 
N. Hopster (Tübingen: G. Narr, 1985), pp. 115-141, for example. 
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resist the effects of imprisonment, often using the symbol of the mother to show 
themselves as strong women. They attempt to create themselves, in their different ways, 
as authoritative subjects in conjunction with their self-representations as ‘good women’. 
The posthumous publication of Luxemburg’s prison letters brought about widespread 
appraisals of her as sensitive, humane, artistic and, at times, vulnerable – implying that 
she was a ‘real’ woman, as opposed to a transgressive figure. Luxemburg’s letters 
themselves indicate that this exposure of her ‘feminine’ side is brought about by her 
positioning within the carceral world. Luxemburg writes that she is ashamed of this 
‘weak’ femininity, as if she does not approve of this side to her character. At the same 
time, it is a characteristic that she seems to need in her communications with certain 
addressees: she exposes what we are to believe is her inner, feminine self to them as a 
means of maintaining or indeed furthering relationships whilst cut off from the outside 
world. At other times, Luxemburg shows great strength, sometimes crossing into 
transgressive, masculine territory. She may appear ‘masculine’, especially in her more 
public, political letters (such as those to Mathilde Wurm), but these letters are examples 
of Luxemburg’s desire to exert her authority in the outside world. It is important to her 
to be ‘male’ in her letters to Wurm because she is demonstrating political, public 
authority. Luxemburg also uses maternal language to soften her dominant, potentially 
subversive self-representations; in evoking maternal femininity she is able to exert her 
agency too.
Luise Rinser goes to great lengths to persuade the reader of her diary that she does 
not subvert the norms of femininity, persistently writing of herself as non-criminal and 
non-sexual in comparison to those prisoners – and guards – around her. Her location 
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within the carceral space seems to bring about this need to highlight her supposedly 
feminine characteristics. Rinser may insist on an ideal femininity in her self-
representation, but it is one that lacks a vital characteristic of ‘good’ womanhood: 
warmth. Rinser counteracts this in her second foreword of 1973 by writing that her diary 
appeared cold and did not accurately represent her time in prison and, by extension, her 
‘real’ self, one whom, we are to assume, is actually warm and therefore womanly. 
Although Rinser does not create a domineering or subversive self-representation, there is 
still a sense of authority available in her diary-writing. The diary allows her to be a judge 
not only of others but also of herself: Rinser shows self-awareness and through this 
positions herself as an authoritative writer. In her prison diary, Lore Wolf is insistent 
upon the enriching effect that the experience of prison has had upon her. Wolf writes 
that she becomes a better person because of prison; she becomes a superwoman, and, in 
a similar way to Luxemburg, uses the maternal paradigm as a vehicle for safely 
transmitting her strength and her leadership. Wolf is more vocal about her (albeit 
fantastical) role as a leader of the people than Luxemburg, using diary-writing to create a 
more dominant role for herself than the one she actually had while in prison. 
Margret Bechler’s account has provided much scope to develop the issue of prison as 
feminising, and the ‘good’ woman and female prisoner as an amalgamation of 
transgressive, authoritative and conventional femininities. Bechler’s account illustrates 
that the female prisoner, even if she represents herself as a victim in order to avoid being 
perceived as deviant, needs to obtain a level of agency during and after imprisonment. 
Bechler does this by re-writing her femininity: she is a passive feminised victim at the 
start who gradually, through prison, becomes a strong, rebellious agent with a concern 
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for justice and humanity, as well as a protective mother figure. This is represented as the 
‘real’ Bechler, a self exposed by the ‘authentic’ experience of imprisonment. More than 
any other writer in this project, Bechler represents prison as a retreat, a privileged, 
domestic setting in which she is able to improve as a woman: she is still a maternal 
figure but one who has obtained great autonomy within the world of the prison. In 
publishing her diary she is able to obtain a level of authority in the outside world too, 
reclaiming her status as a mother and wife through her name, although her attempts at 
rejoining her children were not successful. 
For Elisabeth Graul, the experience of prison is represented as one which turns her
from a childlike character into a woman. Using a self-representation as a child allows 
Graul to mitigate any potentially deviant or transgressive sides of her life by assigning 
them to her past, childish self. The ‘real’ Graul is the older, wiser Graul, the one who is 
writing her autobiography. Graul shows the reader that this real self was created by and 
during prison. Graul’s representation of her femininity is also tightly bound with those 
ideas of the strong mother found in the previous texts of this thesis. Like Bechler in her 
self-representation as victim, Graul has little agency in her role as a child. The 
construction of a maternal, authoritative self is a means of obtaining not only a sense of 
the self as a ‘good’ woman but also as an agent, with a level of authority within a 
disempowering world. Graul also makes it clear that, although she may change during 
prison, her development is not a result of GDR indoctrination, rather she changes the 
GDR prison and wields authority over it. 
The prison writing investigated in this thesis represents resistance to the impositions 
of incarceration. In it, the author is able to write of herself as an agent, an authoritative 
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prisoner, not an object of the prison system, rather a subject in her own right. With the
exception of Rosa Luxemburg, all of the writers considered in this thesis wrote of their 
incarceration as a worthwhile, life-changing experience. Through writing, they control 
an idea of how their selves and lives have developed. They can reclaim the experience 
and the years spent isolated from the outside world. Through narrative, prison becomes 
more of an autonomous experience and less a place of disempowerment in which the 
subject is at the mercy of the authorities.
In his references to predominantly male prison writing (although he does mention 
some women such as Luxemburg and the Irish prison writer Constance Markievicz 
(1868-1927)), Ioan Davies may state that: ‘prison writing is centrally about violence,’2
but this is not applicable to the accounts I have examined. The authors studied in this 
thesis construct themselves using acceptable tropes of femininity in response to the 
criminal label that accompanies incarceration. The above texts are about the narrative act 
of coping with incarceration through the preservation of self and the creation of a sense 
of acceptable femininity and agency. The current framework for analysing men’s prison 
narratives cannot be applied to women’s narratives of incarceration because it does not 
give enough attention to issues of gender. Prison is a disempowering, indeed 
infantilising environment for men too, and their narratives also need to be examined 
with this in mind.3
                                                
2 Davies, p. 16.
3 For example a study of: Torsten Heyme and Felix Schumann, Ich kam mir vor wie'n Tier: Knast in der 
DDR, (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1991).
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The future of women’s prison writing in the German context
As mentioned in the introduction, twentieth-century narratives of incarceration from 
Germany have been dominated by accounts of the Holocaust, but there is further scope 
for examining narratives of the prison, rather than just the concentration camp. There 
exists a growing corpus of first person accounts written by women who define 
themselves as political prisoners, but are described within cultural discourse as 
dangerous criminals and terrorists. Some of the most infamous self-designated ‘political 
prisoners’ of twentieth-century Germany were members of West Germany’s left-wing 
extremist Red Army Faction (RAF), the majority of whom were female.4 An extensive 
examination of the author’s self-representations would enrich the field of women’s 
prison narratives in Germany.5 I have chosen not to use these accounts in my research, 
partly because the authors come from a different geographical and historical context and 
were figures of intense public scrutiny – especially Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin. 
But I am also aware that the authors were involved in violent activity such as kidnapping 
and murder. They may self-define as political prisoners but it can be quite easily 
contested that they are dangerous criminals. It is the moral task of the academic 
researcher to impose a distinction upon the different kinds of political prisoner found in 
                                                
4  Such as: Marianne Herzog, Nicht den Hunger verlieren (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1980); Inge Viett, 
Einsprüche!: Briefe aus dem Gefängnis (Hamburg: Nautilus, 1996), and Nie war ich furchtloser: 
Autobiographie (Hamburg: Nautilus, 1997); Margrit Schiller, Es war ein harter Kampf um meine 
Errinerung - Ein Lebensbericht aus der RAF (Munich: Piper, 2001); Oliver Tolmein and Irmgard Möller, 
"RAF, das war für uns Befreiung": ein Gespräch mit Irmgard Möller über bewaffneten Kampf, Knast und 
die Linke, (Hamburg: Konkret, 2002); Gudrun Ensslin, Christiane Ensslin, and Gottfried Ensslin, "Zieht 
den Trennungsstrich, jede Minute": Briefe an ihre Schwester Christiane und ihren Bruder Gottfried aus 
dem Gefängnis 1972-1973 (Hamburg: Konkret, 2005).
5 Apart from Sarah Colvin, “ ‘Chiffre und Symbol für Wut und Widerstand?' Gudrun Ensslin - Briefe aus 
der Haft, herausgegeben von Christiane Ensslin und Gottfried Ensslin” in Nachbilder der RAF, ed. Inge 
Stephan and Alexandra Tacke (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 88-105.
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cultural discourse. All of those texts written by prisoners who identify themselves as 
political prisoners should be analysed with regard for any violent, dangerous actions that 
may have led to their incarceration, in order to avoid conflating the illegal activity 
behind their incarceration with political activism. The label ‘political prisoner’ may be 
dependent on its designator and historically variant, but it is a powerful label to use, or, 
in Margret Bechler’s case, to invoke. 
Central to the texts discussed in this thesis are the authors’ attempts to gain a sense of 
agency and of self through the act of writing. Such accounts should not be dismissed 
because of the authors’ lack of literary status or the texts’ lack of conventional aesthetic 
sophistication or ‘literary truth’. The value of these accounts is that the authors (who, 
apart from Luxemburg and Rinser, are not well known) are able to speak publicly for 
themselves. Not only that, they are able to challenge dominant and oppressive narratives 
(created predominantly by the political systems which imprisoned them) and acquire a 
voice as autonomous, authoritative subjects. It is important that these writers have been 
given a public platform; but still there is a dearth of published accounts by women who 
do not identify as political prisoners.6 Twentieth-century Germany was characterised by 
momentous events and authoritarian political systems; there are bound to be many 
                                                
6 Although some anthologies are in existence, such as: Luise  Rinser, ed., Lasst mich Leben: Frauen im 
Knast (Dortmund: R. Padligur Verlag, 1987). This is a collection written by non-political female 
prisoners, but no whole texts written by such prisoners have been published, see: Uta Klein, "Texte 
inhaftierter Frauen," in Gefangenenliteratur: Sprechen, Schreiben, Lesen in deutschen Gefängnissen, ed. 
Uta Klein and Helmut H. Koch (Hagen: R. Padligur, 1988), p. 127. In the twentieth century, the only 
whole publication written by a ‘criminal’ woman in prison is that of Emmy Hennings written in 1918: 
Emmy Hennings, Gefängnis (Wetzlar: Büchse der Pandora, 1981), although there have been more prison 
accounts published by women in the twenty-first century, especially those documenting incarceration for 
drug smuggling.
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former political prisoners wishing to tell their story and they are representative of their 
political and historical time, which means their accounts are in demand. 
But gender, too, is a factor in the lack of published prison narratives written by non-
political female criminals. The male criminal has, historically, been a much more 
celebrated figure than the female criminal. There is more stigma attached to female 
criminality, whereas with men, criminal activity has, at times, been theorised as an 
extension of their ‘innately’ aggressive masculinity.7 The female political prisoner is 
less stigmatised because of the implication that she does not transgress her gender role to 
the same degree as the female criminal does. She represents the cultural ideal of middle-
class, well-educated femininity, unlike the female criminal, who carries with her 
connotations of deviant sexuality and poor background. 
The readership, too, is different. The female criminal’s account would most likely fall 
into the category of Frauenliteratur – a text written by women and for women.8 In this 
category it would be considered of special rather than general interest, unlike the female 
political prisoner’s account which, in relating back to significant political and historical 
events, is part of a more mainstream discourse. Women’s prison writing in the twentieth 
century has been dominated by the voices of political prisoners, the voices of the 
minority since, generally speaking, criminal prisoners far outnumber political prisoners. 
It is crucial that we hear the voices of this largely silent majority in order to fully 
examine the stigma attached to female criminality. 
                                                
7 See: H. Bruce Franklin, Prison Literature in America: The Victim as Criminal and Artist (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), especially Chapter Four for a discussion of the boastful element to men’s 
narratives of their criminal past. Also see my Introduction. 
8 For an interesting discussion of ‘Frauenliteratur’ see: Stephan, pp. 625-9. 
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